Following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, the return of combatants to civilian life and their full reintegration has become one of the key challenges of state policy. Ukraine already has over 2 million veterans, and once the active phase of the war ends their number will rise significantly. At the same time, the current system of support for veterans remains fragmented and is largely based on approaches formed back in the early 1990s.

The principal legislative act in the field of support for veterans and their families is the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection’, adopted in 1993. This Law does not establish a coherent system of state veterans policy; it regulates matters of status and sets out more than 20 benefits, only a few of which work in practice. The regulation of other aspects of veterans support is scattered across dozens of laws and items of subordinate legislation. This leads to the duplication of provisions, gaps in legal regulation and difficulties in accessing services and support.

A further problem is the absence of a legally regulated mechanism for the transition from military service to civilian life. As a result, veterans often face difficulties in accessing medical assistance, mental and psychological support, professional retraining, employment, the launch of their own business, the receipt of social services and participation in community life.

The situation is compounded by insufficient coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies, healthcare institutions, employment services and other actors that provide services to veterans.

The existing system does not take into account the importance of communities as the principal actor in delivering veterans’ reintegration measures. There is also uneven access to services depending on the community of residence, a shortage of trained specialists — particularly in psychological support, rehabilitation and social care — and the insufficient adaptation of many state services to the specific needs of veterans.

The need to create a comprehensive state veterans policy and a system for the transition from military service to civilian life is reflected in the Veterans Policy Strategy until 2030.

The need to develop a comprehensive state veterans policy corresponds to Ukraine’s commitments in the spheres of social policy, employment and inclusion within the process of accession to the European Union.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 Report points to the need to promote the integration of veterans into the labour market and to safeguard the rights of persons with disabilities, whose number is growing as a result of the war.

The need to develop a comprehensive system of support for veterans and their reintegration is also noted in the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) briefing ‘Ukraine’s Veterans Policy’ (2026), which regards veterans as one of the key resources for the country’s post-war recovery.

In June 2026, the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was expanded, addingCouncil of the European Union. ‘EUAM Ukraine: Council broadens the Mission’s mandate to counter hybrid threats and support veteran reintegration’. Press release, 11 May 2026. EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). ‘EUAM Ukraine Starts Operating under Expanded Mandate’. News release, 15 May 2026. new priorities to its work that include support for the rehabilitation and reintegration of veterans.

At the same time, the Ukraine Facility Plan expressly provides for a reform of the transition from military service to civilian life, encompassing rehabilitation, psychological support, professional retraining, employment and support for veteran entrepreneurship, with a completion deadline in the third quarter of 2026.

• a fragmented and outdated model of veterans support oriented towards a system of benefits and payments;
• limited access to medical and rehabilitation care and to mental health support and psychosocial support;
• reduced employment and economic self-sufficiency owing to the underdevelopment of employment and entrepreneurship-support mechanisms;
• heightened risks of social exclusion, deterioration of psycho-emotional wellbeing and the loss of human capital;
• ineffective use of veterans’ potential for economic recovery, community development and strengthening societal resilience;
• the persistence of fragmented regulation and insufficient coordination among authorities, local self-government and service providers;
• a mismatch with contemporary international approaches to veterans policy and the reintegration of veterans.

In March 2025, Law of Ukraine No. 4285-IX was adopted, setting out priorities for creating a system of support for war veterans, members of their families and the families of fallen Defenders of Ukraine, in particular through the streamlining of veterans policy.

These priorities are to be implemented in a corresponding legislative act. Several draft acts have been developed so far: the draft Law of Ukraine ‘On the Fundamental Principles of State Veterans Policy regarding Veterans Who Took Part in Repelling the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ (registration No. 13696, dated 25 August 2025). The draft was prepared to implement step 7.4 of the Ukraine Facility Plan.

In parallel, the Government has drafted the Code of Ukraine on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (the Veterans’ Code) (registration No. 14265, dated 28 November 2025), which aims to codify legislative acts into a single legal instrument.

The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights has prepared its own (alternative) version of the draft Code on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (registration No. 14265-1, dated 17 December 2025).

All of the above draft legislative acts enshrine veterans’ rights in the areas of:

• rehabilitation and medical care, including psychological assistance;
• training, retraining and professional development programmes;
• the conditions necessary for the employment of veterans as a distinct category;
• measures to support veteran businesses.

Persistence of a Fragmented Veterans Policy System

Legislation in the veterans sphere remains scattered across a large number of laws and items of subordinate legislation. In the absence of a comprehensive legislative act, individual aspects of support for veterans and their families continue to be governed by different instruments.

This creates risks of:

• duplication of the functions and powers of public authorities;
• inconsistency among state veterans-support programmes;
• difficulty for veterans in accessing services and support programmes;
• the uneven application of state policy at community level.

Absence of a Coherent System for Transition from Military Service to Civilian Life

Despite the development of individual veterans-support programmes, Ukraine still lacks a legally defined, coherent system for the transition from military service to civilian life that would ensure continuous support for a service member both before and after their discharge.

This increases the risk that:

• veterans will not receive timely information about available services and support;
• veterans’ needs in the spheres of rehabilitation, mental health, education and employment will go unidentified;
• state and local support programmes will operate in isolation from one another;
• the reintegration of veterans will depend largely on their place of residence and the capacity of the particular community.

Loss of Human Capital and of Potential for the Country’s Recovery

Veterans are one of the key groups on which Ukraine’s post-war recovery will largely depend. The absence of an effective system of support and reintegration may limit veterans’ opportunities for employment, education, entrepreneurial activity and participation in community life.

This creates risks of:

• a decline in veterans’ economic activity;
• increased social isolation;
• growing demand for social support in the future and an excessive burden on the social assistance system;
• the underuse of veterans’ potential for community development and the country’s recovery.

Risk of Failing to Meet Commitments under the Ukraine Facility

The entry into force of a legislative act on state veterans policy is defined as one of the steps of the Ukraine Facility Plan. The purpose of this step is to build a comprehensive system of support for veterans, particularly in the spheres of rehabilitation, medical and psychological assistance, professional adaptation, employment and veteran entrepreneurship.

A delay in adopting or implementing the relevant legislation may:

• complicate the fulfilment of the indicators of the Ukraine Facility Plan;
• negatively affect the assessment of reform progress by European partners.

Short-Term (Urgent Legislative Actions)

• Adopt a legislative act on state veterans policy.

A single legislative act should enshrine the foundations of state veterans policy and create the legal basis for forming a system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

In doing so, it is advisable to:

• define the principles and objectives of state veterans policy;
• establish a system for the transition from military service to civilian life;
• define the powers of state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons involved in ensuring the transition;
• provide for mechanisms to identify the individual needs of veterans and members of their families and to introduce case management approaches;
• ensure inter-agency coordination in the field of veterans support.

Medium-Term

• Establish a fully fledged system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

The introduction of such a system should go beyond individual support programmes and provide for the continuous support of a service member from the moment preparation for discharge begins until the reintegration process is complete, engaging numerous stakeholders and ensuring coordination among them.

In particular:

1. introduce a mechanism for assessing a service member’s needs prior to discharge;
2. define the procedure for inter-agency cooperation between the security and defence sector and civilian authorities;
3. ensure continuity of access to medical, rehabilitation, social, educational and other services;
4. create mechanisms for informing veterans about available support programmes;
5. establish a system of coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons that provide support to veterans and their families.

• Strengthen the role of territorial communities in implementing veterans policy.

The reintegration of veterans takes place primarily at community level, so state policy should provide appropriate tools to support the local level.

To this end, it is advisable to:

1. define minimum standards for supporting veterans in communities;
2. ensure the development of a system of veteran-support specialists;
3. create mechanisms for coordination among communities, veteran spaces and service providers;
4. help strengthen communities’ capacity to provide services to veterans and members of their families.

• Ensure the transition from a benefits model to a model of restoring human capital.

The further development of veterans policy should be aimed not only at social protection but also at creating conditions for veterans’ active participation in the life of the state and communities.

In particular, it is necessary to:

• expand opportunities for vocational education and requalification;
• improve veteran employment-support programmes;
• develop tools to support veteran entrepreneurship;
• ensure the necessary level of health recovery;
• integrate mental health issues into all stages of reintegration;
• introduce mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of state veterans policy on the basis of veterans’ outcomes and needs.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Involving international (foreign) experts in selection commissions within judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) is an important element of advancing Ukraine’s European integration interests. It helps to bring national legislation closer to European standards and increases the confidence of European institutions and partners in the reforms. Such involvement stems from Ukraine’s international commitments, as well as from the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The Ukraine Facility Plan provides that ‘further improvement of the selection of new Supreme Court (SC) judges is important, through enhancing the integrity vetting procedure and the meaningful involvement of independent experts’. It also states that the ‘High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is steadily improving its overall operational effectiveness; however, additional judges are needed, selected transparently and on the basis of integrity vetting, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE)’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets out a commitment to fill all 25 vacant positions at the HACC, specifically with the involvement of the PCIE, by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

The European Commission has noted the need to continue involving international experts in the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The Commission has also recommended improving the selection of SC judges and the verification of the integrity declarations of SC judges and judges of other higher courts, with the temporary but meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.

The problem is that, in fulfilling these international commitments, selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts apply different approaches to adopting and publishing their decisions. 

This concerns the selection of candidates for the positions of members of:

• the HQCJ;
• the High Council of Justice (HCJ);
• the head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors;
• judges of the CCU;
• judges of the HACC;
• judges of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC);
• judges of the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).

The differing approaches relate both to the structure and reasoning of selection commissions’ decisions and to the issuing of so-called ‘negative conclusions’ (that is, decisions concerning candidates who have ceased to take part in the competition). For example, the Selection Commission for the positions of HQCJ members (the HQCJ Selection Commission) issues no such conclusions at all; instead, it produces only a final list of candidates recommended for the post of HQCJ member. By contrast, the Ethics Council (which assists in establishing whether a candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity) actively uses ‘negative conclusions’.

Another problem is the adoption of unreasoned decisions. Proper reasoning of decisions following the assessment of candidates against the established criteria should give a clear understanding of what guided the selection commissions when assessing those candidates: what was taken into account and what was not, and the grounds for a particular decision. Proper reasoning would not only resolve many questions for candidates (in particular those who did not pass the competition), but would also help to increase confidence in selection commissions’ decisions. While some selection commissions’ decisions are fairly well structured and properly reasoned (for example, those of the HQCJ and the PCIE), others contain only general wording and boilerplate phrasing and lack proper justification. Such problems are present, for instance, in the Ethics Council’s decisions on candidates’ compliance with the criteriaAt the same time, the Ethics Council’s decisions finding candidates non-compliant with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity are, by contrast, well reasoned. of professional ethics and integrity.

The application of inconsistent practice in formulating decisions may create risks for understanding selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates, and does nothing to promote the transparency of their work.

Different selection commissions use different decision-making models. The votes of international (foreign) experts are always decisive; however, the specific models differ. For instance, a joint decision of the HQCJ and the PCIE in selecting HACC judges requires a majority of the total number of participants in the joint sitting, but no fewer than three votes of PCIE members. For commissions such as the Ethics Council or the SDI Selection Commission, four votes are required, two of which belong to international (foreign) experts. This makes the system of selection commissions confusing and difficult to understand, reducing its transparency and coherence.

A separate issue requiring attention is the right to a casting vote, where approaches likewise differ. For example, international experts hold the right to a casting vote (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the Selection Commission for the positions of the head of the SDI, their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors (the SDI Selection Commission), the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), and the Expert Council); the PCIE has the right to veto any candidate for the post of HACC judge on the grounds of non-compliance with the established criteria.

Numerous cases have also been recorded in which the same person may apply for different competitions for posts, both within a single body and across different bodies under different quotas allocated by different appointing/electing entities. As a result, the absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.

Certain differences are also observed in the publication of selection commissions’ decisions. For example, the Ethics Council adopts and publishes a reasoned conclusion on whether each candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity; the SDI Selection Commission publishes reasoned decisions concerning candidates whose participation was terminated owing to a reasonable doubt as to their compliance with the integrity criterion or the ethical standards established for a judge, but only at the candidate’s written request; for candidates assessed as ‘non-compliant’ against the criteria of high moral qualities or a recognised level of competence in the field of law, the AGE publishes only the operative part of the decision, without setting out the reasons underlying it. The full, reasoned text of the decision is published by the AGE at the written request of such a candidate.

The decisions of some selection commissions (all except the AGE) cannot be challenged in court because they are not regarded as ‘final’. The SC has developed a systematic position on selection commissions, according to which they do not adopt final decisions but merely assist the appointing/electing entity by carrying out a discrete stage of the competitive procedure. Judicial review is instead possible only in respect of the final decision of the appointing/electing entity.

The question of defining the ‘finality of decisions’ is particularly contentious for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For them, such decisions are in essence final (leaving the appointing/electing entity no choice), and the impossibility of challenging them deprives the person of the right to judicial protection. Legislation provides only for the possibility of challenging AGE decisions — specifying which of its decisions may be challenged in court and on which exceptional grounds — whereas no such legislative provision exists for the decisions of other selection commissions.

A further obstacle to the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions in administrative courts is their lack of public-authority powers. The SC’s case law has established an approach according to which selection commissions are not entities vested with public-authority powers in disputed legal relations. Accordingly, in some cases the SC’s case law indicates that disputes against selection commissions are not subject to consideration under the rules of administrative justice (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the SDI Selection Commission). Selection commissions are neither bodies of authority nor entities vested with public-authority powers; they do not have the status of legal entities. Representing such commissions, even in administrative proceedings, is hampered by the absence of rules for designating a representative to sign procedural documents on behalf of selection commissions (their heads do not hold such powers) and to take part in court hearings.

The exception is the AGE, which the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court recognisesRuling of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 20 February 2025 (case No. 990/407/24, proceedings No. П/990/407/24). as a body ‘vested by the state with authoritative and managerial functions in the legal relations arising in the process of forming the judicial corps of the CCU’.

Where such practice is absent:

• the risk of breeding distrust in the functioning of selection commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole increases;
• risks arise in the understanding — by candidates, outside observers, and the public — of these selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates.

At present, there are no draft laws addressing the problem described.

1. Applying different approaches to voting and decision-making by selection commissions — in particular regarding the structure and reasoning of decisions and the approach to determining voting results and so-called negative conclusions — breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
2. The absence of public voting results and insufficient reasoning and justification of such decisions breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
3. The absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.
4. The absence of unified approaches to determining the finality of decisions for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For such candidates these decisions are in fact final — and the impossibility of challenging them, at the level of both regulatory acts and SC case law, deprives them of the right to judicial protection.

The adoption and publication of decisions by selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts in judicial authorities and the CCU require further regulation.

1. Avoid a formalistic approach to justifying decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria.
2. Develop a uniform approach to the structure, justification, and adoption of decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria within a single commission.
3. Develop and approve a template/model decision for the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria, together with accompanying guidance enshrining the requirement that such decisions be properly reasoned.
4. Provide that negative decisions of selection commissions be published in anonymised form, and positive decisions be published with the personal data that were public during the candidate’s public interview. If a person who received a positive decision was not appointed to the post, they may apply to the selection commission to have their data anonymised.
5. Develop and introduce a single database of candidate profiles, with a uniform CV format, for those taking part in competitions for posts in judicial authorities and the CCU. Grant access to these profiles to members of the relevant selection commissions and of the relevant bodies to which candidates are appointed/elected.
6. In future, review the approach to granting international (foreign) experts a casting vote.
7. Hold a broad discussion on the question of defining the final nature of decisions adopted by selection commissions.
8. Enshrine in legislation clear grounds for the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions solely on the basis of procedural non-compliance, in particular for candidates for whom such commissions’ decisions on non-compliance with the established criteria effectively mean the termination of their participation in the competition and are therefore final. The legislation should provide for the period over which a selection commission assesses a candidate’s compliance with the integrity criterion.
9. Enshrine in legislation rules governing which selection commissions’ decisions may be challenged and on what grounds, which may not be challenged, and the rules for representing selection commissions in court.
10. Continue consolidating the SC’s case law and developing standard approaches to resolving disputed situations on the issues identified.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

European integration assessmentThis refers to (1) the assessment of a draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s international commitments in the field of European integration and (2) the verification of a draft law’s compliance with EU law (the EU acquis). is designed to verify whether a draft law complies with European Union law (the EU acquis). Such an assessment makes it possible to evaluate how far the proposed regulation aligns with the relevant act of EU law and to identify, in good time, provisions that may conflict with EU law and slow down the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation.

The obligation to carry out European integration assessment of draft laws is set out in several legal acts of differing legal force, each governing different stages of the legislative process. This approach does not foster a single, unified mechanism for conducting European integration assessment, since its individual elements are regulated in different ways.

Parliamentary assessment is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (hereinafter, the Committee on European Integration). Current legislation does not oblige other committees to respond to the observations and proposals set out in the Committee’s opinions. The absence of any statutory definition of a ‘European integration draft law’, or of the criteria for one, limits the scope for the relevant committee to carry out European integration assessment.

The requirement to assess draft laws for compliance with international commitments on European integration and with EU law is established by several legal acts.

Law of Ukraine No. 1629-IV ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004, remains in force. Law No. 1629-IV provides for the mandatory assessment of all draft laws by the parliamentary committee on European integration. The committee is required to determine whether a draft law falls within an area, the legal relations of which are governed by EU law. Draft laws falling within such areas are referred to the authorised central executive authority for the preparation of an expert opinion on their compliance with the EU acquis.

This Law, however, has not been amended following the enshrinement of the European integration course in the Constitution of Ukraine or the granting to Ukraine of EU candidate status. In practice, although the Law remains formally in force, it is not applied.

Instead, the assessment of European integration laws is governed by several other acts. A draft law initiated by the Government undergoes assessment before it is even registered in Parliament. The Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers require every draft law to undergo a mandatory assessment of its compliance with Ukraine’s European integration commitments and with EU law.

Assessment of European integration laws is provided throughout a draft law’s passage through the Verkhovna Rada: from registration to consideration in the second and subsequent readings.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that, after registration, every draft law must be referred to the Committee on European Integration, which assesses the draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s commitments in the field of European integration and issues an expert opinion. The Committee is required to deliver this opinion within 21 days. In practice, given the volume of draft laws registered in Parliament, meeting this requirement of the Rules of Procedure is unrealistic. Since the start of the ninth convocation, more than 9,000 draft laws have been registeredAs at 01.06.2026, 9,145 draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. in the Verkhovna Rada.

In July 2022, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which provided for additional assessment of European integration draft laws. When preparing such draft laws for the second and subsequent readings, parliamentary committees are required to refer them to the Committee on European Integration and to the Government for additional assessment.

As a result, the mechanism for European integration assessment of draft laws is established by acts of differing legal force, which undermines the development of a consistent practice in assessing European integration draft laws. Moreover, neither the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada nor Resolution No. 2483-IX places main committees any obligation to respond to the observations expressed in the expert opinions of the Committee on European Integration.

At the same time, legislation contains no definition of what constitutes a European integration draft law, which somewhat diminishes the role of such assessment. A draft law may be designated as a European integration draft law at different stages of its passage through the Verkhovna Rada (at registration or after its adoption in the first reading), creating a risk that the relevant committee or the Government may become involved and deliver its opinionFor example, the Committee revised its opinion on Draft Law No. 13071 — determining that the draft law was aimed at implementing a measure under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions — only after the draft law had been adopted in the first reading and after the comparative table for the second reading had been submitted. The Committee on European Integration had not provided an opinion before the first reading. Draft law card, registration No. 13071 of 11.03.2025. only at a late stage. Where a draft law is revised after it has been designated as a European integration draft law, bringing it into line with EU law may require additional time.

For a long time, draft laws were designated as ‘European integration’ by the Committee on European Integration, acting at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative. In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to Membership of the European Union’, which provides that the special ‘European integration’ marker is assigned by the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Law of the European Union. Other draft laws may acquire ‘European integration’ status on the basis of an opinion of the Committee on European Integration.

Whether or not a draft law has been designated as a European integration draft law determines the extent of the Committee on European Integration’s involvement. If a draft law prepared for the second reading is, in substance, contrary to EU law but has not been designated as a European integration draft law, the Committee on European Integration has no right to deliver its opinion.

To strengthen the role of European integration assessment in the consideration and adoption of draft laws in the Verkhovna Rada, the following steps are needed:

• Unify the European integration assessment process across all stages of a draft law’s consideration in Parliament, preferably by introducing a dedicated procedure for the adoption of European integration draft laws.
• Define the concept of, and the requirements for, a ‘European integration draft law’. This would help to resolve the uncertainty surrounding which draft laws are subject to European integration assessment.
• Expand the powers of the Committee on European Integration to conduct assessment at all stages of the legislative process. Assessing every draft law prepared for the second and subsequent readings would be impractical given the Committee’s heavy workload. Instead, the Committee could be granted the right to conduct European integration assessment of draft laws (that have not been designated as European integration draft laws) on its own initiative or at the request of the main committee. Other committees should develop a mechanism for responding to the opinions of the Committee on European Integration — for example, by considering such opinions at committee meetings.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Following the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada were extended, defining the principles for implementing the state’s course towards acquiring full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO. At the same time, no amendments have been made to the sectoral lawsThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of the People’s Deputy of Ukraine’, and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Temporary Investigative Commissions and Temporary Special Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’. that would clarify the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the sphere of European integration.

The role and powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the European integration process are regulated only in a fragmentary manner, which prevents the formation of a coherent system of institutional arrangements for EU accession.

As the sole body of legislative power, Parliament adopts laws, including European integration laws. However, the pace at which such laws are adopted is slow: over the course of 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted only eightAs of 17.06.2026. European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate, expedited procedure for adopting European integration laws.

Within its oversight function, the Verkhovna Rada applies certain mechanisms to scrutinise the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the sphere of European integration: holding a ‘Government Question Time’For example, on 01.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the current state of the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, the opening of negotiation clusters, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of European integration, and the implementation of the list of priority draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 01.05.2026. On 29.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the implementation of state policy in the sphere of Ukraine’s foreign-policy activity under martial law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 29.05.2026. or hearing representatives of the GovernmentOn 29 April 2026, a meeting of the Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy was held. Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. At the meeting on 06.05.2026, the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy heard information at its meeting on the principal commitments within the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the EU relating to finance, taxation and customs policy. Materials of the Committee meeting of 6 May 2026. Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. in committees.

At the same time, there is no coherent legislative mechanism governing how interaction should take place between the Government that currently acts as the principal driving force in the sphere of European integration and Parliament. Certain institutional mechanisms for coordination and procedures for adapting legislation are set out in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004. The Law defined the role of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, of the authorised body in the sphere of adaptation, and of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the State Programme. For example, under this Law, the Coordination Council is to prepare an action plan for implementing the State Programme, the relevant parliamentary committee is to approve it, and the Cabinet of Ministers is to endorse it. However, this Law has not undergone any amendments — neither after the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution, nor after the Association Agreement entered into force, nor after the start of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX on parliamentary support for the negotiation process. By this Resolution, the Verkhovna Rada took note of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘On Approval of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)’ of 01.04.2026 No. 438. It should be noted that measure 2 of strategic outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Public Administration Reform Roadmap provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to adopt a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme., approved by the Government. The Government has an obligation to agree any changes to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law with the Chair of the Verkhovna RadaOr, in the Chair’s absence, with the First Deputy Chair or a Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada..

The Resolution relates rather to the oversight powers of the Verkhovna Rada and provides that the Government must report on progress in the sphere of European integration: (1) inform the Verkhovna Rada, the main committee and the Committee on European integration of the results of consultations with the European Union concerning the content of draft laws being prepared by the Government and of draft laws already registered in Parliament; (2) submit a quarterly report on the state of implementation of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis); (3) submit a quarterly report on the current state of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU; and (4) promptly inform the Verkhovna Rada of decisions taken in respect of Ukraine by EU bodies and of the individual positions of member states, and so on. At the same time, this approach to providing information can hardly be described as inclusive or transparent: Resolution No. 4912-IX does not provide for the consideration of the reports submitted by the Government (whether by the relevant committee or at a plenary sitting of Parliament).

Resolution No. 4912-IX also placesThe National Adaptation Programme also comprises the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, and the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine. the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada under an obligation to ensure coordination of the Verkhovna Rada and its Secretariat with regard to (1) implementing the measures of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (in respect of Section III, ‘The Functioning of Parliaments in a Democratic System’); and (2) the procedure for working with the National Adaptation Programme.

Within the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union is in operation. It is this Committee that carries out the parliamentary assessment of draft laws for compliance with Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the sphere of European integration and with the EU acquis. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that this Committee prepares an opinion on every draft law registered in Parliament.

In addition, pursuant to Resolution No. 2483-IX, the Committee on European Integration also assesses European integration draft laws ahead of the second and subsequent readings, which increases the workload on the Committee. The Chair of the Committee has repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the Committee’s staffing capacity. The Committee’s powers also include granting a draft law ‘European integration’ status, at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative.

Within its oversight powers, the Committee holds monitoring meetings. For example, in April 2026, the Committee held a meeting, where the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law was presented.

At the same time, the Committee has not been designatedThis is due to the distribution of areas of competence among the committees of the Verkhovna Rada. For example, a draft law concerning the protection of natural resources is considered by the Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management; one concerning the activities of political parties, by the Committee on Legal Policy; one concerning customs policy, by the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy, and so on — even though such draft laws may be European integration ones. as the main committee for the preparation of any European integration draft law, which means that the weight of its assessment in the legislative process depends largely on the position of the main committee and its willingness to respond to the comments of the relevant committee. The draft laws that the Committee on European Integration considers as the main committee mostly concern the ratification of Ukraine’s international treaties with the EU and its member states.

In July 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX, which provided for the establishment of European integration subcommittees in all parliamentary committeesNamely, subcommittees on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of EU law (EU acquis) and on the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international legal commitments in the sphere of European integration. (other than the Committee on European Integration).

Committees took two approaches: most established new subcommittees, while a smaller number assigned the new areas of competence to existing subcommittees. As of 2026, such subcommittees have been created within all committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; however, Members of Parliament rate their effectiveness as low.

Members of such a subcommittee take part in the meetings of the relevant Committee on European Integration and also hold meetings with the Government on European integration progress. At the same time, these subcommittees have not been given any new instruments for their work or for their participation in the European integration process. At the subcommittee level, there are no agreed approaches to assessing draft laws for compliance with the EU acquis, nor appropriate mechanisms for coordination between subcommittees or between a subcommittee and the Government, which results in varying levels of involvement. A subcommittee’s participation in preparing European integration laws often depends on the individual chairing it and on his/hers expertise and activity.

The institutional mechanism associated with the formation and implementation of state policy in the sphere of European integration has not undergone substantial change, despite progress in the negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This creates a gap in the inter-institutional coordination of Parliament and the Government and a mismatch between the political commitments undertaken and the actual capacity to fulfil them. A modern framework law on the principles of state policy in the sphere of European integration could help bridge this gap and ensure the implementation of the declared course towards EU membership.

The mechanism for informing the Verkhovna Rada introduced by Resolution No. 4912-IX should be supplemented with procedures for the mandatory consideration of the Government’s reports on the state of implementation of the National Adaptation Programme and of information on the European integration process. Such reports and information could be considered at meetings of the Committee on European integration, with the involvement of representatives of other committees, or at plenary sittings. These measures should ensure proper feedback and the broader involvement of Members of Parliament, as well as transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making in the sphere of European integration.

The Committee on European Integration should be more closely involved in the process of adopting European integration laws in the Verkhovna Rada. Other parliamentary committees should develop a mechanism to interact with the Committee on European Integration so that its assessment is taken into account when preparing draft laws for consideration at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Verkhovna Rada should also define standards for the operation of the European integration subcommittees and establish their systematic cooperation with the Committee on European Integration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 1 April 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union LawIt is worth noting that Measure 2 of Strategic Outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme. (EU acquis) (hereinafter – the National Adaptation Programme). The document comprises 1,875 tasks, providing for the implementation of more than 1,600 EU legal acts. Ukraine has set the ambitious goal of fully completing legislative adaptation by 2027, taking into account possible transitional periods. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Adaptation Programme.

At the same time, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate procedure for processing and adopting draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law (the EU acquis). Moreover, neither the concept of a European integration draft law nor exhaustive criteria for defining one have been established in legislation.

In the absence of a dedicated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws, their priority consideration is not guaranteed, which may delay the adoption of laws needed to fulfil Ukraine’s European integration commitments. The lack of a legally defined status for European integration draft laws, and of requirements applying to them, complicates the systematic review of draft laws for compliance with EU law.

Developing, adopting and implementing legislation on a dedicated procedure for preparing, initiating, considering and adopting European integration draft laws is one of the Verkhovna Rada’s commitments under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The deadline for this measure was set for the fourth quarter of 2025, yet a separate procedure for adopting European integration laws has still not been established.

MPs have registered several legislative initiatives to address this problem, but none has been considered at a plenary sitting of Parliament. The regulation of procedures for considering European integration draft laws currently remains fragmentary.

For a long time, the key piece of specialised legislation was the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’. This law sets out no separate requirements for adopting European integration laws, but it does provide for the examination of draft laws submitted to Parliament for compliance with the EU acquis at every stage of consideration. However, the law has not been amended in connection with Ukraine’s EU accession process: although it remains formally in force, it is effectively inoperative.

After Ukraine obtained candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which introduced some additional tools for adopting European integration laws.

The Resolution designates the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as the principal initiator of European integration draft laws, although in practice most draft laws aimed at European integration — and marked as such on the draft law’s registration card — have been registered by MPsAs of 01.06.2026, 268 draft laws defined as European integration draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. Of these, 153 were registered by MPs, 104 by the Government and 11 by the President.. Draft laws initiated by MPs account for more than half of all European integration laws adopted.

The adopted National Adaptation Programme designates ministries and central executive authorities as responsible for drafting laws. They submit draft laws to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no later than six months before the date set by the National Adaptation Programme for their adoption by Parliament. In other words, the Government allows a minimum of six months for completing all internal procedures within the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (inter-ministerial approval of the draft law, the conduct of examinations, and so on) and for the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the draft law — which, given the slowdown in Parliament’s work, may be insufficient.

The National Adaptation Programme also provides that, when drafting laws, ministries and central executive authorities must ensure cooperation with parliamentary committees and MPs, in particular by presenting and discussing the concepts of such draft laws at meetings of the relevant committees.

A separate instrument intended to give weight to European integration draft laws is the Legislative Work Plan of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is meant to ensure coordination between Parliament and the Government. For example, the Legislative Work Plan for 2026 contains a separate section listing the European integration draft laws that need to be adoptedIt contains 160 draft laws (41% of the total number of draft laws in the Legislative Work Plan for 2026).. Under this Plan, parliamentary committees were expected to ensure the priority consideration of European integration draft laws. However, the Legislative Work Plan is not a particularly effective planning instrument (for example, Parliament fully implemented only 12% of the 2024 Plan): neither the Government nor Parliament takes it into account in its work.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do not establish separate procedures for adopting European integration draft laws, MPs consider them under the ordinary procedure. The Rules of Procedure allow the use of accelerated proceduresFor example, shortening the deadline for submitting alternative draft laws, or shortening the deadline for submitting amendments and proposals for the second reading. that speed up the consideration of laws. During the 15th sessionThe 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 9th convocation began on 03.02.2026., such procedures were not applied to European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure also allow laws to be adopted as a whole at first reading. During the 15th session, the Verkhovna Rada adopted eight European integration laws, seven of which went throughOne law concerned Ukraine’s accession to the Convention on International Access to Justice. The Verkhovna Rada adopts decisions on the ratification or denunciation of international treaties at first reading, both as a basis and as a whole. the full two-reading procedure.

While the European integration procedure is still not enshrined in the legislation, the Verkhovna Rada is attempting to introduce fragmented innovations through its resolutions.

Resolution No. 2483-IX (adopted in 2022) introduces innovations such as an additional examination of a European integration draft law before the second and subsequent readings, and provides that committees must take into account tables of the draft law’s compliance with EU law as well as the official translation of EU legislation.

Resolution No. 2483-IX also gives preference to considering European integration draft laws under the two-reading procedure. A European integration draft law may be adopted only where there is a positive opinion from the examination conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Given the provisions on additional discussionResolution No. 2483-IX provides for the floor to be given to a representative of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and, at the chair’s discretion, to a representative of the main committee responsible for adapting Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of European Union law (the EU acquis) and for fulfilling Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration., Resolution No. 2483-IX is aimed more at the thorough preparation and consideration of a draft law than at an accelerated procedure for its adoption.

In June 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted another resolution, No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union’^[20]. This Resolution additionally requires the Cabinet of Ministers to inform Verkhovna Rada committees of the outcomes of consultations with the European Union on the content of draft laws being prepared for registration in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as of legislative initiatives already registered.

Resolution No. 4912-IX also provides that draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Adaptation Programme are granted ‘European integration’ status. In addition, other draft laws (including alternative onesThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that draft laws are considered alternative where they contain provisions regulating the same range of issues and, in essence, replicate provisions governing the same social relations.) relating to Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments may be granted such status by decision of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union.

Several draft laws proposing to regulate the process of adopting European integration laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

In November 2022, the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada registered Draft Law No. 8242, which provides for a special procedure for considering European integration draft laws. Under this draft law, European integration draft laws are placed on the agenda without an additional vote and are subject to higher requirements for their supporting documents (such as the inclusion of a translation of the relevant EU legislation and a clause-by-clause compliance table). Draft Law No. 8242 gives priority to applying the two-reading procedure when considering European integration draft laws, and allows the text of draft laws to be revised between readings to reflect the comments set out in the opinions of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union, the Government, and the expert and legal units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat. The main committeeThe main committee responsible for the preparation and preliminary consideration of Draft Law No. 8242 is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. issued an opinion recommending that the Verkhovna Rada adopt this draft law as a basis, but it was not considered at a plenary sitting.

In August and September 2025, MPs registered Draft Law No. 13653 and an alternative to it, Draft Law No. 13653-1. Both draft laws propose amending not only the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but also the Laws of Ukraine ‘On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’ and ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.

There are conceptual differences between the two draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 envisages a leading role for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which approves the National Adaptation Programme and acts as the principal initiator of adaptation draft laws, as well as an accelerated procedure for adopting draft laws. The alternative, Draft Law No. 13653-1, by contrast, strengthens the role of the parliamentary Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union in determining the status of such initiatives and allows for broader participation by MPs.

At the same time, both draft laws shorten the deadlines for submitting alternative draft laws as well as the deadlines for committees to provide their opinions. Both also propose introducing two routes for considering draft laws aimed at European integration: (1) an accelerated route (at first reading), where there are no comments from the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; and (2) the two-reading procedure. Where a draft law is considered under the two-reading procedure, MPs may table amendments and proposals for the second reading only with a justification of how they relate to European integration commitments. The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine prepare an expert opinion on a draft law that has been prepared for the second or repeat second reading.

Both draft laws also include a provision repealing the 2004 Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’.

At the same time, these draft laws do not strike a balance between the speed and the quality of considering European integration draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 provides that, at one stage of consideration, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union must deliver its expert opinion within three days. This period may prove insufficient for providing an expert opinion, particularly for large draft laws and given the committee’s overall workload. Another shortcoming of the draft is the requirement to ‘add’ supporting documents to a draft law if it is recognised as a European integration draft law after registration. In that case, the speed of considering and adopting the draft law will depend on the legislative initiator’s capacity to carry out a swift assessment of compliance with EU law and to prepare a clause-by-clause compliance table.

These draft laws have still not been considered by the main committeeThe committee designated for the preparation and preliminary consideration is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. and therefore cannot be brought to a plenary sitting.

1. The Verkhovna Rada should develop a new draft law, or refine the existing ones, on introducing a separate accelerated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws. It should establish exhaustive criteria for defining draft laws as European integration draft laws, as well as requirements for the supporting documents accompanying such draft laws.
2. For a separate European integration procedure, the abuse of accelerated procedures for considering draft laws must not be permitted. Minimum periods should be set to allow sufficient time for MPs to review draft laws and for the committees and the structural units to provide examination opinions. These periods should take into account the real capacity of the committees and the structural units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat to process the text of a draft law.
3. At the same time, the mere existence of such a procedure does not guarantee the swift processing and consideration of European integration draft laws. A significant proportion of European integration initiatives are still pending under review of the main committees, despite the current provision on their priority processing.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

In Ukraine, the interaction between citizens and public institutions is governed simultaneously by the current Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ (No. 393/96-VR of 2 October 1996) and by the recently adopted Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’ (No. 2073-IX of 15 December 2023). However, these two acts rest on different governance logics. The Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ introduces a more modern model of public administration, aligned with European standards and oriented towards taking an individual decision on the merits of a case. The Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’, by contrast, retains a more traditional, post-communist approach centred on the obligation to provide a reply within a set deadline. As a result, situations that are identical in substance — complaints, requests, reports of violations, or requests to resolve an individual matter — may fall under two different procedures (stipulated by two different laws). This is inconvenient for the individual, as it obscures which mechanism should actually be used to resolve a problem. At the administrative level, this duality effectively leaves the choice of procedure to the authorities’ discretion, encourages formal responses rather than genuine resolution, and reduces both the predictability and the effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights.

The specific problem has been described in:

1. the European Commission’s enlargement reports on Ukraine for 2024 and 2025: the sections devoted to public administration reform (2025) state explicitly that Ukraine has still not met the requirement to adopt a Law ‘On Appeals’ that would clearly distinguish administrative procedures from other forms of public petition;
2. the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, which requires the current Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ to be aligned with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and with European legislation, and a new law to be adopted by the end of the fourth quarter of 2025.

The continued parallel existence of two different approaches to handling appeals (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’) creates a number of systemic risks for both the state and citizens, namely:

• it reduces the predictability of interaction with the state: citizens find it difficult to understand the rules under which an authority will consider a particular appeal and whether this will lead to a genuine resolution or merely to a formal reply;
• this uncertainty reinforces a formalistic style of response: rather than resolving the underlying problem, authorities often confine themselves to issuing a reply within the prescribed deadline, which diminishes the practical effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights; 
• it generates duplication of procedures and additional administrative burden, since similar matters may follow different legal routes and give rise to repeated appeals and challenges;
• it creates risks for the European integration process. In the approach taken by the EU and the OECD, a clear distinction between the two functions of the state is essential: administrative procedure means taking binding individual decisions with procedural safeguards for the individual, whereas the appeals mechanism is a feedback channel between society and the state. This distinction is crucial, as it ensures a balance between individual rights and administrative effectiveness.

The problem of duplication and inconsistency in the regulation of appeals is currently being addressed through the government’s draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024), which is intended to define how the right of persons to apply to public authorities is exercised and to separate the two channels of interaction between citizens and the public authorities:

• administrative procedure (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’): used where a person applies to obtain an individual administrative decision (a permit, registration, licence, or other decision on the merits of a case);
• the appeals mechanism (the new Law ‘On Appeals’): covering proposals, reports of problems, comments, and other forms of communication that do not entail an individual authoritative decision concerning a person’s rights.

To give effect to this approach, draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ proposes the following innovations:

1. a clear definition of the purpose and a classification of proposal-type appeals (proposals, recommendations, comments, and reports of problems);
2. the introduction of a single procedure for considering all appeals;
3. clarification of the range of entities obliged to consider appeals, with a focus on public administration bodies;
4. extension of the right to submit appeals beyond Ukrainian citizens to other natural and legal persons;
5. stronger legal certainty for applicants as to ‘whom to approach’ and ‘under which procedure’;
6. removal of complaints from the appeals mechanism and the transfer of their full regulation to the sphere of administrative procedure, in line with EU standards;
7. institutionalisation of in-person reception of citizens as a component of the work of public authorities, while allowing it to be delegated to authorised officials.

Draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted in the first reading as a basis on 24 April 2024 and is currently being prepared for the second reading.

Although draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024) is intended to separate administrative procedure from the appeals mechanism, its revised version does not fully resolve the key systemic problems that give rise to certain risks, namely:

• Risk of institutional uncertainty in the appeals-handling system. The reference to ‘other entities designated by the head of a state authority, an authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, or a local self-government body, within whose powers the matters raised fall’ creates legal uncertainty as to whether the law applies to housing maintenance offices, hospitals, schools, social protection bodies, and other providers of public services.

This will lead to:

1. a regulatory ‘grey zone’: some citizens’ appeals remain outside the legal framework (covered neither by the new law nor by the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’);
2. inequality among citizens: depending on whether a reviewing body recognises itself as such, a person may or may not receive a reply to their appeal;
3. an erosion of the authorities’ legitimacy: citizens will not know whom to approach, or whether their appeal will be considered at all.

The core problem: in the absence of clear criteria, the law will be interpreted by the very bodies that consider appeals, at their own discretion, creating a risk of manipulation and of blocking unwelcome communications.

• Risk of formalistic responses to appeals owing to insufficient time to prepare them. Short deadlines for preparing a reply create an unrealistic pace of administration, particularly under martial law.

This leads to:

1. the formalisation of appeal handling: rather than substantive consideration, authorities will be compelled to issue template replies to ‘meet’ the deadline;
2. inevitable breaches of reply deadlines: staff shortages and heavy workloads make compliance with such deadlines practically impossible;
3. the provocation of additional appeals: any formal failure to meet the deadlines becomes grounds for a new appeal, creating a vicious circle.

The core problem: excessively short deadlines encourage ‘brush-off’ replies instead of substantive communication between the state’s representative and the author of the appeal.

• Risk to European integration and to EU support. Retaining in the draft law both the appellant’s ability to challenge the reply of the body considering the appeal and the excessively short deadlines for preparing a reply — which encourage formalistic handling — runs counter to Ukraine’s commitments under Cluster 1 of the EU negotiating framework (the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, and the rule of law).

Retaining these shortcomings weakens Ukraine’s position in the EU accession negotiations.

The core problem: the draft law meant to eliminate competition with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and to bring Ukrainian appeals practice into line with European practice instead retains provisions that reproduce that very competition.

Conclusion

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Clarify the range of ‘other entities considering appeals’ in draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ by adding to it institutions that perform public administration functions, provide public services, or carry out public tasks.
• Remove from draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ the right to challenge a reply to an appeal, retaining only the right to challenge a failure to reply or a refusal to consider an appeal.
• Reconsider the excessively short deadlines for handling appeals. It would be advisable to extend the 15-day deadline for providing a reply to the EU standard of 30 days, and to reconsider the obligation to forward an appeal to the competent body within five days.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• The appeals system should become an instrument of feedback between the state and society and a source of governance analytics for identifying systemic problems and improving the quality of public services. Accordingly, implementation of the Law ‘On Appeals’ should provide for (1) its transformation into a tool of evidence-based policy-making, (2) the creation of a national system for analysing appeals, (3) the integration of this analysis into assessments of the performance of public authorities, and (4) a shift towards using feedback to adjust public policy and improve services.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Concept of Reforming Local Self-Government and Territorial Organisation of Power in Ukraine set out, as early as 2014, the objective of achieving an optimal distribution of powers between local self-government bodies (LSGBs) and state authorities. Despite this, the proper delineation of powers between the various levels of public administration remains an open question and has yet to be conclusively resolved. The absence of such delineation sustains the excessive (post-communist) centralisation of public administration, entrenches an ineffective model of power-sharing between central state authorities and LSGBs, undermines the achievements of Ukraine’s decentralisation reform, and does not conform to the European principles governing the distribution of powers across levels of public governance. In practical terms, the lack of delineation gives rise to conflicts of competence, the inefficient use of resources, and the dependence of local self-government on ‘manual’ control from the centre.

The specific problem has been set out in the following documents:

• the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027,which sets the task of bringing into force, by 31 March 2026, legislation delineating powers between LSGBs and state authorities, and between the various levels of public administration, in line with the principles of decentralisation and subsidiarity;
• the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, which establishes commitments: (1) to define the principles for delineating the spheres of competence of the state and of local self-government and (2) to distribute LSGB powers into own and delegated powers by June 2025, and (3) to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine a draft law on delineating the powers of LSGBs of different levels and of LSGBs and executive authorities in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity by August 2025;
• the Public Administration Reform Roadmap (2025), which provides for completing the reform of local self-government and the territorial organisation of power in Ukraine by 31 December 2027 and adopting the corresponding legislation by 31 March 2026.

Entrenching the current model of power-sharing between LSGBs and state authorities, together with the imbalances between the various levels of public administration, creates a set of systemic risks. Specifically, it:

1. makes effective vertical coordination impossible owing to chronic conflicts of competence between levels of authority: the quality of public service delivery becomes secondary, while authorities focus on disputes over the limits of their responsibilities;
2. undermines the very idea of decentralisation: the administrative, financial and resource dependence of LSGBs — driven by the persistence of extensive ‘manual’ control over them by state administrations — devalues the accountability of LSGBs to voters;
3. contributes to a negative assessment of Ukraine’s progress in the EU negotiation process, owing to the late fulfilment of commitments under the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027, the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, the European Commission’s recommendations set out in its report on Ukraine (November 2025), and the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, [АБ1] with regard to regulating the area of multi-level governance.

The problems described above are to be resolved by the government’s draft law ‘On the Principles of Delineation and Distribution of Powers Between Levels of Public Governance’ (No. 14412 of 30 January 2026).

The draft law sets out the framework, principles, conditions and criteria for the delineation and distribution of powers between executive bodies and local self-government bodies. If it is adopted, amendments will be required for a further 158 laws and other legal acts, ultimately establishing the powers of public governance bodies.

Draft Law No. 14412 defines:

• the legal basis and principles for delineating and distributing powers of public governance bodies;
• the levels and bodies of public governance;
• the classification of the powers of public governance bodies;
• the criteria for distinguishing the own and delegated powers of local self-government, as well as the criteria for delineating powers between levels of local self-government;
• the conditions under which the state may delegate powers to LSGBs;
• the specific arrangements for the exercise of powers by executive authorities and LSGBs under martial law or a state of emergency;
• the resourcing of the exercise of powers by public governance bodies;
• the limits of LSGB autonomy in decision-making;
• the accountability of LSGBs for the exercise of their powers.

Draft Law No. 14412 was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted at first reading on 7 April 2026. While it regulates the same matters of local self-government reform and the territorial organisation of power as the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1748 of 12 December 2025, the two documents propose different approaches to classifying the powers of public governance bodies. The government Resolution No. 1748 differentiates between (1) powers of state authorities that cannot be transferred to LSGBs; (2) powers of executive authorities that may be transferred under certain conditions; (3) delegated powers of LSGBs; and (4) own powers of LSGBs. The classification proposed by Draft Law No. 14412 includes (1) functional powers (own, delegated, optional, and those falling within the exclusive competence of the state) and (2) institutional and organisational powers (powers aimed at establishing and providing organisational support for the activities of public governance bodies).

Inconsistency in the legal basis for the activities of the various levels of public governance. Draft Law No. 14412 contains provisions that conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine and with European law, namely: (1) defining by law the manner in which LSGBs perform their own functions; (2) specifying the list of LSGB functions through a legal act of the government or the President rather than through a law; (3) restricting the right of LSGBs to challenge in court the decisions concerning their own powers; and (4) establishing contractual grounds for the joint exercise or delegation of powers. Together with the discrepancies between Draft Law No. 14412 and Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1748 regarding the classification of the powers of public governance bodies, these features create the following risks:

1. a high likelihood that the law will be found unconstitutional, in whole or in part;
2. the emergence of an internally contradictory model of public governance;
3. a slowing of European integration.

Institutional bias in favour of the executive vertical. Draft Law No. 14412 effectively allows the functions of LSGBs to be defined at the level of subordinate legislation (acts of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers), which creates a threat:

• to the balance between the branches of government, in particular by limiting the competence of Parliament and of local councils;
• to the long-term planning of LSGB activities, since subordinate legislation is less stable and predictable than primary law.

Adopting Draft Law No. 14412 without addressing its conceptual inconsistencies would create risks of legal uncertainty and institutional conflict, lay the groundwork for greater centralisation of administration by the executive and the erosion of the positive results of the decentralisation reform, and slow Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Synchronise government decisions with legislative changes in the area of the optimal distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration; align the terminology and the classification of powers used in Draft Law No. 14412 and in government Resolution No. 1748.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on defining the functions of LSGBs through subordinate legislation, and provide that LSGB functions be defined exclusively by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the norms allowing executive authorities to determine the means and procedures by which LSGBs exercise their own powers, leaving communities free to choose their own working methods within the powers conferred on them by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the concept of ‘optional powers’, as it has no equivalent in European law and creates legal uncertainty.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on the contractual redistribution of powers between public authorities, and provide that powers be defined exclusively by law rather than transferred locally through informal arrangements.
• Provide for the resolution of any disputes regarding the exercise of all powers (not only those delegated) through the courts.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• Conduct a functional audit of the system of public powers.
• Develop and enshrine in law a single model for classifying powers.
• Regulate the resourcing for LSGBs’ exercise of delegated powers.
• Institutionalise a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Competitive selection is a basic tool for ensuring professionalism, integrity, and political neutrality in the prosecution service. The comprehensive reform of the prosecution service in Ukraine has lasted nearly 20 years, and the complete HR reset across all levels of the prosecutor’s office (Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices) was carried out in 2019–2021 through the attestation process. 

Since then, appointments to positions of prosecutors in district prosecutor’s offices were carried out only on the basis of a selection announced and conducted by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). Appointments to positions of prosecutors in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office were also based on the results of competitive selection for the transfer of prosecutors from district and regional prosecutor’s offices to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The special order of appointment and transfer of prosecutors without competition under martial law was implemented by the Law No. 4555-IX, introduced in July 2025. Any person without a criminal record with the required legal experience received the opportunity to be appointed to higher-level prosecutor’s offices based on the submitted application, which became an opportunity, including for former law enforcement officers who, according to the results of the attestation (vetting), were recognised as not meeting the criteria of professionalism and integrity.

The particular issue was described in the:

1. European Commission report on Ukraine’s progress within the framework of the 2025 EU Enlargement Package, where it is recommended in the coming year to remove the provisions allowing the transfer and appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition and giving the right for the Prosecutor General to access any pre-trial investigation material, abstain from further enforcement of these provisions until they are repealed;
2. Shadow Report complementing the European Commission’s 2024 Report on Ukraine, which provides the recommendation to repeal the amendments introduced by Law No. 4555-IX, that significantly restricted the scope of prosecutorial procedural independence and unjustifiably strengthened the procedural role of the Prosecutor General;
3. Joint Statement between Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka that introduced 10 priorities, one of which is to adopt, within a year, a law, in line with European standards and after consultation with the Venice Commission, to ensure a transparent and merit-based selection process, appointments and transfers for prosecutors to managerial positions and other prosecutorial positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices, including clear criteria and a transparent, competitive, and meritocratic selection procedure that includes an assessment of professional competence and integrity;
4. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 that repeat the requirement of removing provisions allowing the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition, and giving the Prosecutor General’s Office the right to access any pre-trial investigation material. 

In addition, the Law No. 4555-IX introduced a hidden tool of pressure on the prosecutor — dismissal from the prosecutor’s office in the event of liquidation or reorganisation of the structural unit in which he held the position. This allowed the head of the prosecutor’s office to lay off the independent prosecutors, create a new staffing list, and appoint only those prosecutors who meet the ‘vision’ of the new leader.

Since July 2025, for more than 8 months, no law has been adopted that would abolish non-competitive appointments to the prosecutor’s office, and the prosecutor’s office actively uses the opportunity to appoint prosecutors to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

• abandonment of the meritocratic approach and the destruction of the career growth model for prosecutors;
• undermining the quality of the staff and weakening the independence of the prosecutor’s office;
• formation of lobbying groups in prosecutorial bodies by appointing loyal employees;
• deviation from European standards and reform requirements, and undermining trust from international partners.

Currently, three legislative initiatives (Draft Law No. 13601 dated 06.08.2025, Draft Law No. 13601-1 dated 22.08.2025 and Draft Law No. 13699 dated 26.08.2025) have been tabled in Parliament. All the legislative initiatives are from MPs, not the Government or the President of Ukraine.

The key idea of the first one (No. 13601) is to restore the previous wording of the Law ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’:

• repealing all the amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ introduced by the Law No. 4555-IX and returning to the wording of the law that preceded such amendments;
• restoration of the procedure for appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law.

The second one (No. 13601-1) provides for:

• the gradual cancellation of recruitment for the positions of prosecutors at the district prosecutor’s offices, carried out by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, which means actual deterioration of the independence of prosecutors through the complete abandonment of any competitive procedures at all levels;
• establishing an equal approach to resolving the issue of appointing prosecutors at all levels during the period of martial law.

The third one (No. 13699) on amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ addresses a wider range of issues than HR policy and provides for:

• return to the procedure of appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law;
• cancels the expansion of the powers of the Prosecutor General regarding the provision of pre-trial investigation materials to him, establishing the time limit and method of its implementation, thereby restoring the independence of each prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

Irreversibility of reform roll-back. The prosecution reform of 2019–2021 established merit-based competitive transfer as the only legitimate pathway to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

Continuation of non-competitive appointments:

1. dismantles the core architecture of that reform;
2. normalises exceptional mechanisms;
3. creates dual standards for prosecutors appointed before and after July 2025.

Once institutional practices shift toward discretionary appointments, restoring competitive mechanisms becomes politically and administratively more difficult. Temporary derogation risks becoming permanent regression.

Undermining prosecutorial independence. Non-competitive appointments to higher-level prosecutor’s offices increase institutional dependence on the appointing authority.

Without transparent procedures and professional assessment, prosecutors may be perceived as personally loyal appointees rather than independent procedural actors. 

This increases the risk that:

1. key positions in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office will be filled with personally loyal candidates;
2. informal vertical dependencies replace institutional guarantees of independence;
3. prosecutorial discretion in sensitive cases becomes indirectly influenced by personnel expectations.

Legal uncertainty and selective application risk. The absence of clear, transparent criteria for selecting among applicants creates space for selective or inconsistent decision-making.

Even if appointments formally comply with Law No. 4555-IX, lack of:

1. open list of vacancies and job descriptions for positions;
2. ranking mechanisms;
3. independent commission, undermines predictability and equal access to public office.

This creates:

• perception of unfair advancement;
• fragmentation among prosecutors appointed through a competitive and non-competitive procedure.

EU accession and conditionality risk. Merit-based and transparent appointment of prosecutors is directly linked to Ukraine’s obligations under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) of the EU accession framework. Furthermore, the problem was highlighted in the European Commission report within the 2025 Enlargement Package. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos identified solving the relevant problem as one of ten key priorities. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 underlined the importance of removing provisions that allow the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition.

Maintaining a simplified, non-competitive regime:

• contradicts previously implemented reform commitments;
• weakens Ukraine’s negotiating position in rule of law assessments;
• may affect conditional financial and technical support linked to governance benchmarks.

Given that prosecution reform was repeatedly referenced in European Commission assessments, deviation at this stage carries strategic geopolitical implications.

The continued application of non-competitive appointments to prosecutorial positions at the regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office under Law No. 4555-IX constitutes a direct deviation from the core principles of prosecutorial reform in Ukraine.

Merit-based competitive selection is not a technical HR procedure, but a structural safeguard of independence, professionalism, and political neutrality. Its suspension at the highest levels of the prosecution service undermines the institutional architecture built during the 2019–2021 reform and reverses progress achieved in aligning Ukraine’s prosecution system with European standards.

The argument of wartime necessity cannot justify the systematic replacement of competitive procedures with discretionary appointments. When exceptional mechanisms are applied without strict limitations, they cease to be temporary and instead reshape institutional practice in a way that weakens accountability and transparency.

Moreover, the concentration of HR powers in the hands of prosecutorial leadership creates additional democratic risks. When the same authority simultaneously:

• decides on appointments to higher-level positions without competition;
• has an effective influence over organisational restructuring and liquidation of positions within prosecutorial bodies. This combination of powers creates structural imbalances.

Dismissals based on staff reduction or reorganisation, in a context where appointment decisions are discretionary, may create precedents perceived as instruments of influence rather than as an objective administrative necessity. If prosecutorial leadership can both appoint without competition and eliminate positions occupied by prosecutors, the safeguards against arbitrary HR decisions are significantly weakened.

Such concentration of power contradicts the principle of institutional checks and balances and undermines guarantees of prosecutorial independence. In democratic systems governed by the rule of law, appointment and dismissal mechanisms must be insulated from discretionary political or managerial influence.

Restoring full competitive appointment and transfer procedures is therefore not merely a matter of procedural refinement but a prerequisite for preserving the independence, legitimacy, and democratic accountability of the prosecution service.

Short-term (urgent legislative action):

Immediately repeal the provisions of Law No. 4555-IX that allow the appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competitive selection on the basis of a submitted application.

Competitive appointment must be restored as the only lawful mechanism for access to higher-level prosecutorial positions. 

Abolish the legal provision introduced by the same law that allows dismissal of prosecutors due to liquidation or reorganisation of a prosecutorial body without adequate safeguards.

When a single authority can effectively eliminate a position occupied by an independent prosecutor and subsequently create a new position to which a loyal individual may be appointed, this creates structural conditions for abuse. Such a model contradicts democratic governance principles, weakens institutional checks and balances, and endangers prosecutorial independence.

Medium-term:

Improve and modernise the competitive transfer procedure for prosecutors moving from lower-level to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The restoration of competition should not merely replicate the pre-martial law model but strengthen it. In particular:

• ensure clear, published evaluation criteria;
• establish structured scoring methodology;
• ensure monthly open reporting on available vacant positions and corresponding job responsibilities, and announcement of competitions for lower-level prosecutors to fill such positions.

Mandate the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) to actively resume and systematically conduct competitive selection procedures for transfers to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The QDCP should:

1. adopt and publish a detailed methodology for assessing professional competence, managerial skills (where relevant), and integrity;
2. standardise interview procedures;
3. set predictable timelines for regular competitions (once a month or once every three months).

A clear separation of appointments and dismissal powers and a strengthened institutional role of the QDCP are essential to maintain independence and democratic accountability. 

This Infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Competitive selection is a basic tool for ensuring professionalism, integrity and political neutrality in the civil service. In Ukraine, this model was developed after 2016 as part of public administration reform, implemented with the EU support.

After the full-scale invasion, the state abandoned competitive selection. This alleviated the staff shortage caused by mobilisation and massive forced displacement, both internally and abroad. At the same time, the prolonged suspension of competitive selection created systemic risks for the quality of governance, institutional memory, and trust in the civil service.

• temporary appointments are gradually becoming the ‘new normal’;
• there is a growing risk of politically motivated decisions and abandonment of the meritocratic approach;
• it will be difficult to return to the standard competitive model after the war.

Currently, the only legislative initiative aimed at restoring competitive selection during martial law is the Draft Law No. 13478-1. It provides for:

• the gradual restoration of competitive selection procedures;
• the determination of deadlines for competitive selection procedures for positions to which persons have been appointed without competitive selection for the duration of martial law;
• the possibility of continuing service by decision of the appointing authority to preserve human resources, time, and budget;
• the application of positive measures to achieve gender balance in civil service positions in specific state bodies.

The Government supports the adoption of this draft law.

1. Political blocking of the process. Despite the declared political readiness to gradually resume competitive selection procedures during martial law, in practice, this process remains blocked and has not been brought before Parliament for consideration for a long time. This delay indicates a lack of consensus on restoring competitive selection in wartime. The issue of competitions for top civil service positions remains particularly controversialFirst Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Oleksandr Korniyenko: Return to competitive selection for top positions triggers debate among MPs. Interfax-Ukraine. 24.09.2025.. The reasons include the desire to maintain maximum managerial flexibility, concerns of complicating procedures, and the general focus of political attention on security issues. At the same time, this approach ignores long-term risks, as temporary appointments are gradually becoming the ‘new normal.’
2. Unfinished remuneration reform. Resuming competitions without completing remuneration reform creates the risk of an outflowThis is supported by data from an anonymous questionnaire survey of civil servants conducted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in December 2025 with the assistance of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning and the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service. of personnel from the civil service. Despite the adoption of the Law of Ukraine No. 4282 and positive developments, the level of remuneration remains one of the key demotivating factors. There are still significant disparities in remuneration between bodies of different jurisdictions, as well as between different categories of positions within the same body. In its conclusions, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine also notesReport of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine on the results of the compliance audit on the topic ‘Reforming the remuneration system in public administration’, approved by Decision of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine No. 26-1 from October 28, 2025. that the reform has not fully achieved its goals of creating a fair, transparent and competitive remuneration system.
3. Institutional instability. Frequent changes in the system of central executive bodies (reorganisations, mergers, changes of powers) destabilise their activities, cause staff turnover, loss of institutional memory and reduced efficiency.
4. Political dependence of senior civil servants. After the reset of power in 2019Based on the Law of Ukraine No. 117-IX ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Restructuring of Government’., state secretaries of ministries and heads of central executive bodies (category ‘A’ positions) remain dependent on political figures. Appointment and dismissal procedures undermine the meaning of competitive selection and create conditions for politically motivated decisionsStarting from September 29, 2019 (the date of entry into force of the Law of Ukraine No. 117-IX), the Commission determines not the winner of the competition, but the candidates for civil service positions who have received the highest total number of points based on the results of the overall ranking of candidates (no more than three per position) for selection of the winner by the appointing authority or head of the civil service.. The practice of frequent changes of state secretaries (who change with the appointment of a new minister, or even more often) makes it impossible for them to perform their key functionFor example, over the past five years, the state secretaries of the Ministry of Culture (in all variations of its name) have changed five times since 2019 (Bidenko A., Dul’ Y., Leshchuk Y., Kurochenko O., Levchuk V.) and none of them has served the full five-year term provided for by law (although the latter still has a chance to do so). — ensuring the stability and continuity of the work of ministries. The Draft law No. 13478-1 does not eliminate these risks.

The restoration of competitive selection is a necessary condition for a professional civil service; however, it must be accompanied by systemic changes. Without the completion of the remuneration reform, reduction of political influence, and ensuring institutional stability, competitive selection may not fully fulfil its function.

Short-term

1. Adopt the Draft Law No. 13478-1 in the first reading (take as a basis).
2. During the revision of the Draft Law No. 13478-1 for the second reading, provide for: 1) strengthening the role of the Senior Civil Service Commission and competitive commissions formed by the appointing authority, granting them the power to determine one winner and the next candidate who can take the position in case of refusal by the winner or vacancy of this position within a year after the competition; 2) establishing the submission of the Senior Civil Service Commission as a mandatory basis for the dismissal of category ‘A’ civil servants; 3) specifying the responsibility for interference in the work of the Senior Civil Service Commission and the competition commissions; 4) bringing the procedure of the Senior Civil Service Commission formation in line with the Constitution of Ukraine.

Medium-term

1. Complete the remuneration reform, taking into account the recommendations of the Accounting Chamber.
2. Introduce the practice of reformatting the system of central executive bodies only based on a functional review of the entire system, identification of all alternatives, and justification of the proposed changes, in particular in terms of financial and human resources.

Infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

In the sphere of the state’s internal (civil) security, there exists a range of threats that negatively affect human security, primarily physical security. Among these threats, as in any society, there is crime, which cannot be eradicated or overcome, given that this negative social phenomenon is a direct consequence of human nature (behaviour). However, crime as a phenomenon can be controlled and minimised in certain areas.

The level of crime and its perception (people’s sense of security) fall within the direct influence of law-enforcement bodies, and both human security and the perception of security depend on the effectiveness of their work. Under these conditions, effectiveness may be undermined by corrupt practices within these bodies. And while a system affected by corruption may remain effective in certain aspects of crime control, public perceptions of crime will inevitably suffer because of the negative image of law-enforcement agencies. Conversely, attempts to improve their image through active communication of performance results will not necessarily have positive consequences, particularly in terms of real crime control.

At the same time, people’s attitudes towards the system of combating crime depend directly on two circumstances. On the one hand, law-enforcement bodies must have the proper capacity to help a person with their problem — that is, the criminal-law conflict (the criminal offence) that has occurred. Namely, they must provide support to the victim, investigate the criminal offence and restore justice by bringing the perpetrators to justice and ensuring compensation for the harm. On the other hand, it is the law-enforcement system that is endowed with the most invasive instruments regarding human rights and freedoms, as it has lawful powers to restrict liberty, conduct searches or seize property and so on. It is precisely here that cases of unlawful detention, torture, falsification of evidence, corruption and similar abuses occur.

Today in Ukraine, complaints about both the first and the second components are quite widespread. Depending on the type of offence (it is obvious that in cases of violent crime, a person is more likely to seek protection from law-enforcement bodies, whereas in property-related or, all the more so, in office-related offences, much less so), people assess differently the ability of law-enforcement bodies to protect their rights, that is, to guarantee their safety.

For example, in 2024, 48% of companies experienced pressure from law-enforcement or regulatory bodiesThe state and needs of business in Ukraine: results of the survey in August 2024. The survey was conducted by the Innovation Development Centre, the Entrepreneurship and Export Development Office, the national project Diia.Business and AdvanterGroup in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Coalition of Business Communities for the Modernisation of Ukraine. Survey period: 20.08.2024 — 31.08.2024.. This is because within law-enforcement agencies, there are abuses of criminal law instruments for the purpose of exerting pressure and obtaining undue benefit. This occurs within the framework of artificially initiated criminal proceedings (conducting searches, seizure and arrest of property). As a consequence, this blocks the operation of the enterprise, harming businesses and their investors. Such actions have long-term negative impacts on the Ukrainian economy and limit its development. Foreign investors often name problems with the rule of law among the reasons why they are not ready to operate in the Ukrainian market.

Thus, citizens seek support from the law-enforcement system in order to protect themselves from unlawful encroachments that negatively affect their safety, while at the same time expecting that the law-enforcement system will fulfil the duties directly assigned to it — namely, ensuring proper respect for human rights and freedoms — and not create new unlawful acts in the sphere of offences committed by officials. For this, the law-enforcement system must be effective, oriented towards the needs of people, primarily victims and use scientifically grounded approaches to forecasting and countering crime at a systemic level.

That is why law-enforcement reform consists of these structures fulfilling their core task — countering crime that negatively affects the internal security of people in society. It concerns the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodiesThe Constitution of Ukraine uses both the term ‘law-enforcement bodies’ (Article 131-1) and ‘law-enforcement agencies’ (Article 17). Sectoral legislation uses varying terminology that requires unification. The first step towards this may be the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law-Enforcement Bodies’, the adoption of which is envisaged in para. 1.1 of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies for 2023–2027. In our view, law- enforcement bodies should be understood as bodies endowed with powers: 1) to conduct pre-trial investigations of criminal offences; 2) To exercise operational-search activity (in future — criminal intelligence). At the same time, the term ‘law-enforcement bodies’ is a specific (narrower) category, whereas ‘law-enforcement agencies’ is a generic (broader) category. The latter encompasses the former and includes bodies with attested staff, uniforms, the right to carry weapons, and those that perform oversight functions of a security nature, or which are expressly designated by law as law-enforcement agencies. to carry out the prevention of and fight against crime, primarily organised crime, which causes the greatest harm to the interests of society.

In the context of European integration, Ukraine continues the process of aligning its legislation with the EU acquis communautaire, as well as implementing the enlargement-policy recommendations contained in the European Commission’s Enlargement Reports (2023, 2024, 2025) under Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’. It is in this chapter that the focus is placed on organised crime, cybercrime, drug-related crime, the fight against terrorism and international cooperation in this field (Europol, Eurojust), as well as other aspects of combating serious crime.

In addition, the issue concerns not only the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies to counter crime, but also the instruments for the strategic prevention of crime and for the prioritisation of law-enforcement resources through the introduction of planned and consistent criminal policyFor details, see: Krapyvin Y. Criminal policy and strategic planning in combating crime: prospects and what European integration has to do with it. JustTalk, 12.11.2025.. Thus, the introduction of European mechanisms for assessing threats posed by such crime (SOCTASerious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment., IOCTAInternet Organised Crime Threat Assessment.), information exchange with European law-enforcement bodies (SIENA, SIENA-CT, cooperation with Europol and Eurojust) and the implementation of intelligence-led policing concepts is envisaged. In other words, the issue concerns strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime.

In addition to institutional capacity and the strengthening of the analytical component (strategic planning), the discussion also concerns a review of criminal procedural powers and of the infrastructure of criminal justice. The former includes improving the system of investigative jurisdiction over criminal offences, improving alternative measures for resolving criminal-law conflicts (for example, international practice with transactions), transforming the institution of operational search activity into criminal intelligence, introducing safeguards against the abuse of procedural rights and so forth. The latter includes implementing a system for compensation of victims of violent crimes, improving the system for ensuring the safety of participants in criminal proceedings and expanding the whistleblowing framework to a broader range of offences committed by officials, as provided by the relevant EU Directive 2019/1937 and so on.

Thus, Ukraine’s European integration commitments are directed towards building a more effective law-enforcement system that will be oriented towards consistent and effective criminal policy, the prioritisation of criminal proceedings and the allocation of resources to counter serious crime.

At the centre of such a system will be the victim and their need for compensation for harm, rather than solely the criminal prosecution of the offender at any cost.

Law-enforcement reform consists of three key areas:

1. strengthening the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies in countering serious crime;
2. improving the system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — the introduction of a system of criminal policy;
3. reviewing the criminal procedural powers of the prosecution service and of law-enforcement bodies and, more generally, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system.

The main document in the sphere of reforming law-enforcement bodies is the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027: Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 273/2023 of 11.05.2023. (the OAS) and the Government’s Action PlanAction Plan aimed at implementing the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027: Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 792 of 23.08.2024. aimed at its implementation (the OAS Action Plan). Certain provisions of the OAS are reflected in the Rule of Law Roadmap, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in May 2025Certain issues of ensuring the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union under Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the EU Accession Process’: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 475 of 14.05.2025.. At the same time, implementation of the OAS is one of the measures under Chapter 24 of the EU acquis.

Certain measures are also included in the Plan for the Ukraine FacilityPlan for the Ukraine Facility. 2024–2027., in the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025On the Approval of the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 220 of 04.03.2023. (a new programme is currently being prepared by the NACP) and in sectoral documents (the Strategy for Combating Organised Crime, the Prosecution Service Development Strategy for 2025–2028, the National Strategy for the Protection of Children’s Rights in the Sphere of Justice until 2028 and others). Achieving comprehensive reform of law-enforcement bodies on the path towards European integration is possible only on the condition that all measures provided for in these documents in the sphere of state policy are implemented, as they concern, at the same time, amendments to legislation, the resolution of institutional problems, the introduction of strategic planning practices and so forth.

By contrast, addressing individual components — whether personnel matters (the introduction of competitive selection procedures and so on), or the expansion of powers, or institutional practices — will not have the proper effect given the unsystematic and fragmented nature of such reforms.

Key measures for strengthening the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies in countering serious crime:

• adoption of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law-Enforcement Bodies’, which will define the legal framework for the functioning of law-enforcement bodies and will unify their status and powers;
• introduction of merit-based principles for the selection of candidates to managerial positions in law-enforcement bodies, including the heads of these bodies (the National Police, the SBI, NABU);
• reform of the Security Service of Ukraine through the gradual removal of pre-trial investigation functions, which will transform it into a classical counterintelligence body;
• strengthening the institutional capacity of analytical units of law-enforcement bodies;
• strengthening the internal security system of law-enforcement bodies and the procedures for conducting internal investigations and disciplinary proceedings; strengthening the institutional capacity of authorised units within the criminal justice system responsible for preventing and detecting corruption and granting them the powers necessary for effective monitoring and for supporting the implementation of anti-corruption programmes;
• improving the system of accountability and transparency of law-enforcement bodies.

Key measures for improving the system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — the introduction of a criminal policy system:

• introduction of a system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — criminal policy — which will encompass both prevention and the fight against crime;
• introduction of European strategic planning instruments: the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) and the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA);
• introduction of a system for collecting alternative data forming the knowledge base on crime: crime surveys, victimology surveys and so forth;
• improvement of the criminal statistics system;
• introduction of criminal policy documents: 1) national priorities for combating crime (long-term, high-level criminal policy for a period of 5–10 years); 2) strategic priorities of law-enforcement bodies (medium-term criminal policy — annual plans); 3) priorities in individual criminal proceedings (short-term criminal policy), which constitute part of the management system in this field.

Key measures for reviewing the criminal procedural powers of the prosecution service and law-enforcement bodies and, more generally, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system:

• improving the system of investigative jurisdiction as a means of determining the specialisation of law-enforcement bodies;
• introducing detectives into all law-enforcement bodies;
• introduction a common performance evaluation system for detectives and others, who are involved into the crime investigation, which is oriented to the quality of data, not only quantity;
• expanding the discretionary powers of the prosecutor for the purpose of implementing the measures provided for by criminal policy;
• improving alternative measures for resolving criminal-law conflicts (for example, international practice of transactions);
• introducing into the CPC of Ukraine the principle concerning the abuse of procedural rights;
• improving the system for guaranteeing the safety of participants in criminal proceedings;
• establishing a compensation fund for victims of violent crimes;
• reforming the system of forensic expert activity in criminal proceedings;
• adopting the Law of Ukraine ‘On Criminal Intelligence’, which will transform the institution of operational-search activity by delimiting it from criminal procedural, intelligence and counterintelligence activity;
• full implementation of the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime and its Second Additional Protocol, including the introduction into the CPC of Ukraine of the concept of electronic (digital) evidence (by analogy with the Commercial and Procedural Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine and the Code of Administrative Proceedings of Ukraine), criminalisation of cyberviolence and so forth.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is an independent Ukrainian think tank that for 25 years has been helping the state build sustainable institutions and develop evidence-based public policy across various sectors.