On 29 August 2019, MPs of the Verkhovna Rada’s 9th convocation took the oath of office. Seven years later, the newly elected — and not so newly elected — representatives still hold their mandates, as martial law remains in force and parliamentary elections cannot be held.

So, what will this Verkhovna Rada be remembered for? The Agency for Legislative Initiatives invites you to look back at Parliament’s journey through the lens of time.

Eighty-four — that is the number of women MPs in the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation as of August 2026. Women chair committees, parliamentary factions and groups, as well as parliamentary delegations. Since 24 February 2022, they have also been actively advancing parliamentary diplomacy.

This is the result both of consistent state policy — including requirements for party lists and additional funding for political parties that complied with the gender quota — and of growing public demand for women’s representation in politics.

One of the first laws adopted by MPs of the 9th convocation abolished parliamentary immunity.

The idea, supported in the all-Ukrainian referendum of 2000, was finally implemented almost two decades later. Since the law was adopted, dozens of MPs have been notified of suspicion of criminal offences. Yet alongside the possibility of holding MPs accountable came the risk of political pressure on them from law enforcement agencies.

‘Button pushing’ had long been an integral part of parliamentary ‘culture’, and even its criminalisation failed to eliminate the problem completely. Finally, in 2021, the touch-sensitive button of the Rada-3 electronic voting system became operational in the Verkhovna Rada.

The voting principle is straightforward: for ten seconds, an MP must keep the voting button pressed with one hand while simultaneously keeping the other hand on the touch-sensitive button. In other words, both hands of the MP are occupied. That put an end to the possibility of multiple voting.

The story of ‘button pushing’ is also an example of how criminalisation does not always work. Adopting a law did not solve the problem; the best solution — a technical one — had been within reach all along.

The electoral victory of the Servant of the People party enabled it, for the first time in independent Ukraine’s history, to form a coalition on its own. Or, more precisely, to become the coalition itself.

In political vocabulary, the phenomenon became known as the ‘mono-majority’. As a result, all power within the ‘Parliament – Government – President’ triangle was concentrated in one political force. Today, however, the mono-majority can hardly adopt any decision without ad hoc support from other factions and groups.

The media dubbed the beginning of the 9th convocation’s work ‘turbo mode’, but the Verkhovna Rada set its real records for adopting legislation during the first months of the full-scale invasion. Between 24 February and 2 April 2022, Parliament sat in plenary on five days, while MPs spent a total of around 2 hours and 23 minutes in the session hall. They devoted roughly 57 minutes directly to considering draft laws and adopted a total of 70 laws and 3 resolutions during that time.

At the same time, the data show a slowdown: draft laws now take longer to pass than at any other point in the convocation, with more than a year elapsing between registration and adoption.

A total of 63 laws were adopted during the 14th session — the lowest figure for the 9th convocation. Given the record-low number of registered draft laws, this points to a substantial decline in legislative activity.

During the term of the Verkhovna Rada’s 9th convocation, Ukraine opened negotiations on accession to the European Union. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis). Yet deadlines for fulfilling all of Ukraine’s EU membership commitments keep being postponed, while MPs are voting for fewer and fewer European integration initiatives.

Parliament appears to have become a hostage to its own ambition: despite its declared readiness to adopt the European integration legislation required, it has still failed to establish a separate accelerated procedure, limiting itself to two half-measures in the form of resolutions.

What the data show: only two European integration laws were adopted during the 14th session. This is the lowest number and the lowest share of adopted European integration laws since the 7th session. Such a pace poses a serious risk to Ukraine’s European integration prospects.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada has extended martial law 20 times.

At the beginning of the convocation, 424 MPs were serving; today, there are 392. Few of them can have expected at the start of their term to hold a mandate for longer than five years, still less under wartime conditions. With no prospect of elections in the near future, MPs are effectively ‘stuck’ in their seats.

The years of the full-scale invasion have shown that the Verkhovna Rada is adaptable to external change and capable of acting when circumstances demand it. At the same time, the overall pace of legislative work has declined over the years. Yet despite this slowdown, and despite debates about Parliament’s agency and capacity, the institution remains central to major state processes. Foremost among them is steering Ukraine along its path towards membership of the European Union. Both the preservation of democratic order and the trust of international partners depend on the Verkhovna Rada’s ability to function effectively.

At the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026), the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) — represented by Kateryna Riabiko, Chair of ALI’s Board — signed the Gdańsk Common Message together with representatives of Ukrainian and international organisations as part of the Civil Society Forum. The document sets out a shared vision for Ukraine’s recovery and priority actions for the Ukrainian Government and international partners, adopted during the Civil Society Forum in Gdańsk on 25–26 June 2026.

The document states that recovery processes should be based on local leadership, transparency, accountability and democratic values. Participants in the discussions stressed that rebuilding institutions and strengthening civic participation are inseparable components of the country’s reconstruction.

The Forum also included meetings with alumni of the Ukrainian School of Political Studies (USPS), which the Agency established and has developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe since 2005. Their leadership in civil society, public administration, business, defence, local self-government, international cooperation and entrepreneurship is a vivid demonstration of the long-term impact of investing in the development of a values-based leadership model in Ukraine.

Kateryna Riabiko noted that today USPS is much more than an educational programme. It is a community of people who shape Ukraine’s future every day across a wide range of fields, support one another’s efforts and unite around shared values. She added that last week she represented Ukraine as part of a delegation at VivaTech in Paris and this week at URC in Gdańsk. In the view of ALI’s Chair of the Board, the value of such events lies in being able to connect them into a coherent picture and a shared outcome in addressing the challenges Ukraine faces today.

In addition, Kateryna Riabiko and USPS alumni took part in discussions on democratic governance, legislative reforms and the role of civil society in Ukraine’s recovery and continued European integration.

URC 2026, co-hosted by the Republic of Poland and Ukraine, brought together representatives of governments, international organisations, business, local self-government bodies and civil society.

The aim of URC 2026 is to strengthen international support for the country’s reconstruction and stimulate investment in Ukrainian business. The event focuses on the sectors most affected by Russian aggression: energy, critical infrastructure and logistics. As a high-level platform for facilitating investment, URC brings together international, sovereign and private investors to accelerate deal-making and lay the foundations for long-term economic transformation.

A separate focus of this year’s Conference is on strengthening Ukraine’s security capabilities, as strengthening the country’s defence capacity is regarded as a necessary precondition for broader reconstruction and long-term development.

Involving international (foreign) experts in selection commissions within judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) is an important element of advancing Ukraine’s European integration interests. It helps to bring national legislation closer to European standards and increases the confidence of European institutions and partners in the reforms. Such involvement stems from Ukraine’s international commitments, as well as from the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The Ukraine Facility Plan provides that ‘further improvement of the selection of new Supreme Court (SC) judges is important, through enhancing the integrity vetting procedure and the meaningful involvement of independent experts’. It also states that the ‘High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is steadily improving its overall operational effectiveness; however, additional judges are needed, selected transparently and on the basis of integrity vetting, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE)’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets out a commitment to fill all 25 vacant positions at the HACC, specifically with the involvement of the PCIE, by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

The European Commission has noted the need to continue involving international experts in the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The Commission has also recommended improving the selection of SC judges and the verification of the integrity declarations of SC judges and judges of other higher courts, with the temporary but meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.

The problem is that, in fulfilling these international commitments, selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts apply different approaches to adopting and publishing their decisions. 

This concerns the selection of candidates for the positions of members of:

• the HQCJ;
• the High Council of Justice (HCJ);
• the head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors;
• judges of the CCU;
• judges of the HACC;
• judges of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC);
• judges of the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).

The differing approaches relate both to the structure and reasoning of selection commissions’ decisions and to the issuing of so-called ‘negative conclusions’ (that is, decisions concerning candidates who have ceased to take part in the competition). For example, the Selection Commission for the positions of HQCJ members (the HQCJ Selection Commission) issues no such conclusions at all; instead, it produces only a final list of candidates recommended for the post of HQCJ member. By contrast, the Ethics Council (which assists in establishing whether a candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity) actively uses ‘negative conclusions’.

Another problem is the adoption of unreasoned decisions. Proper reasoning of decisions following the assessment of candidates against the established criteria should give a clear understanding of what guided the selection commissions when assessing those candidates: what was taken into account and what was not, and the grounds for a particular decision. Proper reasoning would not only resolve many questions for candidates (in particular those who did not pass the competition), but would also help to increase confidence in selection commissions’ decisions. While some selection commissions’ decisions are fairly well structured and properly reasoned (for example, those of the HQCJ and the PCIE), others contain only general wording and boilerplate phrasing and lack proper justification. Such problems are present, for instance, in the Ethics Council’s decisions on candidates’ compliance with the criteriaAt the same time, the Ethics Council’s decisions finding candidates non-compliant with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity are, by contrast, well reasoned. of professional ethics and integrity.

The application of inconsistent practice in formulating decisions may create risks for understanding selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates, and does nothing to promote the transparency of their work.

Different selection commissions use different decision-making models. The votes of international (foreign) experts are always decisive; however, the specific models differ. For instance, a joint decision of the HQCJ and the PCIE in selecting HACC judges requires a majority of the total number of participants in the joint sitting, but no fewer than three votes of PCIE members. For commissions such as the Ethics Council or the SDI Selection Commission, four votes are required, two of which belong to international (foreign) experts. This makes the system of selection commissions confusing and difficult to understand, reducing its transparency and coherence.

A separate issue requiring attention is the right to a casting vote, where approaches likewise differ. For example, international experts hold the right to a casting vote (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the Selection Commission for the positions of the head of the SDI, their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors (the SDI Selection Commission), the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), and the Expert Council); the PCIE has the right to veto any candidate for the post of HACC judge on the grounds of non-compliance with the established criteria.

Numerous cases have also been recorded in which the same person may apply for different competitions for posts, both within a single body and across different bodies under different quotas allocated by different appointing/electing entities. As a result, the absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.

Certain differences are also observed in the publication of selection commissions’ decisions. For example, the Ethics Council adopts and publishes a reasoned conclusion on whether each candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity; the SDI Selection Commission publishes reasoned decisions concerning candidates whose participation was terminated owing to a reasonable doubt as to their compliance with the integrity criterion or the ethical standards established for a judge, but only at the candidate’s written request; for candidates assessed as ‘non-compliant’ against the criteria of high moral qualities or a recognised level of competence in the field of law, the AGE publishes only the operative part of the decision, without setting out the reasons underlying it. The full, reasoned text of the decision is published by the AGE at the written request of such a candidate.

The decisions of some selection commissions (all except the AGE) cannot be challenged in court because they are not regarded as ‘final’. The SC has developed a systematic position on selection commissions, according to which they do not adopt final decisions but merely assist the appointing/electing entity by carrying out a discrete stage of the competitive procedure. Judicial review is instead possible only in respect of the final decision of the appointing/electing entity.

The question of defining the ‘finality of decisions’ is particularly contentious for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For them, such decisions are in essence final (leaving the appointing/electing entity no choice), and the impossibility of challenging them deprives the person of the right to judicial protection. Legislation provides only for the possibility of challenging AGE decisions — specifying which of its decisions may be challenged in court and on which exceptional grounds — whereas no such legislative provision exists for the decisions of other selection commissions.

A further obstacle to the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions in administrative courts is their lack of public-authority powers. The SC’s case law has established an approach according to which selection commissions are not entities vested with public-authority powers in disputed legal relations. Accordingly, in some cases the SC’s case law indicates that disputes against selection commissions are not subject to consideration under the rules of administrative justice (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the SDI Selection Commission). Selection commissions are neither bodies of authority nor entities vested with public-authority powers; they do not have the status of legal entities. Representing such commissions, even in administrative proceedings, is hampered by the absence of rules for designating a representative to sign procedural documents on behalf of selection commissions (their heads do not hold such powers) and to take part in court hearings.

The exception is the AGE, which the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court recognisesRuling of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 20 February 2025 (case No. 990/407/24, proceedings No. П/990/407/24). as a body ‘vested by the state with authoritative and managerial functions in the legal relations arising in the process of forming the judicial corps of the CCU’.

Where such practice is absent:

• the risk of breeding distrust in the functioning of selection commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole increases;
• risks arise in the understanding — by candidates, outside observers, and the public — of these selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates.

At present, there are no draft laws addressing the problem described.

1. Applying different approaches to voting and decision-making by selection commissions — in particular regarding the structure and reasoning of decisions and the approach to determining voting results and so-called negative conclusions — breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
2. The absence of public voting results and insufficient reasoning and justification of such decisions breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
3. The absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.
4. The absence of unified approaches to determining the finality of decisions for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For such candidates these decisions are in fact final — and the impossibility of challenging them, at the level of both regulatory acts and SC case law, deprives them of the right to judicial protection.

The adoption and publication of decisions by selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts in judicial authorities and the CCU require further regulation.

1. Avoid a formalistic approach to justifying decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria.
2. Develop a uniform approach to the structure, justification, and adoption of decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria within a single commission.
3. Develop and approve a template/model decision for the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria, together with accompanying guidance enshrining the requirement that such decisions be properly reasoned.
4. Provide that negative decisions of selection commissions be published in anonymised form, and positive decisions be published with the personal data that were public during the candidate’s public interview. If a person who received a positive decision was not appointed to the post, they may apply to the selection commission to have their data anonymised.
5. Develop and introduce a single database of candidate profiles, with a uniform CV format, for those taking part in competitions for posts in judicial authorities and the CCU. Grant access to these profiles to members of the relevant selection commissions and of the relevant bodies to which candidates are appointed/elected.
6. In future, review the approach to granting international (foreign) experts a casting vote.
7. Hold a broad discussion on the question of defining the final nature of decisions adopted by selection commissions.
8. Enshrine in legislation clear grounds for the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions solely on the basis of procedural non-compliance, in particular for candidates for whom such commissions’ decisions on non-compliance with the established criteria effectively mean the termination of their participation in the competition and are therefore final. The legislation should provide for the period over which a selection commission assesses a candidate’s compliance with the integrity criterion.
9. Enshrine in legislation rules governing which selection commissions’ decisions may be challenged and on what grounds, which may not be challenged, and the rules for representing selection commissions in court.
10. Continue consolidating the SC’s case law and developing standard approaches to resolving disputed situations on the issues identified.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The second presentation of the interim Shadow Report: the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, together with a coalition of civil society organisations, presented the findings of its monitoring under the ‘Functioning of Democratic Institutions’ area of the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster. It covers Parliament, European integration, elections, civil society, governance and multi-level governance. The report sets out the current state of play, the progress of reforms in this area, and recommendations from experts at the organisations concerned.

Experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Civil Network OPORA and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law shared their work. The presentation was joined by representatives of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), which is responsible for enlargement and EU accession negotiations with candidate countries and potential candidates.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director for Analytical Work at ALI, congratulated the coalition partners and the EU representatives on the opening of the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster for Ukraine.

Under the ‘Parliament’ section, participants discussed the challenges and recommendations relating to parliamentary reform, the autonomy of the Verkhovna Rada, the legislative process and related matters. The expert noted that, since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada has remained functional and legitimate, and that during the first session under martial law parliamentarians passed 258 laws — the largest number of laws adopted in a single session in the history of the Ukrainian parliament.

The presentation also addressed Ukraine’s progress on the European integration track, in particular the planning and development of law-making, policy implementation, and the monitoring of the changes introduced.

One of the significant achievements in this area has been the approval of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law. It is now important to enshrine in law the status and binding nature of the National Programme, and to align it with the Verkhovna Rada’s legislative work plan.

During the presentation of the ‘Governance’ section, Oleksandr Zaslavskyi described the current situation — namely the structural and staffing changes in the Ukrainian Government, the challenges in its interaction with the Verkhovna Rada, and the planning of government activity, particularly with regard to fulfilling international commitments.

On multi-level governance, Volodymyr Skrypets noted that the European integration processes are continuing in this area too: in December 2025 the Government adopted Resolution No. 1748, ‘Certain Issues of Reforming Local Self-Government and the Territorial Organisation of Power under Martial Law and in Preparation for Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union’. However, under conditions of full-scale war, the problems that come to the fore are those linked to the depopulation of Ukrainian communities, the falling number of local council deputies, and the attraction of investment at the local level, including the implementation of the State Strategy for Regional Development.

As a reminder, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, together with a coalition of civil society organisations, previously presented to the European Commission the interim findings of this year’s Shadow Report under Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

For the third year running, the coalition of civil society organisations coordinated by ALI has been monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress on European integration. This is an independent, alternative analysis by representatives of civil society and the expert community, coordinated by ALI. The coalition comprises experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe without Barriers, the Ukrainian Bar Association, Civil Network OPORA and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, with media support from European Pravda.

As has become customary, the new Shadow Report will be published ahead of the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2026.

The Shadow Report is a systematic audit by sector experts from civil society organisations. It does not duplicate the state’s official documents or the European Commission’s assessments and is not dependent on their positions. Rather, it is an analytical tool for developing a professional and comprehensive understanding of European integration processes, one that involves experts in the reform process. At the same time, it assesses how far Ukrainian legislation and the system as a whole conform to EU standards.

Producing shadow reports is a regular practice for all candidate countries seeking to join the European Union. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova, independent coalitions of civil society organisations have for years carried out alternative monitoring of reform progress in areas such as the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions. In Ukraine, this work has been carried out systematically since 2024, when a coalition of civil society organisations first prepared an alternative analysis to accompany the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is entirely a product of civil society, regardless of its sources of support. To strengthen the institutional independence of the process, from 2026 ALI is establishing a new trend: the Shadow Report is also financed by independent civil society organisations. A significant share of the funding for its development will be covered by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine. ALI takes on the mission of ensuring the maximum impartiality and objectivity of this preparation process, as it does every year.

European integration assessmentThis refers to (1) the assessment of a draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s international commitments in the field of European integration and (2) the verification of a draft law’s compliance with EU law (the EU acquis). is designed to verify whether a draft law complies with European Union law (the EU acquis). Such an assessment makes it possible to evaluate how far the proposed regulation aligns with the relevant act of EU law and to identify, in good time, provisions that may conflict with EU law and slow down the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation.

The obligation to carry out European integration assessment of draft laws is set out in several legal acts of differing legal force, each governing different stages of the legislative process. This approach does not foster a single, unified mechanism for conducting European integration assessment, since its individual elements are regulated in different ways.

Parliamentary assessment is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (hereinafter, the Committee on European Integration). Current legislation does not oblige other committees to respond to the observations and proposals set out in the Committee’s opinions. The absence of any statutory definition of a ‘European integration draft law’, or of the criteria for one, limits the scope for the relevant committee to carry out European integration assessment.

The requirement to assess draft laws for compliance with international commitments on European integration and with EU law is established by several legal acts.

Law of Ukraine No. 1629-IV ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004, remains in force. Law No. 1629-IV provides for the mandatory assessment of all draft laws by the parliamentary committee on European integration. The committee is required to determine whether a draft law falls within an area, the legal relations of which are governed by EU law. Draft laws falling within such areas are referred to the authorised central executive authority for the preparation of an expert opinion on their compliance with the EU acquis.

This Law, however, has not been amended following the enshrinement of the European integration course in the Constitution of Ukraine or the granting to Ukraine of EU candidate status. In practice, although the Law remains formally in force, it is not applied.

Instead, the assessment of European integration laws is governed by several other acts. A draft law initiated by the Government undergoes assessment before it is even registered in Parliament. The Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers require every draft law to undergo a mandatory assessment of its compliance with Ukraine’s European integration commitments and with EU law.

Assessment of European integration laws is provided throughout a draft law’s passage through the Verkhovna Rada: from registration to consideration in the second and subsequent readings.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that, after registration, every draft law must be referred to the Committee on European Integration, which assesses the draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s commitments in the field of European integration and issues an expert opinion. The Committee is required to deliver this opinion within 21 days. In practice, given the volume of draft laws registered in Parliament, meeting this requirement of the Rules of Procedure is unrealistic. Since the start of the ninth convocation, more than 9,000 draft laws have been registeredAs at 01.06.2026, 9,145 draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. in the Verkhovna Rada.

In July 2022, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which provided for additional assessment of European integration draft laws. When preparing such draft laws for the second and subsequent readings, parliamentary committees are required to refer them to the Committee on European Integration and to the Government for additional assessment.

As a result, the mechanism for European integration assessment of draft laws is established by acts of differing legal force, which undermines the development of a consistent practice in assessing European integration draft laws. Moreover, neither the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada nor Resolution No. 2483-IX places main committees any obligation to respond to the observations expressed in the expert opinions of the Committee on European Integration.

At the same time, legislation contains no definition of what constitutes a European integration draft law, which somewhat diminishes the role of such assessment. A draft law may be designated as a European integration draft law at different stages of its passage through the Verkhovna Rada (at registration or after its adoption in the first reading), creating a risk that the relevant committee or the Government may become involved and deliver its opinionFor example, the Committee revised its opinion on Draft Law No. 13071 — determining that the draft law was aimed at implementing a measure under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions — only after the draft law had been adopted in the first reading and after the comparative table for the second reading had been submitted. The Committee on European Integration had not provided an opinion before the first reading. Draft law card, registration No. 13071 of 11.03.2025. only at a late stage. Where a draft law is revised after it has been designated as a European integration draft law, bringing it into line with EU law may require additional time.

For a long time, draft laws were designated as ‘European integration’ by the Committee on European Integration, acting at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative. In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to Membership of the European Union’, which provides that the special ‘European integration’ marker is assigned by the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Law of the European Union. Other draft laws may acquire ‘European integration’ status on the basis of an opinion of the Committee on European Integration.

Whether or not a draft law has been designated as a European integration draft law determines the extent of the Committee on European Integration’s involvement. If a draft law prepared for the second reading is, in substance, contrary to EU law but has not been designated as a European integration draft law, the Committee on European Integration has no right to deliver its opinion.

To strengthen the role of European integration assessment in the consideration and adoption of draft laws in the Verkhovna Rada, the following steps are needed:

• Unify the European integration assessment process across all stages of a draft law’s consideration in Parliament, preferably by introducing a dedicated procedure for the adoption of European integration draft laws.
• Define the concept of, and the requirements for, a ‘European integration draft law’. This would help to resolve the uncertainty surrounding which draft laws are subject to European integration assessment.
• Expand the powers of the Committee on European Integration to conduct assessment at all stages of the legislative process. Assessing every draft law prepared for the second and subsequent readings would be impractical given the Committee’s heavy workload. Instead, the Committee could be granted the right to conduct European integration assessment of draft laws (that have not been designated as European integration draft laws) on its own initiative or at the request of the main committee. Other committees should develop a mechanism for responding to the opinions of the Committee on European Integration — for example, by considering such opinions at committee meetings.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

In Ukraine, the office of Prosecutor General is regarded as one of the offices most subject to political considerations. Questions about appointments, powers and insufficient independence have surrounded almost everyone who has held the post.

Prosecutors General have consistently faced accusations of lacking professional experience, political bias, persecuting activists and even participating in the July 2025 attempt to eliminate the independence of the anti-corruption institutions. There is no avoiding the truth: Ukraine has often appointed politicians, unqualified individuals or people of questionable reputation as Prosecutor General. Sometimes all three at once.

The possibility of early termination does not guarantee the Prosecutor General sufficient independence. A resolution of no confidence supported by a majority of MPs, or 226 votes, is enough to remove the office holder. This makes the Prosecutor General a hostage to political forces and creates scope for pressure while the office holder remains in post.

The European Commission has noted the politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General. It requires a transparent and objective process that takes account of the views of prosecutors themselves.

There is now active discussion of introducing competitive selection for the position: the relevant draft law No. 15343 was registered on 22 June 2026. Ukraine’s scope for far-reaching legislative change is limited, however, because the Constitution cannot be amended during martial law.

If elements of the chosen model are found unconstitutional, its further implementation will be called into question. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) has assessed how these processes could unfold in Ukraine’s circumstances.

Can the office of Prosecutor General be made less politicised during the war and, if so, how? How can Ukraine meet the European Commission’s requirement now and improve the procedure further once martial law ends? This article examines the options.

Under the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor General with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada. Yet the appointment procedure does not provide for transparent selection, prior assessment of a candidate’s professional competence or the participation of prosecutorial self-governance bodies through a merit-based selection process. The President’s unrestricted discretion over whom to nominate increases the risk that candidates will be politically dependent.

The Prosecutor General may be dismissed either for a breach of the law, under the professional criterion, or on political grounds through a vote of no confidence. The first mechanism does not work in practice, as all attempts to hold a Prosecutor General to disciplinary account have come to nothing. This leaves a vote of no confidence by political forces, which may be a direct response to the Prosecutor General’s efforts to combat political corruption and economic offences involving MPs themselves. It can therefore become a tool of political pressure and has repeatedly led Prosecutors General to submit a resignation pre-emptively. As early as 2014, the Venice Commission recommended ‘abolishing the vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General’.

At first glance, a competitive procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General appears to be one possible mechanism for strengthening prosecutorial independence, reducing political influence over the office and increasing public trust in the prosecution service.

The Government does not support competitive selection. The prosecution service is not an executive authority and the Prosecutor General is not a member of the Government appointed on political grounds. The office is nevertheless part of the political system. Since competitive selection would restrict the President’s and Parliament’s discretion over whom to appoint, they are also likely to oppose such a solution.

The main constraint, however, is the constitutionality of such a step. Introducing it would require amendments to the Constitution, which cannot be made during martial law.

The Constitution clearly provides that appointing the Prosecutor General is currently the exclusive competence of the President and Parliament. This means that no competition, consultation or other appointment procedure is presently possible.

There are as many arguments that competitive selection would be constitutional as there are arguments to the contrary. Few people, however, are prepared to ask Parliament to support a risky legislative initiative that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) may soon declare unconstitutional.

In my view, the CCU would ultimately adopt a purposive interpretation. It would reason that, because the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General did not change even when the prosecution service became part of the justice system in 2016, the legislature did not intend to introduce such a change. A competition was introduced for judges, but not for the Prosecutor General. The Court would therefore conclude that any restriction of the powers of the joint appointing authority, the President and the Verkhovna Rada, would be unconstitutional. The President’s powers to appoint judges and the Prosecutor General are thus part of the system of checks and balances that, among other things, safeguards the rule of law.

Ukraine could reduce the politicisation of the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, and thereby meet the European Commission’s requirement, as early as 2026. The first step would be to await the Venice Commission opinion referred to in Ukraine’s EU integration commitments.

Any legislative initiative adopted must avoid risks that could subsequently lead to the procedure being declared unconstitutional. A transitional model is therefore unavoidable: it will be a compromise rather than an ideal arrangement. Once martial law ends or is lifted, MPs will have a much wider range of options, although no one knows when that will happen.

One temporary solution could require the President, before submitting a nominee for Prosecutor General, to obtain an opinion on the candidate from the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine. This would require a genuinely independent Council. The Rule of Law Roadmap provides for the Council’s transformation and for its institutional independence to be strengthened through legislation by the end of 2026. This should include its complete separation from the Office of the Prosecutor General, a review of its functions and members’ working arrangements, its establishment as a separate legal entity and provision of its own secretariat.

Would the opinion be binding? Not as a matter of law, because the President’s and Parliament’s discretion cannot be restricted without constitutional amendments. Under the transitional model, respect for the opinion would therefore depend on political convention. Even so, the procedure would clearly increase transparency and trust, demonstrate the criteria on which the President nominates a candidate and allow the self-governance body to provide a considered assessment. Making the process public would reduce the politicisation of the appointment.

After the war, when the Constitution can be amended, such an opinion could become binding and the Council of Prosecutors could conduct a competition or apply another procedure at its discretion. It could, for example, select the strongest candidate from among prosecutors on the basis of predetermined criteria, including integrity.

Without amending the Constitution, the dismissal procedure could involve a Temporary Investigation Commission (TIC) of the Verkhovna Rada. A TIC exercises parliamentary oversight by investigating matters of public interest. It would therefore be logical for MPs serving on the commission to examine failures by the Prosecutor General to perform functions and tasks that do not amount to a criminal offence or disciplinary misconduct and do not otherwise create grounds incompatible with holding office.

Once martial law ends, Ukraine could consider fully abolishing the political procedure for dismissing the Prosecutor General, namely a vote of no confidence. The law should retain only professional grounds for dismissal, such as the commission of a criminal offence or disciplinary misconduct.

Ukraine’s European partners are not demanding competitive selection, the involvement of international experts or the complete removal of the office of Prosecutor General from politics. They require the appointment and dismissal procedures to be open and transparent and the prosecutorial community to be involved. European standards for prosecution services do not prescribe a single mandatory model for appointing a prosecutor general. They focus on the quality of the procedure, candidates’ professionalism and minimising political influence.

Ukraine should therefore not risk introducing potentially unconstitutional selection and dismissal mechanisms in the name of openness. There are viable ways to update the procedures, including a model involving an institutionally strengthened Council of Prosecutors. The focus should be on realistic mechanisms capable of producing a constitutionally acceptable result and delivering change now, during martial law. Otherwise, the goal of depoliticising the office of Prosecutor General will remain at the level of ambitious declarations rather than be translated into functioning procedures, drawing Ukraine into a politically unproductive dispute with no practical outcome.

Who should appoint and dismiss the Prosecutor General, and how? Today, that decision rests almost entirely with those in power: the President appoints the head of the prosecution service with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada, while removal can be secured through a parliamentary vote of no confidence — a majority of MPs’ votes.

The consequence is chronic institutional instability: in all the years of Ukraine’s independence, no Prosecutor General has served a full term of office, and the average tenure falls short of even two years.

The dismissal procedure was criticised as far back as 2014 by the Venice Commission, yet the 2016 constitutional amendments on justice left the office of the Prosecutor General untouched. Ukraine has therefore already committed to depoliticising the procedure as part of its accession to the European Union. The agenda now features a draft law that would introduce an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General with the involvement of international experts — a proposal that has stirred public debate.

In a new policy paper, the experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives examine the substance of Ukraine’s European integration commitments, the relevant European standards and the models adopted by EU member states; weigh the arguments for and against an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General through the lens of constitutionality; and set out concrete scenarios — from the most far-reaching to the most modest — for both appointment and dismissal.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives sets out its own vision: which option is best in the long term, and what can realistically be done right now — under martial law, when amendments to the Constitution are not possible.

Read the policy paper to understand how the office of the Prosecutor General can be depoliticised — and why this is one of the key preconditions for the rule of law in Ukraine.

On 15 June, the European Union opened the first and most difficult negotiating cluster in its accession talks with Ukraine. This not only recognises the progress Ukraine has made during the full-scale invasion, but also reminds us of the scale of the ‘homework’ that remains on the path towards EU membership.

Ukraine’s further progress on EU integration depends largely on the Verkhovna Rada’s ability to adopt legislation. Some laws are directly linked to tranches of macro-financial assistance. Others concern the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law. In particular areas, Ukrainian rules must therefore correspond to those of the EU, including through common terminology, mechanisms and instruments for exercising the rights conferred.

The authorities’ plan is ambitious: to complete legislative alignment in 2027. This will require the preparation and adoption of almost 300 new EU integration laws. The National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law sets out this task and is intended to guide the Government on what must be adopted and when. The Verkhovna Rada generally supports the document, but problems arise when it comes to voting.

At the same time, Ukraine has no modern framework law on European integration. The Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted as far back as 2004, is not adequate for this task. Although it defines general approaches and institutional mechanisms, it has not been amended to reflect Ukraine’s accession process. In other words, Parliament has not developed new rules since Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and accession negotiations began.

A gap has therefore emerged between the scale of the new tasks and the tools available to perform them. A modern law defining responsibilities for state policy on European integration would end MPs’ endless search for their place in the process and could strengthen their oversight of the Government. Since the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution in 2019, there has been ample time to regulate an area in which the scale of legislative approximation is unprecedented.

It is therefore unsurprising that both society and MPs are sceptical about the prospect of adopting all EU integration legislation by the end of 2027. In 2026, Parliament adopted only eight EU integration laws, counting only those with the relevant designation in their draft law records. If the pace of the past year continues, Ukraine may join the EU in 75 years.

The slow pace reflects both institutional fatigue and flawed Government initiatives that MPs have to revise in Parliament. They appear trapped. They can either become scapegoats by voting for poor-quality laws and unpopular decisions, or refuse to vote, jeopardising Ukraine’s access to loan financing and disrupting the legislative alignment timetable. Yet the issue is not only the speed or number of legislative initiatives adopted. The quality of Parliament’s legislative work and the organisation and planning of the process are equally important.

The Verkhovna Rada appears to lack a common vision for a procedure to adopt EU integration legislation that reflects the positions of all political forces represented in Parliament. MPs themselves have different views of Parliament’s role. This was also demonstrated by the registration of a draft resolution to dismiss the chair of the relevant European integration committee. It was, however, withdrawn almost immediately after registration.

The Verkhovna Rada has failed even partially to address the problem by amending its Rules of Procedure to introduce a separate procedure for adopting EU integration draft laws. Draft law No. 8242 did not seek to accelerate the legislative procedure but proposed stricter requirements for the supporting documents for EU integration draft laws and a more thorough assessment of compliance with Ukraine’s EU integration commitments. Although registered in November 2022 and recommended by the committee, it was never brought forward for consideration. Draft law No. 13653 and its alternative, which propose an expedited procedure by shortening the time allowed to prepare EU integration draft laws for consideration, have not even received a committee opinion. They would effectively give EU integration laws priority and allow them to be adopted in a single reading if neither the parliamentary committee on European integration nor the Government has objections. Parliament evidently lacks the political will to consider these draft laws, despite the declared need and the initiatives already registered. As a result, around one hundred EU integration draft laws are waiting for their turn on the agenda.

Instead of introducing a comprehensive separate procedure for EU integration legislation, the Verkhovna Rada has relied on half-measures in the form of resolutions. Such resolutions generally address individual organisational issues, whereas a law establishes a coherent regulatory framework for an entire field.

After Ukraine was granted candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX in July 2022 to improve the legislative process. It identifies the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law as one of the Verkhovna Rada’s priorities and the Government as the principal initiator of EU integration draft laws. The Resolution introduced an expert assessment of draft laws’ compliance with EU law before the second reading and required parliamentary committees to establish European integration subcommittees. The effectiveness of these subcommittees is, however, open to question. The Verkhovna Rada also instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to ensure official translations of EU legislation and create a single information database on legislative approximation. Although the Resolution introduced an EU compliance review mechanism for draft laws, it is no substitute for a full legislative procedure established by the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada.

In early June 2026, MPs supported Resolution No. 4912-IX, which is intended to strengthen cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. MPs had often complained that the Government did not inform them of forthcoming EU integration plans. The Resolution therefore appears to be a compromise between the Cabinet and Parliament aimed at increasing MPs’ involvement in the process. It provides for ‘parliamentary support’ for the Government’s work on EU integration draft laws and partly addresses Government officials’ accountability to Parliament.

Under the Resolution, the Government must agree amendments to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Legislation to EU Law with the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada or a Deputy Chairman, taking into account the positions of the relevant sectoral committee, the European integration committee and the relevant negotiating group for the chapters concerned. The Cabinet of Ministers must also cooperate more closely with them, including by informing them of the results of consultations with the European Union. In addition, the Resolution requires the Government to submit quarterly reports to the Verkhovna Rada on implementation of the National Programme and the current state of EU accession negotiations. Such reports are unlikely to be considered at a plenary sitting, however, as Resolution No. 4912-IX does not impose this obligation on the Government.

The adoption of laws is unquestionably the exclusive power of the Verkhovna Rada, which may choose whether and how to regulate its own activities under the principle of parliamentary autonomy. Yet all these decisions remain fragmented. Parliament is effectively trying to adapt to new tasks through a series of isolated, targeted measures. The workload on the EU integration track will only increase, creating a need for a comprehensive legislative procedure that reflects the specific features of preparing, considering and adopting EU integration draft laws. This would allow Parliament to address a much broader set of tasks systematically instead of wasting time patching up outdated tools.

Parliament’s success on the EU integration track does not depend solely on its ability to press a few buttons. MPs do not have the Government’s bureaucratic resources to prepare article-by-article concordance tables and assess draft laws’ compliance with EU law. The Verkhovna Rada’s progress also depends on the Cabinet’s ability to prepare substantively sound draft laws and make the case for their adoption, a task at which the Government has so far performed poorly. For example, the Kos-Kachka plan, agreed in December 2025, does not yet have a single item completed in full.

Only the Verkhovna Rada can adopt laws, however, so it should have the strongest interest in creating conditions for the smooth and swift adoption of EU integration legislation. A dedicated EU integration legislative procedure would help. It should define what constitutes an EU integration draft law and establish requirements for its supporting documents, including assessments and tables of compliance with EU law. At the same time, an expedited parliamentary procedure must include safeguards against abuse: a minimum period should be set to give MPs and committees sufficient time to examine the text.

Experience also shows that rules and procedures may not be enough. Breaching the Rules of Procedure is commonplace in the Verkhovna Rada. Even today, a significant share of EU integration initiatives remain ‘stuck’ in committees despite their priority status. The effectiveness of the EU integration track will therefore depend not only on the existence of a special legislative procedure, but also on MPs’ genuine willingness to follow it. Otherwise, the ambitious goal of joining the EU in 2027 will remain yet another piece of empty rhetoric.

Following the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada were extended, defining the principles for implementing the state’s course towards acquiring full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO. At the same time, no amendments have been made to the sectoral lawsThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of the People’s Deputy of Ukraine’, and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Temporary Investigative Commissions and Temporary Special Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’. that would clarify the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the sphere of European integration.

The role and powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the European integration process are regulated only in a fragmentary manner, which prevents the formation of a coherent system of institutional arrangements for EU accession.

As the sole body of legislative power, Parliament adopts laws, including European integration laws. However, the pace at which such laws are adopted is slow: over the course of 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted only eightAs of 17.06.2026. European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate, expedited procedure for adopting European integration laws.

Within its oversight function, the Verkhovna Rada applies certain mechanisms to scrutinise the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the sphere of European integration: holding a ‘Government Question Time’For example, on 01.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the current state of the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, the opening of negotiation clusters, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of European integration, and the implementation of the list of priority draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 01.05.2026. On 29.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the implementation of state policy in the sphere of Ukraine’s foreign-policy activity under martial law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 29.05.2026. or hearing representatives of the GovernmentOn 29 April 2026, a meeting of the Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy was held. Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. At the meeting on 06.05.2026, the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy heard information at its meeting on the principal commitments within the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the EU relating to finance, taxation and customs policy. Materials of the Committee meeting of 6 May 2026. Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. in committees.

At the same time, there is no coherent legislative mechanism governing how interaction should take place between the Government that currently acts as the principal driving force in the sphere of European integration and Parliament. Certain institutional mechanisms for coordination and procedures for adapting legislation are set out in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004. The Law defined the role of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, of the authorised body in the sphere of adaptation, and of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the State Programme. For example, under this Law, the Coordination Council is to prepare an action plan for implementing the State Programme, the relevant parliamentary committee is to approve it, and the Cabinet of Ministers is to endorse it. However, this Law has not undergone any amendments — neither after the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution, nor after the Association Agreement entered into force, nor after the start of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX on parliamentary support for the negotiation process. By this Resolution, the Verkhovna Rada took note of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘On Approval of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)’ of 01.04.2026 No. 438. It should be noted that measure 2 of strategic outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Public Administration Reform Roadmap provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to adopt a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme., approved by the Government. The Government has an obligation to agree any changes to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law with the Chair of the Verkhovna RadaOr, in the Chair’s absence, with the First Deputy Chair or a Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada..

The Resolution relates rather to the oversight powers of the Verkhovna Rada and provides that the Government must report on progress in the sphere of European integration: (1) inform the Verkhovna Rada, the main committee and the Committee on European integration of the results of consultations with the European Union concerning the content of draft laws being prepared by the Government and of draft laws already registered in Parliament; (2) submit a quarterly report on the state of implementation of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis); (3) submit a quarterly report on the current state of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU; and (4) promptly inform the Verkhovna Rada of decisions taken in respect of Ukraine by EU bodies and of the individual positions of member states, and so on. At the same time, this approach to providing information can hardly be described as inclusive or transparent: Resolution No. 4912-IX does not provide for the consideration of the reports submitted by the Government (whether by the relevant committee or at a plenary sitting of Parliament).

Resolution No. 4912-IX also placesThe National Adaptation Programme also comprises the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, and the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine. the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada under an obligation to ensure coordination of the Verkhovna Rada and its Secretariat with regard to (1) implementing the measures of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (in respect of Section III, ‘The Functioning of Parliaments in a Democratic System’); and (2) the procedure for working with the National Adaptation Programme.

Within the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union is in operation. It is this Committee that carries out the parliamentary assessment of draft laws for compliance with Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the sphere of European integration and with the EU acquis. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that this Committee prepares an opinion on every draft law registered in Parliament.

In addition, pursuant to Resolution No. 2483-IX, the Committee on European Integration also assesses European integration draft laws ahead of the second and subsequent readings, which increases the workload on the Committee. The Chair of the Committee has repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the Committee’s staffing capacity. The Committee’s powers also include granting a draft law ‘European integration’ status, at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative.

Within its oversight powers, the Committee holds monitoring meetings. For example, in April 2026, the Committee held a meeting, where the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law was presented.

At the same time, the Committee has not been designatedThis is due to the distribution of areas of competence among the committees of the Verkhovna Rada. For example, a draft law concerning the protection of natural resources is considered by the Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management; one concerning the activities of political parties, by the Committee on Legal Policy; one concerning customs policy, by the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy, and so on — even though such draft laws may be European integration ones. as the main committee for the preparation of any European integration draft law, which means that the weight of its assessment in the legislative process depends largely on the position of the main committee and its willingness to respond to the comments of the relevant committee. The draft laws that the Committee on European Integration considers as the main committee mostly concern the ratification of Ukraine’s international treaties with the EU and its member states.

In July 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX, which provided for the establishment of European integration subcommittees in all parliamentary committeesNamely, subcommittees on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of EU law (EU acquis) and on the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international legal commitments in the sphere of European integration. (other than the Committee on European Integration).

Committees took two approaches: most established new subcommittees, while a smaller number assigned the new areas of competence to existing subcommittees. As of 2026, such subcommittees have been created within all committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; however, Members of Parliament rate their effectiveness as low.

Members of such a subcommittee take part in the meetings of the relevant Committee on European Integration and also hold meetings with the Government on European integration progress. At the same time, these subcommittees have not been given any new instruments for their work or for their participation in the European integration process. At the subcommittee level, there are no agreed approaches to assessing draft laws for compliance with the EU acquis, nor appropriate mechanisms for coordination between subcommittees or between a subcommittee and the Government, which results in varying levels of involvement. A subcommittee’s participation in preparing European integration laws often depends on the individual chairing it and on his/hers expertise and activity.

The institutional mechanism associated with the formation and implementation of state policy in the sphere of European integration has not undergone substantial change, despite progress in the negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This creates a gap in the inter-institutional coordination of Parliament and the Government and a mismatch between the political commitments undertaken and the actual capacity to fulfil them. A modern framework law on the principles of state policy in the sphere of European integration could help bridge this gap and ensure the implementation of the declared course towards EU membership.

The mechanism for informing the Verkhovna Rada introduced by Resolution No. 4912-IX should be supplemented with procedures for the mandatory consideration of the Government’s reports on the state of implementation of the National Adaptation Programme and of information on the European integration process. Such reports and information could be considered at meetings of the Committee on European integration, with the involvement of representatives of other committees, or at plenary sittings. These measures should ensure proper feedback and the broader involvement of Members of Parliament, as well as transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making in the sphere of European integration.

The Committee on European Integration should be more closely involved in the process of adopting European integration laws in the Verkhovna Rada. Other parliamentary committees should develop a mechanism to interact with the Committee on European Integration so that its assessment is taken into account when preparing draft laws for consideration at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Verkhovna Rada should also define standards for the operation of the European integration subcommittees and establish their systematic cooperation with the Committee on European Integration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 1 April 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union LawIt is worth noting that Measure 2 of Strategic Outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme. (EU acquis) (hereinafter – the National Adaptation Programme). The document comprises 1,875 tasks, providing for the implementation of more than 1,600 EU legal acts. Ukraine has set the ambitious goal of fully completing legislative adaptation by 2027, taking into account possible transitional periods. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Adaptation Programme.

At the same time, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate procedure for processing and adopting draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law (the EU acquis). Moreover, neither the concept of a European integration draft law nor exhaustive criteria for defining one have been established in legislation.

In the absence of a dedicated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws, their priority consideration is not guaranteed, which may delay the adoption of laws needed to fulfil Ukraine’s European integration commitments. The lack of a legally defined status for European integration draft laws, and of requirements applying to them, complicates the systematic review of draft laws for compliance with EU law.

Developing, adopting and implementing legislation on a dedicated procedure for preparing, initiating, considering and adopting European integration draft laws is one of the Verkhovna Rada’s commitments under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The deadline for this measure was set for the fourth quarter of 2025, yet a separate procedure for adopting European integration laws has still not been established.

MPs have registered several legislative initiatives to address this problem, but none has been considered at a plenary sitting of Parliament. The regulation of procedures for considering European integration draft laws currently remains fragmentary.

For a long time, the key piece of specialised legislation was the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’. This law sets out no separate requirements for adopting European integration laws, but it does provide for the examination of draft laws submitted to Parliament for compliance with the EU acquis at every stage of consideration. However, the law has not been amended in connection with Ukraine’s EU accession process: although it remains formally in force, it is effectively inoperative.

After Ukraine obtained candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which introduced some additional tools for adopting European integration laws.

The Resolution designates the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as the principal initiator of European integration draft laws, although in practice most draft laws aimed at European integration — and marked as such on the draft law’s registration card — have been registered by MPsAs of 01.06.2026, 268 draft laws defined as European integration draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. Of these, 153 were registered by MPs, 104 by the Government and 11 by the President.. Draft laws initiated by MPs account for more than half of all European integration laws adopted.

The adopted National Adaptation Programme designates ministries and central executive authorities as responsible for drafting laws. They submit draft laws to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no later than six months before the date set by the National Adaptation Programme for their adoption by Parliament. In other words, the Government allows a minimum of six months for completing all internal procedures within the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (inter-ministerial approval of the draft law, the conduct of examinations, and so on) and for the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the draft law — which, given the slowdown in Parliament’s work, may be insufficient.

The National Adaptation Programme also provides that, when drafting laws, ministries and central executive authorities must ensure cooperation with parliamentary committees and MPs, in particular by presenting and discussing the concepts of such draft laws at meetings of the relevant committees.

A separate instrument intended to give weight to European integration draft laws is the Legislative Work Plan of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is meant to ensure coordination between Parliament and the Government. For example, the Legislative Work Plan for 2026 contains a separate section listing the European integration draft laws that need to be adoptedIt contains 160 draft laws (41% of the total number of draft laws in the Legislative Work Plan for 2026).. Under this Plan, parliamentary committees were expected to ensure the priority consideration of European integration draft laws. However, the Legislative Work Plan is not a particularly effective planning instrument (for example, Parliament fully implemented only 12% of the 2024 Plan): neither the Government nor Parliament takes it into account in its work.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do not establish separate procedures for adopting European integration draft laws, MPs consider them under the ordinary procedure. The Rules of Procedure allow the use of accelerated proceduresFor example, shortening the deadline for submitting alternative draft laws, or shortening the deadline for submitting amendments and proposals for the second reading. that speed up the consideration of laws. During the 15th sessionThe 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 9th convocation began on 03.02.2026., such procedures were not applied to European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure also allow laws to be adopted as a whole at first reading. During the 15th session, the Verkhovna Rada adopted eight European integration laws, seven of which went throughOne law concerned Ukraine’s accession to the Convention on International Access to Justice. The Verkhovna Rada adopts decisions on the ratification or denunciation of international treaties at first reading, both as a basis and as a whole. the full two-reading procedure.

While the European integration procedure is still not enshrined in the legislation, the Verkhovna Rada is attempting to introduce fragmented innovations through its resolutions.

Resolution No. 2483-IX (adopted in 2022) introduces innovations such as an additional examination of a European integration draft law before the second and subsequent readings, and provides that committees must take into account tables of the draft law’s compliance with EU law as well as the official translation of EU legislation.

Resolution No. 2483-IX also gives preference to considering European integration draft laws under the two-reading procedure. A European integration draft law may be adopted only where there is a positive opinion from the examination conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Given the provisions on additional discussionResolution No. 2483-IX provides for the floor to be given to a representative of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and, at the chair’s discretion, to a representative of the main committee responsible for adapting Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of European Union law (the EU acquis) and for fulfilling Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration., Resolution No. 2483-IX is aimed more at the thorough preparation and consideration of a draft law than at an accelerated procedure for its adoption.

In June 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted another resolution, No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union’^[20]. This Resolution additionally requires the Cabinet of Ministers to inform Verkhovna Rada committees of the outcomes of consultations with the European Union on the content of draft laws being prepared for registration in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as of legislative initiatives already registered.

Resolution No. 4912-IX also provides that draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Adaptation Programme are granted ‘European integration’ status. In addition, other draft laws (including alternative onesThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that draft laws are considered alternative where they contain provisions regulating the same range of issues and, in essence, replicate provisions governing the same social relations.) relating to Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments may be granted such status by decision of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union.

Several draft laws proposing to regulate the process of adopting European integration laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

In November 2022, the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada registered Draft Law No. 8242, which provides for a special procedure for considering European integration draft laws. Under this draft law, European integration draft laws are placed on the agenda without an additional vote and are subject to higher requirements for their supporting documents (such as the inclusion of a translation of the relevant EU legislation and a clause-by-clause compliance table). Draft Law No. 8242 gives priority to applying the two-reading procedure when considering European integration draft laws, and allows the text of draft laws to be revised between readings to reflect the comments set out in the opinions of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union, the Government, and the expert and legal units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat. The main committeeThe main committee responsible for the preparation and preliminary consideration of Draft Law No. 8242 is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. issued an opinion recommending that the Verkhovna Rada adopt this draft law as a basis, but it was not considered at a plenary sitting.

In August and September 2025, MPs registered Draft Law No. 13653 and an alternative to it, Draft Law No. 13653-1. Both draft laws propose amending not only the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but also the Laws of Ukraine ‘On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’ and ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.

There are conceptual differences between the two draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 envisages a leading role for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which approves the National Adaptation Programme and acts as the principal initiator of adaptation draft laws, as well as an accelerated procedure for adopting draft laws. The alternative, Draft Law No. 13653-1, by contrast, strengthens the role of the parliamentary Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union in determining the status of such initiatives and allows for broader participation by MPs.

At the same time, both draft laws shorten the deadlines for submitting alternative draft laws as well as the deadlines for committees to provide their opinions. Both also propose introducing two routes for considering draft laws aimed at European integration: (1) an accelerated route (at first reading), where there are no comments from the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; and (2) the two-reading procedure. Where a draft law is considered under the two-reading procedure, MPs may table amendments and proposals for the second reading only with a justification of how they relate to European integration commitments. The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine prepare an expert opinion on a draft law that has been prepared for the second or repeat second reading.

Both draft laws also include a provision repealing the 2004 Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’.

At the same time, these draft laws do not strike a balance between the speed and the quality of considering European integration draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 provides that, at one stage of consideration, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union must deliver its expert opinion within three days. This period may prove insufficient for providing an expert opinion, particularly for large draft laws and given the committee’s overall workload. Another shortcoming of the draft is the requirement to ‘add’ supporting documents to a draft law if it is recognised as a European integration draft law after registration. In that case, the speed of considering and adopting the draft law will depend on the legislative initiator’s capacity to carry out a swift assessment of compliance with EU law and to prepare a clause-by-clause compliance table.

These draft laws have still not been considered by the main committeeThe committee designated for the preparation and preliminary consideration is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. and therefore cannot be brought to a plenary sitting.

1. The Verkhovna Rada should develop a new draft law, or refine the existing ones, on introducing a separate accelerated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws. It should establish exhaustive criteria for defining draft laws as European integration draft laws, as well as requirements for the supporting documents accompanying such draft laws.
2. For a separate European integration procedure, the abuse of accelerated procedures for considering draft laws must not be permitted. Minimum periods should be set to allow sufficient time for MPs to review draft laws and for the committees and the structural units to provide examination opinions. These periods should take into account the real capacity of the committees and the structural units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat to process the text of a draft law.
3. At the same time, the mere existence of such a procedure does not guarantee the swift processing and consideration of European integration draft laws. A significant proportion of European integration initiatives are still pending under review of the main committees, despite the current provision on their priority processing.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.