The war has made weapons part of Ukrainian reality, and the state has a duty to address this. Even before 24 February 2022, experts estimated that civilians may have held between three and eight million illegal firearms. The number has since increased, with some weapons reaching civilians as a result of hostilities. Following the launch of the state firearms register in July 2023, citizens voluntarily declared around 22,000 firearms and the police seized a further 20,000. These measures, however, are only isolated responses to the circulation of weapons in Ukraine, a problem that will become more acute after the war. The central question is not whether weapons will be present in Ukrainian society, but whether the state can build a coherent and effective security architecture governed by law.

This is not only a domestic task, but also part of Ukraine’s EU integration commitments. On 14 July 2026, negotiations were opened with Ukraine on Cluster 6, ‘External Relations’, which covers foreign policy, security and defence. For a country at war, this is one of the most strategically important areas, as Ukraine’s resilience and defence capability depend directly on it.

Under this cluster, the EU expects Ukraine to adopt a national strategy and action plan to combat illicit trafficking in and possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, with clear deadlines, funding and a clear division of responsibilities among public authorities. Adopting the relevant documents alone will not be enough: Ukraine must demonstrate tangible progress in implementing them. In other words, the EU expects a new system capable of effectively controlling weapons and the risks associated with them.

Ukraine cannot limit the question to whether weapons should be permitted or prohibited. The principal challenge is how to bring their presence under effective control, so that one person’s right to protection does not conflict with another’s right to life and the freedom to own weapons does not become immunity from rules and responsibility.

This must form the basis of a new state policy. A law on civilian firearms is necessary, but it is only the first step.

It is commonly claimed that civilian weapons are prohibited in Ukraine. This is not entirely accurate. Civilians may legally own hunting firearms (both smooth-bore and rifled), less-lethal weapons, bladed weapons such as hunting knives, stilettos and daggers and gas pistols. No special permit is required to own airguns or certain types of small-calibre weapons (up to 4 mm) chambered for Flobert rounds. These rules are established by an order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

For the duration of martial law, legislation also allows civilians to be issued firearms or retain firearms they have found in order to repel and deter Russia’s armed aggression. The exceptions are rifled weapons exceeding 12.7 mm in calibre, smooth-bore weapons of 23 mm or more, weapons assigned to military personnel or law enforcement officers and weapons used to commit a criminal offence.

The debate focuses almost entirely on whether civilians should be permitted to acquire and carry short-barrelled firearms, namely pistols and revolvers.

A total ban and completely uncontrolled access to weapons are both extremes. A complete restriction of this right may deter law-abiding citizens, but criminals, who by definition break the law, will seek ways to circumvent or manipulate the rules.

Supporters of a total ban generally argue that violent crime will inevitably rise in proportion to the number of weapons held by civilians. There are, however, no comprehensive studies establishing a direct relationship between these figures. Nor is there a common methodology that would allow these questions to be studied regularly and the results compared over time. There are therefore no sound grounds for claiming that the number of civilian-held weapons either worsens the crime situation in the country or makes public spaces safer.

During the war and in the post-war period, a total ban would naturally drive firearms further underground and increase illicit trafficking. Law enforcement agencies would then find it more difficult to control weapons and ensure public safety.

The state’s task is to build a system of rules under which the right to own weapons does not threaten public order or deprive others of a sense of security. Civilian firearms legislation must be balanced and any expansion of related rights should be introduced gradually, taking account of the country’s current security situation.

In addition to the requirements under Cluster 6 described above, control over the circulation of firearms is part of Ukraine’s commitments under Chapter 24, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, of Cluster 1, ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’. Ukraine must improve the legal framework governing the circulation of firearms, cooperation among law enforcement agencies and international cooperation in this area. Criminal liability for illicit arms trafficking must also be brought fully into line with the EU acquis and international law. The acquis (in full, acquis communautaire) comprises all binding EU rules, laws, principles, decisions, case law and obligations applicable to Member States and candidate countries — editor’s note.

Adopting laws alone will not be enough. Ukraine must demonstrate tangible progress in implementing them. The EU expects a new security architecture that fits organically into the wider European security space. These processes will therefore remain under close and continuous scrutiny by European partners throughout Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

In the European Union, the general rules governing civilians’ acquisition and possession of firearms are laid down in Directive (EU) 2021/555. It defines categories of firearms that may lawfully be acquired, carried and used, including for hunting or sport, and establishes rules on marking, control over their circulation and movement between EU Member States.

The Directive requires a register through which firearms can be identified and traced. Each state must also establish a system regulating firearms manufacturers, dealers and gunsmiths, including checks of their personal and professional integrity.

A person may obtain a licence to acquire and possess a firearm if they have good cause, have reached the required age and do not pose a danger to themselves or others. Checking a person only once when a permit is issued is not sufficient. Under European rules, the licence must be reviewed at least every five years. The system therefore contains safeguards that not only grant access to firearms, but also respond promptly when an owner no longer meets the established criteria.

The Directive also allows EU Member States to introduce stricter rules than those it sets.

Firearms legislation across Europe ranges from relatively liberal regimes to strict restrictions. Weapons are generally permitted for hunting or sporting purposes. Common standards apply, particularly to categories prohibited for civilian use and weapons whose acquisition or carrying requires a special licence.

Croatia, for example, permits concealed carry with a special authorisation. Austria permits concealed or open carry but carrying a weapon must not cause public alarm. Civilian carry is effectively prohibited in Norway, where only limited numbers of firearms may be acquired for hunting or sport. Only a few countries, including Finland, Czechia and Poland, expressly recognise firearms in legislation as a means of personal security.

There is no universal formula for regulating firearms and fully protecting society from the risks they create. Each state develops its own mechanisms and procedures in light of its national context. In every case, the objective is to develop a shared security architecture across Europe, not merely to grant a right to own weapons.

Ukraine has debated and attempted to adopt a firearms law for decades, but has still failed to reach a consensus. At least 20 draft laws on the subject have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada over the past 30 years. Each initiative prompted intense debate that ultimately failed to produce a legislative solution.

Under the Rule of Law Roadmap, a law regulating firearms and strengthening liability for violations in this area must be adopted by the fourth quarter of 2026.

Draft law No. 5708, which is currently under discussion, was adopted at first reading shortly before the full-scale invasion. It partly reflects European requirements, but requires further revision to make the system more effective and eliminate risks and loopholes through which unscrupulous applicants could obtain the right to own weapons. The draft law also fails to provide clear answers on certain procedures for obtaining a firearms owner’s certificate, the rules for carrying weapons and the designation of areas where firearms may not be carried.

The law will create only a general framework, which will not function without institutions, resources and daily practice. Its adoption must be followed by a lengthy implementation process: developing infrastructure and a system of cooperation among public authorities, the firearms industry and firearms owners, conducting public information campaigns, strengthening the state’s capacity to trace weapons, identify risks in time and prevent violent crime.

The permit procedure and subsequent control must be designed to prevent corruption loopholes. Work is also needed to shape public attitudes through information campaigns and training in the safe and responsible handling of firearms.

Firearms owners and those seeking to acquire a weapon must regard it not only as a means of protection, but also as a source of heightened risk. Training, clear procedures, regular monitoring and the inevitability of sanctions for violations must become integral elements of responsible firearms ownership.

The regulation of civilian firearms does not exist in a vacuum: weapons have already become part of life in Ukraine. Without a resilient security architecture, however, any decision to expand the right to own and carry them would be premature.

A firearms law would form the first level of that architecture. The second would consist of systemic changes in society that allow freedom and the right to protection to coexist with control and responsibility.

Ukraine must first improve and codify the existing rules without undermining the foundations of public safety. Once the system has been established and tested, the country can return to the debate on liberalising the carrying of handguns.

The well-known firearms manufacturer Samuel Colt is credited with saying that ‘the most important part of any firearm is its owner’s head’. A responsible attitude to weapons must become the foundation of Ukraine’s new reality.

This week marks three years since the President of Ukraine approved the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform by Decree No. 273. Has Ukrainian society become safer criminal justice fairer? What is the current state of law enforcement reform?

Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s ‘Law and Order’ Area, suggests looking at the dynamics of change through the lens of state policy in the field of law enforcement and its strategic objectives. Since the Plan runs until 2027, it is worth taking a ‘helicopter view’ of where Ukraine currently stands, while also taking into account Government Order No. 792-r, which sets out the details of the Plan’s implementation.

What should Ukraine have achieved by the end of 2027, based on the substantive sections of the Overarching Strategic Plan?

1. Effective and Efficient Law Enforcement Agencies and Prosecutor’s Office

The draft law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ is still being developed, and without its adoption it is difficult to speak of unifying these bodies. The problems of military justice also remain unresolved: the draft law ‘On Military Police’, adopted in the first reading in 2024, is clearly insufficient. Approaches to appointing and dismissing heads of law enforcement agencies are being criticised from all sides: either there is no competition, or there is a lack of international experts to conduct competitive procedures. There is still no unified approach to the status, functions and powers of these bodies, taking their specialisation into account.

2. Consistent Criminal Policy

The set of measures on criminal policy as a form of strategic planning in countering crime has not been implemented. The idea itself is popular, but any steps towards its implementation face misunderstanding and resistance. National crime prevention strategies, criminological review of legislative initiatives, reform of criminal statistics and the introduction of crime and victimisation surveys are promising, but for now remain issues discussed mainly within narrow professional circles. Ukraine needs an alternative source of knowledge about crime, rather than relying solely on criminal statistics, which are imperfect by definition and have been distorted by years of manipulation by the relevant agencies.

3. Swift Criminal Proceedings

There is indeed a lack of a comprehensive vision for updating criminal procedure legislation. As of today, amendments to the CPC of Ukraine remain one of the most difficult issues in the entire European integration process. There is an anti-corruption package, controversial amendments concerning abuse of procedural rights or improving the tax compromise mechanism and more fundamental changes such as revising the prosecutor’s discretionary powers in criminal proceedings. The Overarching Strategic Plan covers the latter, but support for these changes from public authorities and professional communities remains minimal.

In the context of forensic examination, there is strong competition between different visions: both the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) have their own ideas. On the other hand, the question is how ready the Ukrainian Parliament is to amend the CPC of Ukraine without destabilising it.

4. Result-Oriented Management System

Most measures under this objective are visible primarily because they concern specific agencies and inter-agency cooperation. There have been some improvements in staffing, internal control, including anti-corruption controls. The SBI is introducing a performance assessment system, but so far the only body where such a system actually works is the NABU. In Yevhen Krapyvin’s view, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is investing the most effort in this area. It is therefore already possible to speak of certain results among the bodies that are part of the MIA system or are coordinated with the Ministry’s involvement.

5. Comprehensive Digital Transformation

At present, the situation appears to fall between the two extremes: either ‘comprehensive transformation, but not digital transformation’ or ‘digital transformation, but not comprehensive transformation’.

In many areas, digitalisation still remains at the level of digitisation, meaning at a basic initial stage. In the anti-corruption field, despite challenges, the eCase electronic criminal proceedings system has gradually become operational for the NABU, SAPO and HACC. By contrast, the introduction of the SMEREKA system for all other law enforcement agencies and the Prosecutor’s Office has only just begun. The system provides for the management of pre-trial investigations across the entire law enforcement system and will be integrated with the Unified Judicial Information and Communication System (UJICS).

6. Openness, Transparency, Accountability and Independence of the Law Enforcement System

Building a fully open, transparent and accountable system under martial law is impossible. However, certain forms of public oversight, such as Public Oversight Councils, continue to operate as a default mechanism. The situation with the Ministry of Defence shows that such councils should function, although it is difficult to assess their results and the role of similar councils under the SBI, the NABU or the ESBU. At the same time, the work of public oversight commissions within the police has been suspended.

The greatest achievement is that, this year, law enforcement agencies have begun preparing higher-quality annual reports. These now follow a narrative format, explaining the state of crime, its dynamics and the contribution of these agencies’ law enforcement work.

Yevhen Krapyvin notes that, as with any public policy cycle in any sector, moving from documents to results requires painstaking daily work.

Law enforcement reform is an important part of Ukraine’s path towards EU membership and contributes to the shared security of both Ukraine and the European Union. At the same time, this issue cannot be considered outside the context of Ukraine’s current realities and the practical steps needed to implement the required changes.

On 29 April, the regional conference ‘Law Enforcement Reform in the Context of Ukraine’s European Integration: Implementation of the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Regional Dimension’ was held in Dnipro.

Participants discussed the priorities and progress in implementing the Overarching Strategic Plan, Ukraine’s progress in meeting EU requirements, the regional dimension of reforms in the context of European integration and the next steps in the reform process. Ukraine is steadily integrating into the European security area, while the Overarching Strategic Plan defines the key areas for transforming the law enforcement system. Particular attention was also paid to the Roadmap on Countering the Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives.

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Oleksii Serhieiev emphasised that the practical implementation of strategic plans should begin with frontline regions, which are critical to the state’s resilience. Among other things, he spoke about building a multi-level security system that involves strengthening the analytical capacity of law enforcement agencies, preventing offences and ensuring close cooperation between law enforcement agencies, public authorities, local self-government bodies and international partners.

As part of the event, Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ‘Law and Order’ Area at ALI, together with Olha Kildiushkina, Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister, held an expert discussion on law enforcement reform in the context of Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, focusing on the negotiation process for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

Krapyvin noted that ALI continues its systematic work and monitors the implementation of European integration commitments in the field of law enforcement. This includes the Overarching Strategic Plan, which holds an important place among European integration policy documents: its implementation is envisaged under Chapter 24 of the EU acquis, which focuses on building an institutionally capable law enforcement system able to counter serious crime.

This is why discussing the state of law enforcement reform with the leadership of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions and ensuring that their views are reflected in national plans is a necessary step towards the European integration of Ukraine’s law enforcement system.

Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Taras Kachka emphasised that negotiating Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ is one of the most sensitive and demanding parts of the accession process, as it concerns the state’s ability to ensure security, protect citizens and create a predictable environment for business.

The event was attended by Charlotte Suren, Chargée d’Affaires a.i. of the United Kingdom in Ukraine, Rolf Holmboe, Head of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation, the Economic Security Bureau, higher education institutions, civil society, international organisations, independent experts and participants from Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The event was organised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine together with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine as part of the Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine project (CSSR), implemented by Chemonics UK in partnership with Siren Associates, with the support of the Government of the United Kingdom and the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine.

Researching veterans policy issues is not a new topic for the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, and the need for its effective development and implementation is more relevant than ever for Ukraine. Therefore, the ALI continues to work in this area. In particular, on February 19, we held a meeting with representatives of the German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ).

We shared our thoughts and visions on the Ukrainian approach to working with veterans — which aspects need to be revised and which procedures — improved. We focused separately on the importance of developing a comprehensive veteran policy and discussed the challenges and specifics of its implementation, in particular:

• forming a legislative framework for veteran policy;
• developing a network of veteran support assistants;
• involving local businesses in supporting veterans;
• the capacity of local authorities to integrate veterans;
• the suitability of services to the needs of veterans and the capacity to provide them.

ALI already has systematic experience in this area, including a comprehensive Shadow Report on the Study of Invisible Veteran Policy for 2014–2022, in which ALI experts described the entire cycle of veteran policy — to understand whether it is possible to create a policy that will be able to truly solve the problems of veterans, and what systemic mistakes were made earlier.

The ALI educational project, the Ukrainian School of Political Studies (USPS), also ran the ‘You Are Important’ training programme in 2024. More than 30 servicewomen and female veterans participated in the first cycle of the programme.

The meeting was attended by Svitlana Matviienko, Executive Director at ALI, Volodymyr Skrypets, the Analytics Lead at ALI, Oleksandra Egert, Deputy Executive Director for Operations and Project Coordination, Sebastian Schlebusch, Head of the InClude Component EMPOWER Project (GIZ), and Oleksandr Khoruzhenko, GIZ Ukraine Project Advisor.

With a 37-day delay, the Svyrydenko Government has finally submitted its Programme of Activities to Parliament. In July 2025, for the first time since the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada accepted the resignation of the Prime Minister — and, accordingly, of the entire Cabinet of Ministers — and formed a new Government.

The Svyrydenko Government is already the third Cabinet of Ministers formed during the tenure of the Ninth Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. The first, led by Oleksii Honcharuk, had an approved programme but lasted less than six months. The second, led by Denys Shmyhal, operated without an approved programme altogether, yet remained in office for more than five years. This practice has revealed a paradox: formally, legislation grants Parliament the tools to exercise influence over the Government; in reality, political circumstances have allowed Cabinets to evade their programme commitments.

By law, a newly formed Cabinet of Ministers is required to develop and submit this document to the Verkhovna Rada within one month of its formation. This refers specifically to the formal registration of the relevant resolution in Parliament. The public presentation of the draft was purely Yuliia Svyrydenko’s initiative — the law does not require it. The Government approved the Programme of Activities on 10 September, and Svyrydenko stated that it would be sent to the Verkhovna Rada. However, it was registered in Parliament even later — only on 23 September. The issue of approving the Programme is to be considered within 15 days of its registration, approximately in early October.

The Programme of Activities is the main document for planning state policy. It forms the basis for the Government’s medium-term action plans (for a three-year period) and its priority action plans (for up to one year). The document should not only outline the Government’s priorities but also include clear goals, objectives, evaluation criteria and implementation timelines. Its approval represents both a vote of confidence in the Cabinet and a granting of immunity — the Verkhovna Rada may not consider any motion of responsibility against the Cabinet of Ministers within one year of the Programme’s adoption.

The Programme of Activities serves as the foundation for the Government’s annual reports to Parliament. Its existence is therefore a key instrument of parliamentary oversight. Based on the discussion of these reports, the Verkhovna Rada may determine whether the Government’s performance is satisfactory or not — and even adopt a resolution of no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers. However, if there is no Programme, this entire logical chain collapses from the start, and Parliament’s oversight function loses its meaning. No Programme — no report. No report — no grounds for assessing the Government’s performance. No assessment — no accountability. This creates a vicious circle of irresponsibility, where the systematic evaluation of political decisions becomes impossible, as such decisions are taken largely on an ad hoc basis.

The experience of previous Cabinets of Ministers shows that governments can function even without any strategic vision of their activities. However, assessing their performance without predefined indicators of achievement appears highly unlikely. For instance, the previous Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (currently Minister of Defence of Ukraine) presented his Programme of Activities in 2020, which Parliament declined to approve even after revisions. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada allow the Government to resubmit its Programme for consideration, but not earlier than one year after its previous submission. Yet Denys Shmyhal did not do so in 2021, 2022 or the following years. As a result, Parliament had no opportunity to evaluate the Government’s performance in the manner prescribed by law.

The absence of regular reporting creates another challenge: each successive Government is effectively forced to ‘reinvent the wheel,’ having no clear understanding of what its predecessors achieved. The former Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroisman’s attempt to introduce the tradition of ‘transition books’ never became an established practice. As a result, Parliament is unable to assess whether the measures proposed by a new Cabinet are innovative initiatives or simply a continuation of previous policies.

The Svyrydenko Government’s Programme of Activities resembles many other strategic documents in Ukraine — a classic case of being ‘for all things good and against all things bad’: approve strategies, raise salaries, create jobs, digitalise services (the latter, incidentally, is almost the only proposed anti-corruption measure).

The Programme covers only the end of 2025 and the year 2026 — just 16 months in total. This is an unusually short planning horizon, suggesting that the Government itself does not envision a longer-term perspective. Structurally, the document consists of 12 priorities, 16 programme goals, and 129 operational tasks. From the previous programmes of the Honcharuk and Shmyhal Governments, it retains the system of assigning responsible ministries, which simplifies monitoring of their performance.

Many of the goals and performance indicators for 2026 are planned to be achieved ‘by New Year’s Eve,’ with a deadline of 31 December. Such end-loaded planning appears questionable, creating the impression that implementation will be postponed until the very end, rather than taking place gradually and predictably.

A telling case is that of the Ministry of Education and Science, which in 2026 is expected to upgrade the qualifications of 50,000 teachers under a new preschool education standard — one that has yet to be approved. This can be interpreted in two ways: either 12,500 teachers would undergo training each quarter, or all 50,000 would do so by 31 December. Both approaches would technically achieve the goal, yet their impact on the education process would differ significantly.

Old projects have also reappeared on the agenda — for example, the construction of a new building for the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre in Kyiv Oblast. This idea is not new: the same proposal was made in February 2022 by then Minister of Justice Denys Maliuska. At that time, the construction was estimated at over half a billion hryvnias, but the tender was cancelled in June 2022 due to spending cuts. In 2025, the construction of the new detention centre returned as a public investment project, with funding allocated in the 2025 State Budget.

A significant portion of the Programme’s goals and performance indicators consists of previously announced projects or ministry plans, or even activities already included in the Government’s Priority Action Plan for 2025. Examples include the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ initiatives such as ‘community rescue officer’ and ‘community police officer’ programmes; the establishment of mental health centres; the ‘e-Consul’ service; and the ‘money follows the teacher’ project — an idea first proposed as far back as 2019.

On the one hand, this approach promotes continuity of government, ensuring that projects are not ‘lost’ but continue to be implemented. On the other hand, the Programme resembles more a compilation of previous plans than a coherent strategic document. Moreover, tasks that the Government sets for itself but fails to deliver — for one reason or another — tend to accumulate and migrate from one programme to another, eventually remaining at the level of promises, plans, concepts or public consultations. No analysis is carried out to understand why something did not work, nor is there a proper assessment of the soundness of future plans and projects.

Whether the Government will receive its one-year immunity from parliamentary no-confidence and whether the Verkhovna Rada will be able to use the oversight mechanism provided by law — we shall soon find out.

Parliament now has a chance to restore its oversight function, as this document serves as a benchmark for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the Government as a whole and of its individual members. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada risks further undermining its own capacity to hold the Cabinet of Ministers to account if it fails to approve the document. In that case, the Government will not be obliged to report to Parliament on its activities — and given MPs’ constant complaints about the lack of control over the Cabinet, such a political stance would be little more than a shot in the foot. The country would once again be left with another collection of promises, whose implementation and success could neither be measured nor properly monitored.

On 16 September, the Verkhovna Rada voted to establish new courts — the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). They will replace the dissolved District Administrative Court of Kyiv, notorious for its anti-Ukrainian rulings. The SDAC and SACA will handle an extremely sensitive category of cases — lawsuits against the Cabinet of Ministers, central executive bodies, the National Bank, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and other key institutions. It took Parliament nearly three years to reach this decision. According to the Ukraine Facility Plan (the Plan), the law should have been adopted by the end of 2024.

At the same time, the commitments also state that the competition for positions at the SDAC and SACA must be announced by the end of September 2025, so that Ukraine does not fail to deliver on the key benchmarks of the Plan. By adopting the law just two weeks before the deadline, Parliament has effectively left the judiciary no chance to conduct this procedure within normal timeframes. Between the first and second readings, Draft Law No. 13302, designated as urgent by the President, gathered dust in the Verkhovna Rada for nearly three months. It is evident that the political leadership was not particularly interested in establishing new higher specialised courts, yet at the last moment, MPs remembered the benchmarks (and the funding tied to their fulfilment) and did eventually vote. The law still requires the President’s signature. Next, the High Council of Justice and the State Judicial Administration must determine the necessary number of judicial posts in the new courts, while the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) must announce the competition.

The adopted law allows civil servants with seven to nine years of experience to apply for judicial positions, which creates an obvious conflict of interest. Representatives of the executive branch would, in effect, be able to adjudicate decisions made by their former employers. In other words, the state would be judging the state. Apart from the inevitable constant recusals of judges, the very structure of these courts differs from existing higher specialised courts, above all the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). This raises the risk that in future the establishment of the SDAC and SACA may be declared unconstitutional. For example, there has already been a submission to the Constitutional Court recognising the HACC as unconstitutional, which the Court has failed to resolve over the past five years.

The competition for positions in the new courts will be conducted by the HQCJ together with a new advisory body — the Expert Council. It consists of three international experts with a casting vote and three Ukrainian judges. In practice, this means a judicial quota in both the HQCJ (eight members) and the Expert Council (three members), which is entirely unjustified and unclear. Moreover, civil society has raised objections regarding two of the three Ukrainian judges in the Expert Council.

The selection of judges for specialised courts should follow procedures that have already been tested and proven effective. One such example is the Public Council of International Experts, composed exclusively of foreigners, which oversees the competition for the HACC.

In addition, for the past three years, administrative cases of Kyiv residents have temporarily been heard by the Kyiv District Administrative Court (KDAC). The Kyiv City District Administrative Court (KCDAC), meanwhile, still exists only on paper. Judges are expected to be appointed there at best in 2026, when the HQCJ fills more than 1,800 vacant posts in local courts. Of these, over 50 judges are to be selected for the KCDAC.

Thus, in the end, new specialised courts will indeed be established. Yet at present, this does not look like a victory. Their creation entails several risks, among them the strengthening of political influence. It remains unclear where these fantastically independent judges will come from if the state intends to select civil servants to adjudicate disputes against the state.

The most important task now is to ensure an impartial and transparent selection of judges who are as virtuous and independent as possible. They must have no loyalty to the state, no political connections and no corruption risks. Otherwise, what was the point of it all? Simply to create yet another controlled court?

The institution of plea bargains was introduced into Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code back in 2012. Its logic is straightforward: the prosecutor may conclude an agreement with a suspect or accused person at any stage of criminal proceedings. The prosecution saves resources, while the defence receives a predictable, agreed punishment, in exceptional cases even below the minimum threshold set by the sanction of the article.

In ordinary criminal cases (theft, robbery, fraud and so on), plea bargains have never gained popularity. In contrast, at the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), their use has been growing exponentially. Society often perceives this as injustice and a ‘buyout’ for the corrupt. At the same time, experts stress that plea bargains are not about avoiding punishment but about ensuring the inevitability of punishment for a greater number of offenders. Still, where is the line between fairness, resource efficiency and public trust?

In 2024, more than 10,000 plea bargains were concluded, mostly in cases of crimes against property and drug-related offences, according to official statistics. The total number of judgments in criminal proceedings was about 77,400. In other words, around 14% of them ended with plea bargains.

At the same time, Ukrainian courts operate a simplified procedure without the examination of evidence (Article 349 of the CPC of Ukraine, which serves as a substitute for plea bargains). Since 2020, even ‘written proceedings’ have been possible in cases of criminal misdemeanours, without a court hearing. The key here is the admission of guilt. According to statistics, more than 80% of defendants (in both crimes and misdemeanours) plead guilty, so the issue lies not in proving guilt but in determining the severity of punishment.

At the same time, the simplified procedure is unpredictable and provides far fewer guarantees than a plea bargain. Neither the prosecutor nor the judge owes the accused anything at all, they merely take it into account as a mitigating circumstance. This is not an agreement (a contract). In practice, this results in an extremely low percentage of acquittals, since in most cases there is no dispute over guilt, and the issue is only the severity of punishment. Everything rests on informal practices — the judge may show leniency and humanity in this matter, as the accused has cooperated with the investigation and admitted guilt. Yet going beyond the limits of the sanction is possible only in exceptional cases, and only to a minor extent.

Global practice looks quite different. In the United States, 95–99% of criminal proceedings end with plea bargains. In the United Kingdom — about 70%, in EU countries — on average more than 50%. In Ireland, this figure reaches 90%.

The case law of the European Court of Human Rights also points to the usefulness of such a mechanism. Concluding plea bargains makes it possible to save resources of both the state and private individuals. A suspect does not have to spend large sums on a lawyer or endure the stress of a lengthy trial with an unpredictable verdict. Meanwhile, the prosecutor and the court also save time and money. Thus, a plea bargain becomes a rational choice, advantageous for both sides.

In Ukraine, one often hears complaints that ‘the institution of plea bargains has not worked’ since 2012. This is indeed true, except for one category of proceedings — high-level corruption cases heard by the HACC. In these cases, plea bargains are increasingly often concluded. Over six years of the Court’s operation, half of its judgments have been concluded in this way. Moreover, in most cases, this happens at the pre-trial investigation stage, which indicates the parties’ real use of procedural economy tools and their desire to reduce the time needed for evidence gathering and the transfer of a case to court.

The dynamics after November 2024 proved particularly telling when Law No. 4033-IX came into force. Before that, the share of plea bargains in the HACC ranged between 25% and 40%. In contrast, Law No. 4033-IX, adopted within the framework of the Ukraine Facility Plan, introduced certain improvements to the institution of plea bargains, albeit in a less ambitious version than the Government had proposed. Yet even under these conditions, the new rules produced a positive effect — 66% of convictions at HACC were delivered based on plea bargains. In comparison, in ordinary courts, only 14% of cases are concluded in this way.

Has Ukraine’s criminal justice system become more effective thanks to the institution of plea bargains? Undoubtedly yes, since a plea bargain is not about avoiding punishment. On the contrary, it is a mechanism for ensuring the inevitability of punishment. This has allowed detectives and prosecutors to concentrate on other proceedings, often more complex and large-scale. In other words, it has freed up resources for a greater number of suspects and criminal schemes.

Yet society does not hear this message. People often say that ‘plea bargains are not fair’. The reason lies in the lack of communication from the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the HACC. They have failed to explain to the public why concluding plea bargains is effective for the criminal justice system. Moreover, the criteria by which the SAPO proposes or agrees to a plea bargain, if it was not the initiator, are not transparent. All the arguments about the rational choice of the individual or the maximisation of criminal prosecution by exposing more corrupt actors do not feature in the public communication of these bodies.

In addition, the court must verify whether a plea bargain serves the public interest. But how is this to be defined? HACC judges interpret the meaning of public interest differently, and their practice diverges. Some judges proceed from public expectations — whether the decision they make will correspond to the demands of citizens. Others focus on resolving the case as quickly as possible with minimal state expenditure, the need to expose other criminal offences and so forth. Thus, the very concept of ‘public interest’ remains evaluative and ambiguous. The absence of a unified approach only reinforces the perception of unfairness.

High-profile cases only add fuel to the fire. The obligations to transfer UAH 2 million to the AFU from the Mayor of Poltava, Oleksandr Mamai, UAH 6 million from MP Oleksandr Trukhin or UAH 500 million from former Minister Mykola Zlochevskyi provoked a storm of debate. Fines amounting to tens of thousands of hryvnias, against the background of multimillion-dollar donations, are perceived by society as an outright attempt to ‘buy out’. A voluntary donation looks like a substitute for punishment, and the entire judicial process appears to be a farce. Yet this is not the case, since we do not know how many resources were saved, how many incriminating testimonies were provided by these convicted individuals, or what the long-term effect of these plea bargains will be.

Explanations — simplified, but considering the secrecy of pre-trial investigation — could be communicated periodically by the leadership of the SAPO and the HACC. Interpreting the ‘policy’ of concluding plea bargains is itself a form of accountability to society, rather than juggling ‘dry’ statistical data without proper interpretation. After all, data without interpretation can be turned in any direction.

The conclusion of plea bargains in HACC cases is increasing and demonstrates its effectiveness. Yet this instrument lies on the edge of public trust. Unless people are given clear explanations of how the process works, it will continue to be perceived as unfair.

Public outrage over plea bargains is understandable. At the same time, it reflects the dominance of a deontological (values-based) approach — ‘to jail every last corrupt official’, so to speak. Yet the resources of the criminal justice system are limited. It is necessary to distinguish between more and less significant proceedings, that is, to prioritise efforts. Combating crime must be viewed dynamically — we could spend all the resources of detectives and prosecutors on prosecuting one ‘notorious’ corrupt official, while dozens or even hundreds of others continue committing crimes. In this way, we absolutise the moral imperative of punishing each individual offender without noticing how others escape liability.

Instead, the fight against corruption can be seen as a system, and the consequences of plea bargains can be considered through a consequentialist approach to justice. That is, to accept that a particular defendant may receive a lighter sentence, but thanks to their cooperation, it becomes possible to expose large-scale schemes and bring dozens of others to justice. This ensures the inevitability of punishment for a greater number of corrupt actors.

As early as the 18^th century, Cesare Beccaria wrote in his treatise On Crimes and Punishments: ‘The certainty of even a mild punishment will always make a stronger impression than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping’. These words remain relevant today, though they are still not understood by most politicians who propose to criminalise something, increase sanctions and believe that criminal law can resolve any social problem.

Draft Law No. 12439 emerged as a response to the decision of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) on the need to protect economic security during wartime. In February 2025, Parliament supported it at the first reading. This looked like a triumph of common sense: business was to receive the long-awaited protection from state pressure, while the state gained a chance to restore entrepreneurs’ trust. As a result, everyone would benefit: business would operate effectively, taxes would flow into the budget, and Ukraine’s investment appeal would grow, enabling the attraction of larger foreign capital. After all, the economy in wartime is crucial for defence capability, making this a matter of national security rather than merely business.

However, between the first and second readings, the draft law turned into something of a monstrosity. Provisions appeared that created new corruption risks and weakened the anti-corruption authorities and the Bureau of Economic Security (ESBU). This compels us to ask: is it truly about the consistent protection of entrepreneurs, or another attempt to covertly destabilise criminal justice in a direction convenient for certain actors? According to sources of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, the updated text of Draft Law No. 12439 was carefully concealed and is expected to be put to a vote in the near future.

New provisions have provoked sharp criticism from civil society organisations, academics and state bodies, including the ESBU, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Let us examine the main advantages and disadvantages of this new pig in a poke from the Ukrainian authorities, and what businesses can expect. A detailed analysis of the draft law is available on the ALI website.

Given the events of July 2025, when attempts were made to restrict the independence of the NABU and SAPO, and the appointment of the winner of the competition for Director of the ESBU was delayed, further introduction of provisions into the Criminal Code is a matter of concern. They may help the guilty evade responsibility, provided they have the ‘right’ connections.

The most problematic is the provision of exemption from criminal liability for tax evasion, smuggling, abuse of office, and so forth on the basis of ‘clarifications’ by the state financial control authority or other central and local executive bodies. In essence, the state is creating a mechanism of official indulgences: the necessary clarification could be obtained even through corrupt means. This would make it possible to circumvent the law and would serve as automatic protection from prosecution, undermining the role of the courts and opening space for abuse in the tax, customs and procurement spheres. 

The ESBU also emphasises the danger: ‘Clarifications by authorised bodies become not merely evidence of good faith in court, but an automatic “alibi” that blocks the very initiation of criminal proceedings’.

Executive bodies cannot interpret the substance of a legal norm enacted by the legislator. Only the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine may claim this role — and even then, only in defined cases. Such ‘indulgences’ grant executive authorities excessively broad discretion, which they may exercise solely within the boundaries of the law. A rhetorical question arises: what kind of ‘school of law’ could have written such a provision?

No less controversial is the attempt to limit the independence of the ESBU. Draft Law No. 12439 proposes new mechanisms. The first — a suspect or their defence lawyer would be able to request a higher-level prosecutor to change the jurisdiction of their case if they believe it is being investigated by ‘the wrong authority’. At first glance, this seems a safeguard for a business or citizen to avoid situations where a case is handled by a body they deem incompetent or conflicted. Yet the defence would need information they usually do not possess to prove a breach of jurisdiction. Thus, one could quite reasonably insist that the ESBU (or any other law enforcement agency) cannot investigate a case. After all, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC) does not define what constitutes a ‘breach of the jurisdiction of a criminal offence’. Prosecutors could approach this matter creatively, including by citing ineffectiveness.

The second mechanism — only the Prosecutor General would be able to register criminal proceedings in cases under Article 191 of the Criminal Code (embezzlement in the economic sphere by officials). Yet these cases fall within the jurisdiction of the ESBU. Formally, this is an ‘additional filter against abuse’, with the prosecution checking whether an investigation should begin. What is striking, however, is the selectivity: why does this apply only to the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine and specifically to Article 191? It looks more like an additional layer of administrative control over the ESBU, which already has limited resources and an unstable state of reform, rather than a systemic solution to the problem of jurisdiction.

This is ostensibly meant to protect businesses from abuse by the ESBU. However, if case materials are first reviewed by a prosecutor, then in situations where there is mistrust of the prosecutor, and the ESBU must act swiftly, this could damage the proceedings. Such violations can be prevented through disciplinary liability, anti-corruption restrictions and internal control mechanisms, rather than by filters of this kind.

The draft law also proposes an unbalanced approach to protecting business by reintroducing the ‘filtering’ practices of the 1960 CPC at the stage of registering criminal proceedings. Under the proposed amendments, a crime report would need to contain sufficient data to be registered. For entrepreneurs, this creates a barrier against unfounded proceedings, but other categories of the criminal process would suffer — victims of ordinary crimes. For them, there is a risk that their reports will not move forward. Even now, it is often necessary to apply to an investigating judge to have a crime report entered when investigators ignore it. What then to say of situations where one must provide ‘sufficient data’ that is often not visible even during the investigation itself, as in cases of sexual violence?

Equally controversial is the expansion of the role of investigating judges, who would be empowered to summon and interrogate witnesses and collect evidence independently. This moves us away from the European model of adversarial proceedings, where the judge’s role is to act as an impartial arbiter. Instead, the judge would be given the right to summon witnesses and experts or examine documents and objects, even if neither party initiated it. In effect, the judge would be ‘supplementing’ the evidence rather than merely assessing what was provided. A biased investigating judge could create conditions for the prosecution to ‘supply’ the missing evidence.

An even greater threat arises in ordinary criminal cases, for instance, when a preventive measure in the form of detention is being considered. The prosecutor submits a motion supported by evidence. The defence objects, arguing that there are no risks and that the evidentiary base is weak. Draft Law No. 12439 would allow the judge to demand additional materials, interrogate witnesses and so on — effectively correcting the shortcomings of the investigation. In such logic, the court ceases to be the guarantor of balance and instead becomes another player on the prosecution’s or the defence’s team.

This resembles the inquisitorial system characteristic of the Soviet CPC. It also goes beyond the impartiality of the court, creating a risk of biased decisions. A judge who independently initiates ‘additional’ testimony or evidence inevitably becomes a party to the process. Instead of remaining neutral, the judge turns into an active player who undermines the principle of adversarial proceedings and may erode trust in criminal court judgments.

At the same time, the draft law contains several positive innovations for business that remain overshadowed by its negative provisions. These would make the criminal process less punitive and more procedurally fair. Business gains real safeguards against procedural pressure, victims receive effective mechanisms to defend their rights, and judicial oversight is provided with clearer standards of reasoning and time limits.

Although Draft Law No. 12439 does include many positive changes for business, in its current form, under the guise of ‘protection’, it weakens the anti-corruption infrastructure and the ESBU.

There is one Criminal Procedure Code in Ukraine. It does not contain adaptations ‘for business’, ‘for officials’ or ‘for ordinary citizens’. All provisions apply equally to different types of criminal offences. If Draft Law No. 12439 now seems like salvation for business, tomorrow these same provisions may work against, say, a victim of a violent crime.

The criminal process should not serve the interests of only one group. Its logic must work for everyone. Otherwise, any amendment intended to ‘protect business’ will in practice undermine victims’ rights, create new loopholes for evading liability or deprive the court of impartiality. We have already experienced this with the ‘Lozovyi amendments’, which we have been unable to repeal fully since 2018. Now we are falling into the same trap again.

If Parliament genuinely wishes to support business rather than provide new tools for abuse, the draft law must be substantially revised, with harmful provisions removed. Otherwise, the so-called ‘protection of business’ will turn into a new spiral of impunity.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation has begun. The start of each parliamentary season always renews expectations of MPs — both regarding new draft laws and legislative initiatives whose consideration has been suspended or has stalled altogether for various reasons and factors.

However, the postponement of strategically important draft laws cannot be blurred into an abstract ‘not the right time’. So which initiatives should MPs consider first?

The Government’s Programme of Activities is the main document for planning state policy. It forms the basis for the Government’s medium-term action plans (for a three-year period) and its priority action plans (for a period of up to one year). The adoption of such a Programme should not be perceived as a mere formality: this document occupies a central place in the entire structure of Ukraine’s state policy and is an important component of parliamentary oversight. In its absence, it is in fact impossible to assess the Government’s performance, since there are no goals or objectives against which this can be done. Indeed, we already have such a precedent: in 2020, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal presented his Programme of Activities, which the Verkhovna Rada sent for revision, but which was never approved. Thus, the previous Government operated without an adopted Programme for more than five years.

On 18 August 2025, Prime Minister of Ukraine Yuliia Svyrydenko, together with members of the Cabinet of Ministers, presented the Draft Programme of Action of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for 2025–2026. But the presentation itself is not enough. The Draft must now be submitted to Parliament for consideration — that is, either to be approved or rejected.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives was involved in the development of this draft law — it is currently under review by the Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights. At this stage, however, it is important to continue working on improving its provisions, discussing and refining them. First, because there are indeed many problems accumulated in the sphere of veteran policy, and they are often systemic in nature, which means that solutions should not be piecemeal but comprehensive.

Work on the draft law needs to be resumed, since oversight of the security and defence sector makes it possible to ensure the rule of law, legality, accountability and transparency of the institutions of the security and defence sector.

The need to adopt an ethical code is highlighted by each successive scandal involving Members of Parliament. Moreover, holding individual MPs to account, whose behaviour discredits the only legislative body of Ukraine, is critically important for restoring its credibility. One need only recall July of this year, when certain MPs outraged the public with their undisguised joy after the vote on Draft Law No. 12414.

Such a code should define the rules of conduct for Members of Parliament in the plenary chamber, in other working bodies of Parliament and, importantly, outside it. The need to adopt an ethical code has been raised since 2016 — in particular, it is one of the recommendations of the Roadmap on Parliamentary Reform. A draft resolution is already before the Verkhovna Rada: at the end of 2022, Draft Law No. 8327 was registered, which is intended to modernise the current rules of parliamentary ethics and create an effective system for their implementation. This will not only separate out unworthy manifestations of behaviour by individual MPs but will also be one of the steps towards increasing trust in Parliament.

Improving the procedures for adapting Ukraine’s legislation to the European Union acquis is one of the key directions of Ukraine’s European integration course. This is important above all for monitoring and screening the reforms being implemented by Ukraine, as mentioned in the recommendations and Roadmaps from the European Union.

Continuing work on the draft law that brings legislation closer in the context of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU must remain in the focus of the Verkhovna Rada and be supported at the level of all parliamentary Committees without exception.

The draft law is intended to reinstate the mandatory competition for appointment to the position of prosecutor in prosecution offices of all levels, conducted by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). It also proposes to repeal other negative changes introduced by Law No. 4555-IX: granting the Prosecutor General oversight powers, bypassing the independent prosecutor-procedural supervisor in criminal proceedings, and providing additional grounds for dismissing ‘disloyal’ prosecutors through structural changes.

Among other things, the draft law provides for measures to improve the operation of criminal justice bodies, primarily of anti-corruption specialisation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives consistently supports the introduction of the Legislative Impact Assessment tool in the law-making activity of the Ukrainian Parliament, in particular, helping to integrate it into the work of parliamentary Committees and the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. This is a structured tool through which the future consequences and likely impacts of proposed decisions can be identified and assessed.

Impact Assessment is mentioned in the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform and the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, which was created in preparation for negotiations with the European Union on concluding the Agreement on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Conducting an Impact Assessment is also required by the Law of Ukraine ‘On Lawmaking’, adopted in 2023. But since the Law will take effect one year after martial law is lifted, Parliament has so far been in no hurry to apply the tool of Legislative Impact Assessment systematically, and it still remains ad hoc. Nevertheless, understanding the principles and practice of applying Impact Assessment is important for everyone involved in developing legislation, especially in the context of continuing parliamentary reform.    

The organisation of recruitment for civil service positions remains one of the most problematic areas in public administration. At the same time, the draft law provides for the phased resumption of competitions for civil service positions, which is critically important for relaunching the process of renewing staff in the public sector.

It was developed as an alternative to the government draft, which was withdrawn due to the change in the composition of the Government.

More on what this draft law seeks to address is noted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in its infobrief on the issue of a politically neutral civil service.

The draft law concerns problems that require urgent resolution at the legislative level, and delaying its consideration is truly unacceptable. At present, the draft law is under review in the relevant Committee and requires further refinement, but its adoption is very important for adapting the state secrets protection system to wartime conditions.

In particular, the draft law regulates such issues as:

• speeding up, during martial law, the classification of information as state secrets;
• revising approaches to the functioning of the clearance system (risk-based approach);
• updating the mechanisms of information exchange between bodies during security checks related to clearance for state secrets and the granting of special permits for activities connected with state secrets.

This draft law grants the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) the authority to develop and submit to the President of Ukraine and the Government draft regulatory acts on matters within the competence of the SSU.

It was adopted as a basis at first reading in April 2025, and there are no critical comments on the content of the draft law. Therefore, its final adoption must also be a priority since it will contribute to the preparation of timely decisions, particularly in ensuring the protection of state secrets.

During the war, Ukraine faces systemic threats and heightened enemy interest in information constituting state secrets — and therefore delaying the adoption of these draft laws, which is certainly not in the interests of the state.

The advancement of the initiatives listed above in Parliament is important for timely responses to all the challenges Ukraine faces under martial law. An updated agenda makes it possible to focus on priority tasks and not postpone important decisions ‘for later’, when the issue will become acute and inevitably require an immediate response.

‘The stick and carrot’ have long been known, since school days, as methods of influence. The state also uses them to govern society. The ‘stick’ — that is, sanctions and punishments — is applied when the state wants to discourage society from certain behaviour. When it seeks to encourage more people to behave in a particular way, it applies the ‘carrot’ — motivation and reward. Both tools must be applied to achieve results, as the proverb teaches us. The Ukrainian Parliament, in striking a balance between the ‘stick’ and the ‘carrot’, is severe — it gives preference to punishment over reward. 

Parliament’s standard reaction to any social problem is the ‘stick’: to increase liability for citizens, to add new articles to the codes, and to introduce harsher sanctions.

Let us take, for example, Draft Law No. 13452 — yet another ‘stick’. It proposes to strengthen punishment for military personnel for disobeying an order with imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years. Moreover, the court would have no right to take circumstances into account or impose a lighter sentence. MPs may vote on this draft law as early as today, 3 September.

The declared aim is to increase discipline in the army, allegedly in response to a demand from the military itself. Yet as soon as information about the draft law appeared, the most critical voices came precisely from the soldiers. Lawyers also question the effectiveness of this approach. For example, Judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, Doctor of Laws Oleh Tkachuk, emphasises: ‘Increasing punishment in itself will not ensure law and order in the Armed Forces’. And not only in the Armed Forces, in fact; this example is by no means an isolated one.

Let us move to 3 March 2022. Exactly one week had passed since the start of russia’s full-scale invasion, and Parliament convened for a session at which it would for the first time adopt laws under martial law. One of the first problems it sought to address was ‘looting’, or what MPs understood by this term. And what they understood by it were theft, robbery, brigandage and extortion committed under martial law or a state of emergency. At that time, the imagination could draw a picture of gangs of criminals carrying away property from houses whose owners were fleeing the fighting. What had to be done to prevent such a situation? MPs used their time-tested trump card — in their imagination — to increase liability. Thus, on 3 March, they registered, reviewed and adopted Law No. 2117-IX, equating any theft ‘under martial law’ to a serious crime.

Did such a decision stop thefts under martial law? No. But it created an exceptional legal problem that even the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court could not resolve, and complicated the interpretation of the new provisions in courts. The very fact that many cases of theft under martial law were heard shows that such offences were nevertheless committed, even though Parliament had increased liability for them.

Moreover, the very definition of ‘looting’ was incorrect. In international law, it means theft of property on the battlefield, in particular from the wounded or the dead. In fact, it has the same meaning in the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this did not prevent lawmakers from calling ordinary offences committed anywhere in Ukraine looting.

‘More punishments — fewer offences’ sounds simple and appealing, but it does not work in practice. Of course, the state cannot hand out only ‘carrots’; there must be punishment for undesirable behaviour. But problems cannot be solved in this way alone. On the contrary, the opposite effect may be achieved — worsening the situation or increasing the burden on law enforcement and the courts. Yet this does not seem to trouble lawmakers. The Committee on Law Enforcement regularly ranks among the top three busiest committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. From session to session, MPs methodically and relentlessly compete over who can devise new punishments. Do these punishments solve social problems? The question is rhetorical. 

The military doubts this — instead of solving the problem, soldiers are likely ‘simply to leave their units (AWOL) more often’. Liability is provided for absence without leave (AWOL), yet more than 200,000 cases show that punishment alone cannot effectively prevent it.

The proverb about the ‘stick and carrot’ is not unique. For example, in the United Kingdom, the more common idiom is about the ‘stick and carrot’. Likewise, Ukraine is not unique in its attempts to influence society. Other states also seek to influence society by different methods. In doing so, they have left the ‘always the stick’ formula far behind. Where Ukraine seizes every opportunity to amend laws, the European Commission proposes a broad set of tools to influence social behaviour, grouped into four categories (each of which includes a list of specific instruments):

1. ‘hard’ binding rules;
2. ‘soft’ regulation;
3. education and information;
4. economic instruments.

Where Ukraine conducts a super-quick analysis in a single day, the European Commission may spend several months studying a problem, choosing the most balanced, rational and effective option for resolving it.

Where Ukraine uses ‘always the stick’, the European Commission may think about changing the environment, the organisational model, the management structure and culture, combining sanctions with incentives, and so on.

This does not mean that the EU never applies ‘sticks’, sanctions and punishments. It does. But only after determining (as a result of thorough analysis and broad consultations) that all other ways of solving the problem will not work, and only legislative changes establishing sanctions for undesirable behaviour can correct the situation.

Ukraine is moving towards the EU. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine plays one of the key roles on this path. And the new, fourteenth session of the Ukrainian Parliament’s work can bring us even closer to the European Union. However, the ratification of a few more technical regulations or uniform product labelling will not make Ukraine a full member of the EU. An important aspect of our development must be a change in the logic of addressing social problems. The European Union was not built with ‘sticks’ alone.

Perhaps Ukrainian lawmakers want to create the impression of a ‘strong hand’ which, holding the ‘stick’, keeps everything under control. Or perhaps MPs continue to do this unconsciously and by inertia, applying only sanctions and punishments, since it is difficult for them to imagine other ways of solving problems. However, the new session of the Verkhovna Rada offers a new chance to change the ways in which society is influenced. Or else — remain hostage to their own ‘stick’.