Lawyers have a long-standing joke: ‘Crime is organised, but you are not.’ Events of the past few days have added an entirely unfunny reality to that joke — one of ‘systematised corruption’ that the Office of the President apparently wants, at the very least, to ‘control’ and, better still, to ‘lead’.

These were the messages Ukrainians heard on the morning of 19 August in the latest recordings concerning high-level corruption. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) then launched a special operation ‘to expose a criminal organisation led by current and former Members of Parliament, involving high-ranking officials from the Office of the President of Ukraine and other individuals’.

Over the following two days, videos appeared containing transcripts of recorded conversations involving members of the criminal organisation. Among those named by SAPO prosecutors were Maksym Mykytas, a former MP and businessman who headed Ukrbud and is now involved in a number of high-profile criminal proceedings; Vadym Stolar, a current MP from the banned Opposition Platform – For Life (OPFL) and a businessman with long-standing interests in Kyiv real estate and property development; Iryna Mudra, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine from March 2024 to August 2026, who had previously served as Deputy Minister of Justice of Ukraine; Viktor Dubovyk, Director General of the Directorate for Legal Policy at the Office of the President, who until 2024 headed the Anti-Raiding Office of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; several officials of Sense Bank JSC, as well as a number of less well-known individuals holding less senior positions. The names of several Ministry of Justice officials were also mentioned.

The published recordings point to the alleged influence of members of the criminal organisation over the Ministry of Justice, the courts and Sense Bank, as well as schemes involving money laundering and corporate raiding against companies owned by third parties, including the use of forged documents. It has all the flavour of the 1990s, except that this is 2026. Hackers have therefore been added to the list as well.

Mykytas, Mudra, Valentyn Yelizarov — Mykytas’s right-hand man — and Dubovyk have already been remanded in custody, with alternative bail set at UAH 30 million, UAH 20 million, UAH 20 million and UAH 7 million respectively.

The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) will give a legal assessment of the published recordings in accordance with the applicable procedural rules. Given, however, that Iryna Mudra and Viktor Dubovyk had been responsible for judicial reform at the Office of the President since March 2024, we will examine where these figures have taken Ukraine over the past two and a half years. More importantly, what should happen next?

In March 2024, after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed Andrii Smirnov, who had served as Deputy Head of the Office of the President, Iryna Mudra was appointed to the position. Almost immediately afterwards, NABU and SAPO notified Smirnov of suspicion of illicit enrichment. The criminal proceedings against him were later expanded to include allegations of laundering illegally acquired funds and offering a bribe.

Mudra was notified of suspicion before being dismissed from office, placing the Presidential Office in a very delicate position. Both deputy heads, who were supposed to uphold the rule of law, are now experiencing the criminal justice system first-hand. They also have the opportunity to greet one another on the steps of the HACC, just as two other well-known defendants, Vsevolod Kniaziev and Pavlo Vovk, recently did.

Yet in March 2024 it was difficult to imagine anyone less connected to the judiciary than Mudra taking up the position of Deputy Head of the Presidential Office responsible for this area. After Smirnov, who had not dealt with judicial reform at all, the position required someone with genuine expertise. That was precisely why Mudra’s appointment created tension.

At the same time, her lack of knowledge and connections in this sphere also gave some hope that there would be no networks of control over the judiciary of the kind that Vovk, Smirnov, Kniaziev and, to some extent, Oleh Tatarov had already tried to build at national level. At regional level, almost every president of an appellate court has a similar network of their own.

So when, in one of her first public appearances, Mudra said that she sorted judges into ‘baskets’ — those vetted by the new compositions of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), and those inherited from the old compositions of those bodies — the judicial system erupted. This was an obvious breach of safeguards for judicial independence and undisguised interference by a political body in the judicial appointment procedure, and it reinforced the behind-the-scenes view that Mudra was an accidental choice for the position.

The same applied to Viktor Dubovyk. Yet it was precisely the two of them who were expected to develop a new reform strategy for the judiciary, since the strategy for the previous period had failed on every count.

A brief digression is warranted here to recall once again that, following the 2016 constitutional amendments on justice, the President was left with almost no powers over the judiciary. The President retains a ceremonial role in appointing judges and swearing them in. The Venice Commission has repeatedly stressed that this role should indeed remain ceremonial, without sorting judges into ‘baskets’ or otherwise interfering with the powers of the HCJ.

The President also has the power to appoint two HCJ members and, following consultations with the HCJ, to submit draft laws to Parliament on the establishment, reorganisation and liquidation of courts. During Zelenskyy’s presidency, we have already seen examples of this: the liquidation of the notorious District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) and the establishment of other courts in its place — one to consider administrative cases involving Kyiv residents and two more to hear high-profile cases concerning central executive authorities. The HQCJ is currently selecting new judges for all of them.

Historically, however, the Office of the President has retained a tradition, dating back to previous Presidents, of defining the strategy for judicial reform. While that may once have been justified by the President’s formerly broad powers, after the 2016 constitutional reform — which was assessed quite positively by the Council of Europe in its 2019 report — such strategies should arguably be developed by the HCJ, following consultations with the Supreme Court (SC). The HCJ is, after all, the constitutional body of judicial governance, modelled on the higher judicial councils that exist in most countries whose reform experience may also be useful for Ukraine.

Perhaps this is why, when Mudra and Dubovyk began working on yet another version of the Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Court Proceedings, the process repeatedly reached a dead end. Initially, this was because the first version of the document was weak and, in many respects, misguided and harmful, forcing the Presidential Office, both officially and behind the scenes, to turn to the judiciary itself for help in developing well-founded proposals for the necessary changes. Later, even a relatively sensible document remained on the President’s desk for a year and a half without any explanation of what exactly Volodymyr Zelenskyy found unacceptable in it.

After yet another failure to secure the President’s signature on the relevant decree, Mudra publicly stated that the Strategy’s non-approval did not prevent its implementation. Yet even the draft submitted to the President has not been made public. It is rather difficult to implement something that does not formally exist. There must be approved indicators, deadlines, responsible actors and all the other elements that distinguish reform from PR about reform. But defining those indicators, and above all being able to monitor implementation, requires real powers — either through a legislative framework or through a power vertical. As we have already established, following the 2016 reform the President, and therefore the Presidential Office, has almost none. That leaves only one option: building a power vertical.

In light of recent events, it is becoming clearer what the Presidential Office’s ‘reformers’ were actually doing. First, there were attempts to place their own people in key public positions. But with the Presidential Office having long since run out of a reserve bench, Viktor Dubovyk personally entered most competitions for top positions. Owing to the principled stance of representatives of international partners — with three such representatives currently sitting on each of the relevant selection commissions — he failed to secure any of them.

Second, Mudra and Dubovyk appear to have tried to use their positions to influence individual court decisions. Serhii Stasiuk, a judge of the Commercial Court of Kyiv, whose name was mentioned during the hearing on the preventive measure for Maksym Mykytas, proved to be far from the last judge to be named.

During the hearing on the preventive measure for Valentyn Yelizarov, the names of judges Pavlo Horbasenko of the Northern Commercial Court of Appeal, Roman Boiko of the Commercial Court of Kyiv, Serhii Narizhnyi of the Commercial Court of Kyiv Region, Anatolii Ivchenko of the Commercial Court of Kyiv and Olena Kuzmyshyna of the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal were also mentioned.

Admittedly, while Stasiuk, Boiko, Ivchenko, Narizhnyi and Horbasenko were mentioned in the context of decisions in specific cases, Kuzmyshyna simply ‘didn’t get a scarf’, even though she had invited Mudra to her birthday celebration, where ‘all the court presidents’ were supposed to be present.

During the hearing on the preventive measure for Iryna Mudra, conversations between Mudra and Mykytas were read out in which she said: ‘I got him the ruling’ and ‘the appeal was fully upheld; we changed the bankruptcy practice’.

We are likely to learn the names of at least some judges of the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv as well, most of whom have been obstructing the qualification assessment of their suitability for office. Attempts by the current HQCJ to conduct that assessment ended with searches by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and pressure on the HQCJ from the Temporary Investigative Commission associated with Serhii Vlasenko and Maksym Buzhanskyi.

Some courts were also searched, but it is for NABU and SAPO to decide whether and when to make that information public.

Third, our own sources have told us about informal contacts between Mudra and certain representatives of the HCJ and HQCJ. If those discussions concerned the reform Strategy or deadlines for the judiciary to fulfil particular international commitments, there is no problem. But if Mudra or Dubovyk mentioned specific names or expressed wishes during those meetings — for example, regarding the appointment of particular individuals to specific judicial positions — then there is a serious problem. That would amount to unlawful influence on decisions of judicial governance bodies, which those bodies should have reported.

Fourth, in one of the recorded conversations, a voice resembling Mudra’s can be heard saying that corruption should not be fought but rather ‘systematised and controlled’. Coming from a person whose responsibilities included building a rule-of-law system in Ukraine, this sounds like a verdict not only on her, but on the very existence of a dedicated Deputy Head of the Presidential Office responsible for the judiciary.

Yet this is not only about particular words. There are also concrete actions that are easy to see if one looks closely: President Zelenskyy’s decrees appointing judges. Most such decrees in recent years have been INDIVIDUAL. Under Poroshenko — and even Yanukovych — individual decrees existed but were more the exception than the rule. Under Zelenskyy, individual decrees have become the norm.

Naturally, no one in the Presidential Office was prepared to take such risks in competitions such as the one for the High Anti-Corruption Court. Judges vetted by international experts could quite easily have reported offers of personal contact with representatives of the Presidential Office. The President’s decrees appointing judges to the HACC and its Appeal Chamber are therefore collective decrees, even though HCJ submissions concerning those judges reached the Presidential Office at different times.

By contrast, the 13 presidential decrees appointing first-instance and appellate judges, signed on the same day as the decrees concerning HACC judges, were individual. More interesting still, not every appointment submission resulted in a decree. In some appellate courts, for example, decrees appointing one or two judges were not signed. What prevented all of them from being appointed? One might try to explain this by saying that it was impossible to process all the submissions at once. But there is a catch: the unsigned decrees concern judges whose appointment submissions were among the first to reach the Presidential Office.

For example, the HCJ considers candidates for a particular appellate court over the course of a month and sends appointment submissions to the Presidential Office as each candidate is considered. Yet, strangely, submissions concerning the last candidates are acted upon before those concerning the first. Administratively and technically, this is impossible, because documents are processed in the order in which they arrive. So, for a document to stop moving inside the Presidential Office, somebody has to halt it manually at some stage, according to the principle of who ‘made it through’ and who ‘didn’t’.

In one of the conversations recorded by NABU, Mykytas said that he knew how Andrii Portnov had ‘kept judges in line’: by issuing or withholding appointment decrees. He summed it up as follows: ‘Whoever got to her got released; whoever didn’t is still running.’

Other recorded conversations appear to confirm this as well. One example is a conversation between Mykytas and Mudra on 19 February.

Mudra: Why are you so hung up on Horbasenko? What, do you want to bribe him or something?

Mykytas: Yeah, yeah, there is. I’ll tell you later. Vasya and Vadym really pushed for it. Well, he did them a favour. They really asked. Fine.

Mudra: Could we make it so that he owes me, not Vasya and Vadym?

Mykytas: Sure. That’s basically how it is. He owes you too. Trust me. He owes you… He’s ready to come and bow to you, even get down on his knees. That’s why I asked you to invite him, so he could swear his loyalty to you again.

As the SAPO prosecutor explained, Judge Horbasenko intended to transfer to an appellate court, and Mudra was facilitating the transfer.

Mykytas: Well, Tuesday then. It’s fine, she’ll let him through… But he shouldn’t forget about her, you know.

Astion: Just think of him as her guy — and ours too. One signal and he’ll do exactly what he’s told…

Mykytas: Is he going to the Kyiv appeal court?

Astion: Well, he’s got a job to do there. He’s got people there who are on the same wavelength. He wants to build up the Barsuk–Khripun connection in a big way. That’s in our interests too. So, yeah, he’ll be coordinated. 

In another conversation, Mykytas says: ‘She’s just letting them through as a batch, by Tuesday. She’s doing them as a batch. She says, “I can’t just let one person out of the whole batch.” She’s holding some of them back — around 30 people.’

On Tuesday, 24 February 2026, President Zelenskyy appointed 26 judges. Among them was Pavlo Horbasenko, appointed as a judge of the Northern Commercial Court of Appeal. Judging from the context, Mudra had been holding decrees concerning 30 judges and released 26 of them; four judges had ‘failed to make it through’ to her.

Another recorded conversation worth noting concerns Mudra’s predecessor, Andrii Smirnov, who also communicated with Horbasenko in relation to Mykytas’s cases.

Astion: Andriukha spoke to Horbasenko this morning.

Mykytas: You mean Smirnov?

Astion: Smirnov, yeah. He spoke to Horbasenko. I’ve got the first instance covered, and this judge or whoever… He went to Pasha Horbasenko and said, ‘Pasha, look, this one’s important. You need to put this guy in his place…’ And Horbasenko came down hard on Boiko, even though Boiko was actually trying to help me in that situation… And now, through Pasha, we’ve sorted out all your issues.

In other words, Smirnov, whose criminal case is being heard by the HACC, continues in his spare time between court hearings to ‘fix little problems for businessmen’ with judges.

There is no simple choice between two pills: choose the red one and corruption continues; choose the blue one and it comes to an end. But there are some mechanisms from recent years that have actually proved effective.

First and foremost, despite all the complexity and difficulties involved in engaging international experts in competitions for key public positions, there is currently simply no alternative if Ukraine wants to select competent people of integrity.

The number of MPs notified of suspicion by NABU and SAPO is measured in dozens. The number of judges, advocates and prosecutors is measured in dozens. The number of senior managers in the executive branch is measured in dozens. The number of Presidential Office officials is now measured in dozens too. And some of them have also tried to place their own people in key public positions.

Allowing selection commissions to operate at this stage without international experts — or Ukrainian experts delegated by international partners — would allow corrupt power verticals to reproduce themselves and even extend their influence into newly created institutions.

International experts with a decisive vote should remain involved in key selection commissions at least until Ukraine joins the European Union.

It is also extremely important to regulate how far back candidate vetting should go. Younger candidates now taking part in competitions often find it very difficult to obtain documents confirming their parents’ property acquired or received in the 1990s, when the candidate was, at best, still at school and, at worst, not yet born. Moldova, for example, has limited judicial vetting to the previous 12 years and considers this sufficient. Ukraine could follow that example, or set a period of 15–18 years for candidates under 45 and 20–22 years for older candidates.

The second, equally important change is that the Office of the President should finally abolish the position of Deputy Head responsible for the judiciary and end attempts to influence judges or use them within its own power verticals.

The law provides that the President must appoint judges within 30 days of receiving an HCJ submission. In practice, this should mean that once a month a single decree is submitted to the President for signature, listing all judges whose appointment submissions reached the Presidential Office during the previous 30 days. Two competent lawyers are sufficient to prepare such a document.

The development and implementation of the Strategy for the Reform and Development of the Judiciary should be left to the HCJ and the SC. After all, under the Constitution they are the institutions with the relevant powers concerning both judicial independence and the unity of case law.

When the President addresses the development of a new network of local general courts, he can establish an ordinary working group to prepare proposals and turn them into a draft law. This is not something that has to be done every month, but perhaps once every 20 or 30 years. The need to liquidate or establish an individual additional court can readily be identified by the HCJ, which can then submit the relevant proposal to the President.

The President and the Head of his Office could then say calmly on international platforms: we do not put pressure on the courts; we simply appoint judges on time and swear them in once a quarter. That would be preferable to having to make excuses for deputy heads responsible for the judiciary who, for more than six years, have tried to use this position for their own unlawful interests. And, as Smirnov’s example shows, even dismissal from office did not end his corrupt links with judges.

This could start immediately by signing all the decrees that have been awaiting the President’s signature for anything from several weeks to several years. No sorting judges into ‘baskets’ of the loyal and disloyal, no calls to presidents of appellate courts asking which judges should be held back without a decree and no requests to resolve particular court cases.

Third, once the competitions for appellate courts and the most heavily burdened first-instance courts are completed, the HQCJ should focus on finishing the qualification assessment that has been dragging on since 2017. This is necessary so that first-instance judges who have successfully dodged assessment for almost ten years finally either pass it — or fail it — or leave the judicial system of their own accord. Most judges of the ‘Pechera’ may well resign of their own accord if they know that assessment really awaits them tomorrow, rather than another favour from their ‘friends’ in the form of, say, yet another ‘urgent’ search of the HQCJ.

It is perfectly natural for any political authority to want controllable courts and pliant judges. Every decision it makes may, at some stage, need the support of a court. That is where stories come from in which some judges are approached with requests and allowed to pocket ‘ten’, while others receive a scarf as a birthday present so that a loyal judge is available for the next steps.

The only possible ‘windows of opportunity’ for separating the political and judicial power verticals are situations such as the one we have today.

The first choice now lies with the courts: will presidents of appellate and cassation courts and members of the HQCJ and HCJ begin running to the new deputy heads and department heads appointed by Zelenskyy or the Head of the Presidential Office? The second choice lies with Zelenskyy himself: he has to decide whether the prospect of future elections is a more attractive carrot than another attempt to build corrupt links with the courts by appointing a new deputy, or through Tatarov, who still works in the Presidential Office. A story about corporate raiding by a criminal organisation that includes officials of the Office of the President is a story about losing an election, whenever that election eventually takes place. That is true regardless of whether the President knew what Mudra and Dubovyk were doing right under his nose. For a President, competence and integrity are equally important values.

In May 2026, former President of the Supreme Court (SC) Vsevolod Kniaziev admitted his guilt in accepting a bribe of almost three million US dollars three years earlier. He entered into a plea agreement with a prosecutor of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and provided purportedly incriminating testimony concerning other Supreme Court judges, which is expected to form the basis for their conviction for corruption offences. The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) sentenced Kniaziev to five years’ imprisonment, barred him from holding positions in judicial bodies for a further three years after serving the principal sentence and confiscated his property. In addition, the convicted person donated one million US dollars to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine through a non-governmental charitable foundation.

But was the agreement concluded in the public interest and does such an outcome amount to ‘buying one’s way out of justice’? How can someone donate an undeclared one million US dollars without raising questions from law enforcement authorities? In this article, we examine the systemic problems in the practical application of plea agreements in criminal proceedings that the Kniaziev case has brought to light.

Vsevolod Kniaziev joined the Supreme Court from a first-instance court through the 2016–2017 competition. At the time of the competition, there were no negative opinions concerning him from civil society, and at the interview he presented himself as a young and promising judge. This subsequently helped him first become Secretary of the Grand Chamber of the SC and later, in contrast to candidates from the ‘old system’, become President of the Supreme Court at the age of 42 with the support of a majority of SC judges. A position that a judge with less than ten years of experience could normally only dream of.

In public, Kniaziev spoke about the need to combat corruption in the judiciary and, at international meetings, expressed zero tolerance for ‘telephone justice’, cronyism and corruption. As later became known, at the same time the President of the SC was building his own ‘vertical of power’ and, according to the authors of this article, meeting informally with the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak. While in spring 2022 loyalty to the Presidential Office affected only the transfer of some judges from the regions to Kyiv courts (for example, Judge Svitlana Hrechana), a year later the same dynamic led Kniaziev to cross all boundaries. He then decided to accept the largest bribe in the history of the judiciary for a decision of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court that was lawful on its merits.

On the evening of 15 May 2023, the media erupted with reports that the President of the SC had been exposed while taking a USD 2.7 million bribe. It was reported that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) was conducting searches at the Supreme Court itself, at the premises of all judges of the Grand Chamber, at the premises of some SC staff members and directly at Kniaziev’s home.

At the time he was served with a notice of suspicion, Kniaziev was the biggest ‘fish’ in the justice system ever caught by the NABU and SAPO. At a press conference concerning his detention, the heads of the anti-corruption bodies also stated that corruption in the SC was extensive. According to them, other judges of the Grand Chamber were allegedly involved, as the ‘Kniaziev tapes’ recorded him instructing that envelopes be prepared for judges of the Grand Chamber of the SC. At the time, it seemed that this concerned virtually everyone in the Grand Chamber (21 judges), and the public therefore expected further notices of suspicion and convictions. This did not happen.

The following day, the Plenum of the SC removed Vsevolod Kniaziev as President, the High Council of Justice (HCJ) gave its consent to his detention in custody and Kniaziev himself spent 8.5 months in a pre-trial detention centre, until his ‘fairy-tale friends’ posted more than UAH 18 million in bail for him.

The investigation lasted slightly less than ten months, which is entirely normal for a case of this category. One month after Kniaziev was released from the pre-trial detention centre, the indictment against him was submitted to the High Anti-Corruption Court. The HACC then heard the case almost every week until the plea agreement was concluded in June 2026. Shortly before that, in May 2026, four former judges of the Grand Chamber of the SC were served with notices of suspicion on the basis of Kniaziev’s testimony. The investigation concerning them is ongoing.

Three of them challenged the HACC decision approving Kniaziev’s agreement with the prosecutor before the Appeal Chamber of the HACC, but the Chamber refused to consider their appeals. The Criminal Cassation Court of the Supreme Court alone can now return the Kniaziev case to the Appeal Chamber of the HACC if it finds grounds to do so — provided, of course, that the decision of the Appeal Chamber of the HACC is appealed to the Criminal Cassation Court of the Supreme Court.

Under the HACC judgment, Kniaziev was found guilty of the criminal offence under Part 4 Article 368 of the CC of Ukraine for accepting an unlawful benefit in exchange for a court decision. Under the terms of the agreement, his sentence is more lenient than under the general rule (up to 12 years’ imprisonment), because Kniaziev purportedly provided testimony that is expected to lead to the conviction of other judges for corruption offences.

The sentence is five years’ imprisonment, of which Kniaziev will in practice serve around four years, taking into account the time he has already spent in the pre-trial detention centre. He is also barred for three years from holding positions in courts and law enforcement bodies (an additional penalty, the term of which will begin after he has served the principal sentence). The court also confiscated Kniaziev’s property: an apartment, a house and funds amounting to UAH 32,000, USD 201,000 and EUR 1,700. The funds seized during the search were subject to special confiscation because they constituted the unlawful benefit, that is, the funds used to pay the bribe.

Charitable giving is an additional condition of Kniaziev’s agreement. He transferred USD 1,104,600 to the Come Back Alive Foundation. These funds had been seized during searches of Kniaziev and held as material evidence in the case.

A plea agreement is an alternative means of resolving a criminal-law conflict and a mechanism for accelerating criminal proceedings. It helps optimise procedural time, simplify the consideration of cases, reduce the workload on pre-trial investigation bodies and the court and lower procedural costs. The resources freed up can then be used to uncover other crimes.

The logic is straightforward: a prosecutor may enter into an agreement with a suspect or accused person at any stage of criminal proceedings. The prosecution saves resources, while the defence receives a predictable, agreed sentence — in exceptional cases, even below the minimum threshold provided for by the sanction of the relevant article.

The HACC has actively used plea agreements since it began operating: over six years, half of its judgments have been based on them. The trend became particularly striking after November 2024, when Law No. 4033-IX entered into force. Before then, the share of plea agreements at the HACC ranged between 25% and 40%. Since then, two thirds of convictions have been based on agreements. ALI experts have written about this instrument in greater detail before.

This does indeed save resources in investigations where suspects do not admit guilt, convincing evidence sufficient for conviction is difficult to obtain and the 10- to 15-year limitation periods for criminal liability are, in some cases, approaching expiry.

The key condition for entering into a plea agreement is the existence of a public interest in doing so. In other words, the prosecutor and the judge must be satisfied that society has an interest in expediting proceedings and uncovering a greater number of criminal offences. Entering into an agreement is a right of the suspect or accused person: the prosecutor is not obliged to conclude it and the judge is not obliged to approve it if there is no public interest. It is therefore not a universal instrument for every situation and cannot replace effective work by the prosecution. When the practice becomes ubiquitous, the value of the public-interest rationale is lost and the very logic of plea agreements is undermined.

At the same time, when assessing whether a public interest exists, the HACC relies only on the materials provided to it by the parties to the criminal proceedings in connection with the agreement. The court’s discretion is therefore extremely constrained by the information provided, and it is not surprising that judges accept these arguments. In addition, the procedural consequence of refusing to approve an agreement is unclear: the trial then proceeds under the ordinary procedure. This is extremely difficult where the person has admitted guilt, disclosed evidence and provided information concerning other persons, among other things.

So how does the HACC substantiate the existence of a public interest specifically in the Kniaziev case?

The HACC states that ‘a real sentence is the important component of this agreement that underscores the public interest, the inevitability of punishment and the restoration of trust in justice’. Most plea agreements involve a suspended prison sentence and therefore often look, in the eyes of the public, like ‘buying one’s way out of justice’. It is worth noting that lawyer Oleh Horetskyi, who described himself as ‘Kniaziev’s back office’, received precisely such an agreement from SAPO and the HACC (a five-year suspended sentence and a UAH 21 million donation).

The judges also considered that concluding the agreement with the former judge substantially saved prosecution resources that would otherwise have been spent on further examination of evidence. In this way, Kniaziev helped free up resources for investigating other corruption offences. The HACC states that his admission of guilt resulted in ‘a reduction in the workload of the prosecution service, the Bar and the courts, which gain more time to uncover other crimes and consider them in court…’.

At the same time, SAPO entered into the agreement with Kniaziev only at the trial stage. By then, around fifty court hearings had already taken place and considerable resources had been spent on gathering and examining evidence. One might expect that two years of trial proceedings would indicate a convincing prosecution case ready to be taken through to a conviction rather than abandoned in favour of an agreement. It therefore remains unclear why the agreement was not concluded at the early stages of the pre-trial investigation, as is usually the case. Here, the volume of resources saved is substantially smaller than in other proceedings.

Another component of the public interest is exposing other persons. This part of the judgment is not publicly available, as it is not subject to disclosure by law. Most likely, in 2026 Kniaziev was used as a ‘torpedo’ — to communicate with SC judges about the circumstances of the case. Recordings of these conversations may be used to prove their guilt. On the basis of this testimony, the NABU subsequently served notices of suspicion on other persons involved in the case. According to the investigation, Supreme Court judges Iryna Hryhorieva, Zhanna Yelenina and Ihor Zhelieznyi, as well as retired SC judge Oleksandr Prokopenko, received an unlawful benefit for delivering a decision in Zhevaho’s interests. There is currently little official information on the progress of these criminal proceedings. The question naturally remains: what could the judges have said in a conversation with Kniaziev three years later, while his case was already being heard in court? It is therefore impossible to assess how significant the information provided by Kniaziev will be for the subsequent evidentiary process leading to convictions.

SAPO has publicly stated that ‘thanks to the agreement, the State obtained a substantial economic benefit: the country’s budget received USD 2,554,300. That is more than UAH 113 million! Today, as the country fights for its survival, these funds are converted into real weapons, drones or financing for social payments’. On the one hand, this is a strong message, as the funds had remained for years in frozen accounts and in storage as material evidence. They have now been channelled into the economy and are being spent directly on national defence.

On the other hand, the charitable contribution to the Armed Forces — more than USD 1.1 million — raises a legitimate question: where did this money come from? It was not declared in Kniaziev’s asset declaration. Taking joint ownership into account, he could legally have transferred an amount ten times smaller. Yet under the agreement these funds have already been confiscated in favour of the State. The origin of the USD 1.1 million should therefore have attracted the attention of both the financial monitoring authorities when the funds were transferred to the charitable foundation’s account and the anti-corruption bodies.

Against the background of this judgment, the asset declaration issue may of course appear minor, but the absence of communication on this point looks like the ‘legalisation’ of proceeds of crime.

Personal funds are also transferred in support of the Armed Forces under other plea agreements, but what is their origin? Does this agreement not call into question the origin of the funds transferred by most persons convicted on the basis of plea agreements?

Support for the Armed Forces, including through charitable foundations, is nevertheless a private matter for each person. It is not a mandatory condition of a plea agreement but rather a circumstance that reflects positively on the person. At the same time, the CPC of Ukraine does not require optional elements of an agreement to be stated in the court judgment, so the donation to the Armed Forces should not have appeared there at all.

The idea of plea agreements as a way to maximise the punishment of corrupt offenders — tackling not an isolated phenomenon but the system — is sound.

The Kniaziev case may appear typical of this practice, especially as regards the ‘donation to the Armed Forces’. At the same time, it is not. The HACC very rarely imposes a sentence of actual imprisonment under a plea agreement. This is related both to the high-profile nature of the case and to the fact that the proceedings were already moving towards a judgment, having been before the court for more than two years.

At the same time, the case exposed systemic problems in the practice of concluding plea agreements. However much Ukrainian society may trust the anti-corruption bodies, there are widespread, well-founded doubts about the policy of routinely concluding plea agreements.

The criteria used by SAPO to conclude agreements. They are currently non-transparent. In the public communications of SAPO and the HACC, no theoretical rationale is offered for plea agreements. The rationale concerns either a person’s rational choice or the maximisation of criminal prosecution by exposing a greater number of corrupt offenders. This needs to be systematised and developed into a separate publicly articulated SAPO policy.

The concept of ‘public interest’. It remains evaluative and ambiguous. It can be elaborated both through HACC practice and through the Supreme Court’s quasi-precedential positions (legal positions). In addition, the legislator could define the public-interest criterion more clearly in the CPC of Ukraine.

Uncovering other criminal offences and persons involved must yield real results, meaning that it must lead to convictions rather than merely create a prospect of them. It is understandable that this sensitive information cannot be disclosed immediately in the judgment, since it will subsequently be used to prove other criminal offences. But this is precisely what most undermines trust in plea agreements: the public does not see tangible results. How many people have been convicted on the basis of incriminating testimony, who were they, how and when were they convicted? Such information can be provided later and in aggregated form.

More radical steps would be to require SAPO and the HACC to publish the full text of a judgment of conviction based on a plea agreement once the incriminating information has been used in court. Alternatively, publication could become mandatory three years after the agreement is concluded, so that the use of the incriminating information can be monitored.

A donation to the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot form part of a plea agreement. Support for the Armed Forces, including through charitable foundations, is a private matter for each person. Charitable giving should under no circumstances be mentioned in a court judgment, so as not to create a sense of impunity — as if the convicted person had ‘bought their way out of punishment’.

A substantive analysis of plea agreements should form part of the audit of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Pursuant to Part 10 Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, SAPO undergoes an audit of its activities every two years. In practice, no such audit has yet taken place, although this provision was introduced in 2023. The audit is conducted by the Commission for External Independent Assessment, which includes international experts. The criteria mentioned above, their practical implementation at the level of criminal prosecution policy and the prospects of convicting persons exposed as a result of plea agreements — all of this should be examined through periodic audits as an instrument of external oversight of SAPO’s activities. SAPO itself also has an interest in the results of regular audits: they provide a credible response to critics or create space for development and for addressing mistakes.

If SAPO strengthens trust in plea agreements, this instrument can be preserved and used to reduce corruption in the country. If it continues its current practice, trust in the NABU, SAPO and the HACC will decline, and under slogans such as ‘they let corrupt offenders buy their way out’, MPs, supported by an outraged public, may restrict these powers.

At present, everything rests on public trust in SAPO and the HACC. In other words, on the assumption that prosecutors act in good faith in the interests of justice and enter into an agreement, or initiate one themselves, only where society genuinely benefits. Accordingly, they have to choose between the risk of ‘losing the case’ and investigating it for so long that the same resources would be better directed to other cases. After all, fair justice is utilitarian: it lies not in imposing a harsh punishment on one person at any cost, but in ensuring the inevitability of punishment for everyone — perhaps a more lenient punishment, but punishment nonetheless. This trust will, however, erode if agreements remain non-transparent and closed, sentences are mostly suspended and the criteria for concluding agreements remain unclear.

On 24 June, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) presented its analytical report ‘Selection Commissions Involving International (Foreign) Experts (Judiciary and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine)’ at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy.

ALI experts focused on whether candidate selection criteria were applied consistently and on the approaches used by selection commissions to assess candidates against those criteria. They presented findings on the commissions’ operating procedures, qualification requirements, scope of powers and evaluation criteria, among other issues.

Denys Maslov, Chairman of the Committee on Legal Policy, noted that some of the study’s proposals aligned with the Committee’s own work in this area, which had been informed by discussions with commission representatives and monitoring of their work. The procedures need improvement, but in most respects this is less about amending the law than about properly applying and implementing provisions that already exist in legislation. Where necessary, however, appropriate legislative amendments may be introduced.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives emphasises that it is still too early for Ukraine to dispense with the involvement of foreign experts in selection procedures. At present, this is the most appropriate model for the transitional period on the path towards the European Union. At the same time, discussion should continue on improving the overall framework and harmonising the approaches used by selection commissions. Candidate selection criteria should be consistent across all commissions. This would strengthen public trust in selection processes, commission members and their decisions.

During the presentation, participants shared their views on the issues raised in the Report. They also noted that it is the first in-depth study to identify systemic shortcomings in the current selection procedures and propose concrete steps to address them.

Read more about all the issues and recommendations identified by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in the Report at this link.

Involving international (foreign) experts in selection commissions within judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) is an important element of advancing Ukraine’s European integration interests. It helps to bring national legislation closer to European standards and increases the confidence of European institutions and partners in the reforms. Such involvement stems from Ukraine’s international commitments, as well as from the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The Ukraine Facility Plan provides that ‘further improvement of the selection of new Supreme Court (SC) judges is important, through enhancing the integrity vetting procedure and the meaningful involvement of independent experts’. It also states that the ‘High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is steadily improving its overall operational effectiveness; however, additional judges are needed, selected transparently and on the basis of integrity vetting, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE)’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets out a commitment to fill all 25 vacant positions at the HACC, specifically with the involvement of the PCIE, by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

The European Commission has noted the need to continue involving international experts in the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The Commission has also recommended improving the selection of SC judges and the verification of the integrity declarations of SC judges and judges of other higher courts, with the temporary but meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.

The problem is that, in fulfilling these international commitments, selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts apply different approaches to adopting and publishing their decisions. 

This concerns the selection of candidates for the positions of members of:

• the HQCJ;
• the High Council of Justice (HCJ);
• the head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors;
• judges of the CCU;
• judges of the HACC;
• judges of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC);
• judges of the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).

The differing approaches relate both to the structure and reasoning of selection commissions’ decisions and to the issuing of so-called ‘negative conclusions’ (that is, decisions concerning candidates who have ceased to take part in the competition). For example, the Selection Commission for the positions of HQCJ members (the HQCJ Selection Commission) issues no such conclusions at all; instead, it produces only a final list of candidates recommended for the post of HQCJ member. By contrast, the Ethics Council (which assists in establishing whether a candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity) actively uses ‘negative conclusions’.

Another problem is the adoption of unreasoned decisions. Proper reasoning of decisions following the assessment of candidates against the established criteria should give a clear understanding of what guided the selection commissions when assessing those candidates: what was taken into account and what was not, and the grounds for a particular decision. Proper reasoning would not only resolve many questions for candidates (in particular those who did not pass the competition), but would also help to increase confidence in selection commissions’ decisions. While some selection commissions’ decisions are fairly well structured and properly reasoned (for example, those of the HQCJ and the PCIE), others contain only general wording and boilerplate phrasing and lack proper justification. Such problems are present, for instance, in the Ethics Council’s decisions on candidates’ compliance with the criteriaAt the same time, the Ethics Council’s decisions finding candidates non-compliant with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity are, by contrast, well reasoned. of professional ethics and integrity.

The application of inconsistent practice in formulating decisions may create risks for understanding selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates, and does nothing to promote the transparency of their work.

Different selection commissions use different decision-making models. The votes of international (foreign) experts are always decisive; however, the specific models differ. For instance, a joint decision of the HQCJ and the PCIE in selecting HACC judges requires a majority of the total number of participants in the joint sitting, but no fewer than three votes of PCIE members. For commissions such as the Ethics Council or the SDI Selection Commission, four votes are required, two of which belong to international (foreign) experts. This makes the system of selection commissions confusing and difficult to understand, reducing its transparency and coherence.

A separate issue requiring attention is the right to a casting vote, where approaches likewise differ. For example, international experts hold the right to a casting vote (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the Selection Commission for the positions of the head of the SDI, their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors (the SDI Selection Commission), the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), and the Expert Council); the PCIE has the right to veto any candidate for the post of HACC judge on the grounds of non-compliance with the established criteria.

Numerous cases have also been recorded in which the same person may apply for different competitions for posts, both within a single body and across different bodies under different quotas allocated by different appointing/electing entities. As a result, the absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.

Certain differences are also observed in the publication of selection commissions’ decisions. For example, the Ethics Council adopts and publishes a reasoned conclusion on whether each candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity; the SDI Selection Commission publishes reasoned decisions concerning candidates whose participation was terminated owing to a reasonable doubt as to their compliance with the integrity criterion or the ethical standards established for a judge, but only at the candidate’s written request; for candidates assessed as ‘non-compliant’ against the criteria of high moral qualities or a recognised level of competence in the field of law, the AGE publishes only the operative part of the decision, without setting out the reasons underlying it. The full, reasoned text of the decision is published by the AGE at the written request of such a candidate.

The decisions of some selection commissions (all except the AGE) cannot be challenged in court because they are not regarded as ‘final’. The SC has developed a systematic position on selection commissions, according to which they do not adopt final decisions but merely assist the appointing/electing entity by carrying out a discrete stage of the competitive procedure. Judicial review is instead possible only in respect of the final decision of the appointing/electing entity.

The question of defining the ‘finality of decisions’ is particularly contentious for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For them, such decisions are in essence final (leaving the appointing/electing entity no choice), and the impossibility of challenging them deprives the person of the right to judicial protection. Legislation provides only for the possibility of challenging AGE decisions — specifying which of its decisions may be challenged in court and on which exceptional grounds — whereas no such legislative provision exists for the decisions of other selection commissions.

A further obstacle to the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions in administrative courts is their lack of public-authority powers. The SC’s case law has established an approach according to which selection commissions are not entities vested with public-authority powers in disputed legal relations. Accordingly, in some cases the SC’s case law indicates that disputes against selection commissions are not subject to consideration under the rules of administrative justice (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the SDI Selection Commission). Selection commissions are neither bodies of authority nor entities vested with public-authority powers; they do not have the status of legal entities. Representing such commissions, even in administrative proceedings, is hampered by the absence of rules for designating a representative to sign procedural documents on behalf of selection commissions (their heads do not hold such powers) and to take part in court hearings.

The exception is the AGE, which the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court recognisesRuling of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 20 February 2025 (case No. 990/407/24, proceedings No. П/990/407/24). as a body ‘vested by the state with authoritative and managerial functions in the legal relations arising in the process of forming the judicial corps of the CCU’.

Where such practice is absent:

• the risk of breeding distrust in the functioning of selection commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole increases;
• risks arise in the understanding — by candidates, outside observers, and the public — of these selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates.

At present, there are no draft laws addressing the problem described.

1. Applying different approaches to voting and decision-making by selection commissions — in particular regarding the structure and reasoning of decisions and the approach to determining voting results and so-called negative conclusions — breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
2. The absence of public voting results and insufficient reasoning and justification of such decisions breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
3. The absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.
4. The absence of unified approaches to determining the finality of decisions for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For such candidates these decisions are in fact final — and the impossibility of challenging them, at the level of both regulatory acts and SC case law, deprives them of the right to judicial protection.

The adoption and publication of decisions by selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts in judicial authorities and the CCU require further regulation.

1. Avoid a formalistic approach to justifying decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria.
2. Develop a uniform approach to the structure, justification, and adoption of decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria within a single commission.
3. Develop and approve a template/model decision for the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria, together with accompanying guidance enshrining the requirement that such decisions be properly reasoned.
4. Provide that negative decisions of selection commissions be published in anonymised form, and positive decisions be published with the personal data that were public during the candidate’s public interview. If a person who received a positive decision was not appointed to the post, they may apply to the selection commission to have their data anonymised.
5. Develop and introduce a single database of candidate profiles, with a uniform CV format, for those taking part in competitions for posts in judicial authorities and the CCU. Grant access to these profiles to members of the relevant selection commissions and of the relevant bodies to which candidates are appointed/elected.
6. In future, review the approach to granting international (foreign) experts a casting vote.
7. Hold a broad discussion on the question of defining the final nature of decisions adopted by selection commissions.
8. Enshrine in legislation clear grounds for the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions solely on the basis of procedural non-compliance, in particular for candidates for whom such commissions’ decisions on non-compliance with the established criteria effectively mean the termination of their participation in the competition and are therefore final. The legislation should provide for the period over which a selection commission assesses a candidate’s compliance with the integrity criterion.
9. Enshrine in legislation rules governing which selection commissions’ decisions may be challenged and on what grounds, which may not be challenged, and the rules for representing selection commissions in court.
10. Continue consolidating the SC’s case law and developing standard approaches to resolving disputed situations on the issues identified.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), together with a coalition of civil society organisations, has presented the European Commission with the interim findings of this year’s Shadow Report under Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

The presentation, held on 4 June, was joined by representatives of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), which is responsible for the negotiations on enlargement and EU accession with candidate countries and potential candidates, as well as by representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

For the third year running, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the coalition of civil society organisations are monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress in the field of European integration. This is an independent, alternative analysis by representatives of civil society and the expert community, coordinated by ALI.

Participants presented and discussed the results in the areas of the rule of law (the courts, the prosecution service and the bar), the fight against corruption and organised crime, the reform of law enforcement agencies, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Taking part were Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, and Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area; Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs at Transparency International Ukraine; and Tetiana Pechonchyk, Head of the Board, and Anastasiia Datsiv, Advocacy Manager for European Integration, both of the Human Rights Centre ZMINA.

Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, presented the key findings on judicial reform. The focus was on the selection of new judges and the work of the competition commissions, the improvement of disciplinary procedures, and the unresolved problems that require attention now — as well as the latest developments concerning possible cases of corruption in the Supreme Court.

An important achievement during the reporting period was the launch of a comprehensive project on the digitalisation of the judicial system, which the Agency is implementing together with key judicial institutions — the Supreme Court, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU).

The key challenges at this stage are the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, preventing the HCJ’s work from being halted owing to legislative conflicts, and responding appropriately to possible cases of corruption in the judiciary.

The parts of the Shadow Report concerning the prosecution service and the bar, as well as the strengthening of the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies to counter serious crime, including organised crime, were presented by Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area.

He stressed that the competitions cancelled in July 2025 have still not been resumed and that the Prosecutor General retains excessive powers. Despite the European Commission’s demand not only to restore the legislation to its previous state but also to refrain from exercising these powers, there has been no progress whatsoever. The greatest challenge for the development of the prosecution service is the 10 Kachka–Kos priorities for Ukraine for 2026. These concern, first and foremost, changing the politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, as well as introducing a mandatory competition for senior positions. This, in particular, forms part of the drafts of the new Anti-Corruption Strategy that Ukraine is currently developing. The competition for senior positions was due to be introduced back in March 2026, but this did not happen.

Yevhen Krapyvin drew attention to the absence of any progress in reforming the bar: despite the creation in January 2026 of a governmental working group on improving the legislation in this area, only one meeting has been held since. This, together with the resistance of the Ukrainian National Bar Association, is significantly slowing the achievement of a proper outcome and of the objectives of the Rule of Law Roadmap in this area.

Yevhen Krapyvin also addressed the key aspects of the Shadow Report under Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

This year, the experts also analysed another part of the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster — ‘Functioning of Democratic Institutions’. The coalition, coordinated by ALI, likewise shared its work in this area with the European Commission.

This year’s Shadow Report is being prepared by experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe without Barriers, the Ukrainian Bar Association, the Civil Network OPORA and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, with the information support of European Pravda. As has now become customary, it will be published ahead of the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s 2026 Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is a systematic audit by specialist experts from civil society organisations that does not duplicate the state’s official documents or the European Commission’s assessment and is not dependent on their positions. Rather, it is an analytical tool for developing a professional and comprehensive vision of the European integration processes — one that provides for the involvement of experts in the reform process — while also assessing the compliance of Ukrainian legislation and of the entire system with EU standards.

Preparing shadow reports is a regular practice in all candidate countries seeking to join the European Union. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova, independent coalitions of civil society organisations have for years carried out alternative monitoring of reform progress in the areas of the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions and others. In Ukraine, this work has been carried out systematically since 2024, when a coalition of civil society organisations first prepared an alternative analysis to accompany the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is entirely a product of civil society, regardless of the sources of support. To strengthen the institutional independence of the process, from 2026, ALI is setting a new precedent: the Shadow Report is also funded by independent civil society organisations. A significant share of the funds for its development will be covered by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine. ALI takes on the mission of ensuring the utmost impartiality and objectivity in this preparation process, as it does every year.

The involvement of international (foreign) experts in the work of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the CCU emerged in response to a number of systemic problems:

• the inability of the judicial governance bodies (primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ)) and the CCU to take decisions under political pressure;
• attempts by some judges to interfere in judicial decision-making;
• the persistently low level of public trust in the courts (according to sociological surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and others).

Together, these factors ultimately resulted in an inability to respond effectively to the crises that regularly arose in the judiciary and the CCU. The requirement to involve international (foreign) experts was also enshrined in Ukraine’s commitments to international organisations and partners. In particular, such involvement was regarded as a safeguard that provided additional oversight of compliance with the principles of judicial independence and professional integrity, as well as the prevention of corruption risks.

The active involvement of international (foreign) experts in the composition of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine began in 2018. On the one hand, the introduction of these experts into the work of the competition commissions was a response to the low level of public trust in the judiciary and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. On the other, it was driven by Ukraine’s international commitments (the Ukraine Facility Plan and European Commission reports), as well as by the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The relevance of this study lies in the fact that examining the results of the work of competition commissions with the participation of international (foreign) experts enables not only to assess their effectiveness in the context of judicial reform, but also to formulate well-grounded proposals for improving their work.

For the purposes of this study, the work of the competition commissions was assessed over the period from January 2022 to November 2025 inclusive. As regards the conduct of competition procedures, updated data as of April 2026 were used.

The study focuses on analysing the work (including the legal framework) of the following competition commissions: the Ethics Council; the Competition Commission for the Selection of Candidates for the Positions of Members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (the HQCJ Competition Commission); the Competition Commission for Conducting the Competition for the Positions of Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors and Disciplinary Inspector (the SDI Competition Commission); the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE); the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE); the Expert Council (legal framework only); and the Public Integrity Council (PIC) — the last of these to the extent relevant for comparison with the work of those commissions which, under the law, are to be replaced by the Public Integrity Council once the current compositions complete their terms. The relevant Supreme Court case law was also analysed.

As part of the study, the interviews held were analysed — the special joint meetings of the HQCJ and the PCIE with candidates for the positions of judge of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the CCU; Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head and disciplinary inspectors; and members of the HQCJ and the HCJ. In total, 143 candidate interviews were reviewed and analysed, together with the decisions of the competition commissions concerning those candidates. Interviews were also conducted with members of several competition commissions.

The study centres on analysing the consistency of the criteria for selecting candidates and the consistency of the approaches taken by the competition commissions in determining whether candidates meet the criteria assessed. The work of the competition commissions was assessed in terms of the mechanism for forming their composition, the number of international (foreign) representatives within them, the qualification requirements, the scope of their powers, the assessment criteria, and so on.

Where relevant, the work of the competition commissions was also compared with that of the Public Integrity Council (PIC).

The conclusions drawn from the study rest, in particular, on statistical data from these competition commissions reflecting the outcomes of their work.

A separate part of the report sets out specific recommendations for addressing the problems identified in the course of the study — recommendations that can serve as reference points for the further development of public policy in this area.

This document has been prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of the CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

A year ago, the Government approved the Roadmap on the Rule of Law — a strategic document outlining a package of reforms in this area. The recommendations of the Roadmap are fundamentally significant for the opening of Negotiation Cluster 1: ‘Fundamentals’, and the fulfilment of the commitments set out therein plays a decisive role in Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

The event, titled ‘Roadmap on the Rule of Law: One Year On’, addressed Ukraine’s progress to this point and the obstacles still impeding its path towards the EU. The event brought together representatives from government, state bodies and civil society, including Svitlana Matviienko, Executive Director of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. International partners were also present, including the European Union Ambassador to Ukraine, Katarína Mathernová; the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to Ukraine, Mr Gaël Veyssière; and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine, Mr Heiko Thoms.

Lyudmyla Suhak, Acting Minister of Justice, emphasised that the adoption of the Roadmap is one of the pivotal stages in Ukraine’s European integration process, but its true value will be measured by the results of its implementation. At present, it is critical to ensure harmonious efforts by all authorities and partners in order to put the planned reforms into practice. After all, this also concerns the strengthening of the rule of law, ensuring a transparent and independent justice system, effectively preventing corruption and safeguarding human rights.

Taras Kachka, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, highlighted that the Roadmap solidifies the steps required to complete all the processes launched during the Revolution of Dignity and enables further progress. He noted that the rule of law is a prerequisite for membership of the European Union and the cornerstone of trust between the state, society, business and international partners.

An inextricable part of this journey and a benchmark for implementing these changes is the Shadow Report, which a coalition of civil society organisations, coordinated by the ALI, has been releasing for three consecutive years. In particular, the 2024 Shadow Report presents more than 500 specific recommendations covering issues related to the rule of law, judicial independence, reform of law enforcement agencies, human rights protection, the fight against corruption and organised crime, and more. It lays the groundwork for the European Commission’s annual Enlargement Report, which is widely covered in the media and discussed by the public.

Svitlana Matviienko also mentioned the importance of this societal control mechanism and the role of the public in these processes in general during the panel discussion ‘Rule of Law Reform: A Unified Call from Ukrainian Society’:

The Executive Director of the ALI also pointed out that we need to gradually and systematically employ all available mechanisms to streamline processes, communicate concerns and collaborate on all the challenges that arise during the reform process, rather than becoming entangled in polarised opinions. Civil society has different ways of conveying information — some informally, others formally. Large and influential think tanks, which have the genuine capacity and ability to discuss the rule of law, employ a combination of these mechanisms.

Svitlana Matviienko also pointed out that one of the key factors is trust in the reforms. First and foremost, this is reflected in trust in institutions — how we perceive them, relate to them, work with them and how transparent they are. At this stage of the reform, this is more important than the figures themselves, which can vary significantly depending on methodology or survey respondents.

The event was co-organised by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, in collaboration with the EU Project Pravo-Justice, implemented by Expertise France, and the GIZ Programme ‘Strengthening Ukraine’s Accession to the EU in the Rule of Law’.

Making appointments to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ) without delay is one of the ten requirements of the Kachka–Kos plan that Ukraine must implement in 2026. It was agreed in December 2025 as a priority plan for Ukraine in the areas of the rule of law and the fight against corruption.

Some progress in appointing members of the HCJ was made in March 2026, when the Congress of Judges of Ukraine voted for two selected candidates. By contrast, five months after the Kachka–Kos plan was agreed, no appointment to the CCU has taken place.

At present, 13 of the 18 judges serve on the Constitutional Court. The term of office of Judge Viktor Horodovenko (Congress of Judges quota) expires in November 2026. Two more terms expire on 2 March and 24 September 2027.

What is happening with the CCU selection competitions? What are the prospects for appointing new judges this year? And most importantly — what other urgent problems need to be resolved to strengthen the CCU and meet the EU integration requirements of the Rule of Law Roadmap? We explain below.

For two and a half years, Ukraine has been selecting and appointing judges of the Constitutional Court under a new procedure. The process is lengthy, imperfect, costly and often ineffective, because competitions are held yet may produce no winner. This has already happened in two previous competitions under the quota of the Congress of Judges and in one competition under the quota of the President of Ukraine. Or someone is selected, but the appointing authority fails to approve them. This happened in 2025, when Parliament did not find enough votes for two candidates under its quota. After the preliminary verification required by law, they had been recommended by the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE).

Since the new procedure was introduced, four new judges have been appointed — two under the President’s quota (in 2025) and one each under the quotas of Parliament and the Congress of Judges (in 2024).

Moreover, in 2025, the CCU was unable to perform its functions for six months because it lacked a quorum. In effect, only one Senate was functioning at that time. Meanwhile, the President and Parliament delayed appointments. Ultimately, the President fulfilled his role, while Parliament failed to vote.

It was probably after this that the EU requirement for Ukraine to make ‘appointments without delay’ emerged.

A new selection process under the parliamentary quota for two vacant positions is underway. Its outcome will become known on 6 May, when the AGE assesses the level of competence of candidates for the positions of CCU judges. This time, 10 people successfully passed the assessment of moral qualities and reached this stage.

Since April, the Advisory Group of Experts has also been reviewing the documents of candidates under the quota of the Congress of Judges. Here, 18 people are competing for two vacant positions. According to ALI, interviews with them will take place in July. By September, the AGE should form a list of candidates for appointment.

By contrast, the competition for one vacant position of CCU judge under the President’s quota has still not started. The start date is unknown.

If both competitions are successful, the appointment of a judge or judges under Parliament’s quota can be expected in the summer, and under the quota of the Congress of Judges in the autumn.

As regards the President’s quota, unless the competition starts within the next two to three weeks, appointments this year are unlikely, given the complexity and duration of the procedures. At the same time, it would be appropriate to announce a competition for the relevant vacancy in the coming months, taking into account the need to appoint a new judge under the same quota as early as March 2027.

We have previously written about how the competition procedures should be redesigned to accelerate the process. Yet things remain unchanged.

Some CCU candidates currently participating in competitions have previously received the green light from the AGE. This brings back the discussion on the need to create a list of reserve candidates who were not appointed for technical reasons.

This concerns situations where the appointing authority, for example, did not have a sufficient number of candidates to make a decision. Specifically, if there is only one vacancy, the law requires at least two people to compete for it. Such a candidate should be able to reach the final stage of the next competition without having to go through the whole procedure again.

Another example is where one of the appointing authorities has fewer vacant positions than the number of qualified candidates in its view (for instance, one vacancy and three qualified candidates). In that case, such persons could be placed in a candidate pool for one or two years and then, without additional competitions, submitted for consideration by other appointing authorities.

This would save the time, money and effort of Ukrainian and international experts serving on the AGE. More importantly, it would not discourage qualified candidates from taking part in competitions. The figures show that fewer people are willing to apply. Instead, many people who have repeatedly received a red light from the AGE keep entering competitions again and again. As a result, there seem to be candidates, but it is difficult, and often simply impossible, to select at least two people for one vacancy.

At the same time, Draft Law No. 14149 has been pending in Parliament since last year and partly addresses these problems, although in a somewhat different way. However, some of its provisions have been criticised by the Venice Commission, so they need to be amended not only to pass the vote in the session hall but also to avoid conflict with our international partners.

For those who closely follow all CCU judge selection processes or actively take part in them, every new competition feels like Groundhog Day. There are two reasons for this. The main one is that CCU judges are unique lawyers — essentially a ‘rare commodity’. A mere desire is not enough to quickly form an independent CCU bench with integrity.

Each selected judge must meet exceptionally high professional standards, be more than a good judge or someone who can draft complex texts well, but also have strategic vision. They must also have extremely high internal standards of integrity and ethics.

Moreover, a judge’s independence matters regardless of who appointed them. They must be equally independent from all branches of government.

And this is where the devil is in the detail. For example, AGE members ask candidates for the position of CCU judge about property acquired by their parents 30 years ago. Or they ask whether the candidate attended music school (what relevance does this have for a CCU judge at all?). Or why a Supreme Court judge decided to enter a competition for the CCU.

Here, the question is already for the Advisory Group of Experts: who exactly would they like to see as a candidate if questions arise about the intentions of certain SC judges to move to the CCU? Especially if some of them have spent half their lives working as judges of higher courts. Where else should such highly qualified lawyers go next?

Instead, one would like to hear the AGE more often ask how a candidate for CCU judge sees the solution to long-standing problems, such as the politicisation of the Constitutional Court. Or the prolonged delay in considering the most high-profile constitutional petitions, which have been pending before the CCU for five to ten years. For example, what should be done about lustration, on which the European Court of Human Rights expressed its position long ago, while the CCU is still unable to do the same?

Or they could ask how the work of the CCU should be reformatted so that cases are not considered for decades in the future. The list could go on.

These are the issues the AGE should examine alongside questions about the property of the candidate, their family, parents, grandparents and sometimes even ‘neighbours’. It should not be calculating how many days a male candidate spent on foreign business trips. Members of the AGE or other competition commissions, for example, may also spend weeks on business trips conducting interviews with candidates or preparing for them. Yet no one questions their integrity.

In 2022–2025, between 43 and 50 constitutional petitions were pending before the CCU. At the end of 2025, 48 such petitions remained pending, 32 of which had been submitted to the CCU before 2022.

From the beginning of the full-scale invasion until 2025, 19 constitutional petitions were submitted to the CCU. In the same period, the consideration of 17 petitions was completed, most of which (14) had been submitted back in 2015–2020. For example, a ruling closing one of the proceedings opened as far back as 2015 was adopted only in 2022.

In other words, over four years of war, two thirds of constitutional petitions have not been resolved. These are the country’s most complex issues, on which entire sectors or even the existence of individual bodies may depend.

For example, the constitutionality of the establishment and functioning of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) has been under consideration since 2020. Given that two more higher specialised courts have now been established in Ukraine (which will consider administrative cases involving central executive bodies), a decision on the HACC is not merely timely — it is about four years overdue.

The CCU has also been drawn into the debate on the participation of international experts in competition commissions. Attempts are being made to remove them by manipulating the alleged interference with state sovereignty. This issue should be resolved now, even though CCU judges are currently being selected with the participation of international experts.

The situation is much better with the consideration of constitutional complaints. Since the possibility of lodging such complaints with the CCU was introduced in Ukraine (30 September 2016), persons entitled to a constitutional complaint have submitted more than four and a half thousand constitutional complaints to the CCU. The highest number was submitted in 2018 (690) and the lowest, for objective reasons, in 2022 (248). The CCU began adopting its first decisions following the consideration of constitutional complaints in 2019. There have been 67 such decisions in total.

The issues raised in complaints are less politicised than those in constitutional petitions. This is why the statistics for their consideration are several times better. However, it is worth noting how much procedural ‘clutter’ reaches the CCU. More than half of constitutional complaints do not even meet formal requirements. Many complainants do not understand the true role of the Court or the essence of such an instrument as a constitutional complaint and therefore try to turn the CCU into a ‘fourth’ judicial instance.

Even despite attempts to flood the entire Court with complaints, the introduction of the institution of constitutional complaint in 2016 was the right decision. The CCU is coping with this task.

In addition to the issues already mentioned, attention should also be paid to the systemic problems caused by the Court functioning on the verge of a quorum. One such problem is the inability to ‘assemble’ the required number of votes even for important and progressive decisions. If, out of 18 judges, only 12–14 have been in office in recent years, and at least 10 votes in favour are required, this leads to constant postponements of the consideration of constitutional petitions.

Some decisions cannot even be put on the agenda for discussion. One reason is the reluctance of the rapporteur judge to submit a politically difficult issue for consideration (and nothing can currently be done about this). There are no mechanisms for the compulsory inclusion of such issues on the agenda. At the same time, the accumulation of unresolved cases creates a ‘vicious circle’: new cases continue to be distributed among judges, their total number grows, consideration periods become longer, and judges prioritise cases at their own discretion, giving preference to those they consider most relevant. However, even if mechanisms for mandatory inclusion on the agenda existed, how could a decision be adopted if the rapporteur judge, who knows the materials better than others, does not even want to discuss such a case?

The recusals and self-recusals of judges are also a problem. Given that some judges are former MPs who often voted for what now needs to be examined for constitutionality, the quorum is disrupted. It is one thing when one or two judges are recused or have recused themselves while 17–18 judges are in office. It is quite another when only 12–13 are in office.

Therefore, the unwillingness to appoint even selected candidates to the CCU, or delays in doing so, essentially blocks the Constitutional Court from adopting any decision.

It is now obvious that the Court functions under both internal and external political pressure. Thus, without the appointment of new CCU judges, the resolution of any truly important but highly political issues is effectively blocked. Yes, the Court may obtain a decision declaring minor legislative ‘flea’ unconstitutional. But resolving something that will produce 400 media stories within a couple of minutes is impossible.

We did not aim to list all existing problems of the Constitutional Court. This is the purpose of the Shadow Reports written annually by a coalition of civil society organisations coordinated by ALI and by other civil society representatives.

At this stage, however, it is extremely important to draw attention to the political and personnel dimension. Not only because this is a requirement of the Kachka–Kos plan, but because the balance of power in a country at war depends on a politically independent and internally stable CCU that functions properly. Ukraine must not only survive the battle with a rabid bear. It must also stay the internal dragons that have for years been destroying Ukraine’s attractiveness, above all for its own citizens who decide to raise their children abroad, as well as for our allies in the European Union and NATO, who are no longer as confident when speaking about Ukraine’s rapid accession even to the EU.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is starting work on a White Paper that will focus primarily on the problems of civil service and patronage service in courts of first instance and courts of appeal, as well as ways to address them. This study is a logical continuation of the Green Paper presented by ALI experts in July 2025.

The White Paper is intended to become a public policy tool and to contribute to systemic changes in attitudes towards the role of court staff in ensuring the administration of justice. In the longer term, ALI’s new study will serve as a basis for transformations in legislation and in the organisation of courts’ work.

ALI experts want to hear directly from those who ensure the daily operation of courts. This concerns civil service and patronage service staff, as well as their experience, needs, vision for change and problems.

1. heads of courts and their deputies: https://forms.gle/uHtC8EM9QM8VcqwA8
2. heads of court offices and their deputies: https://forms.gle/vXsVhmQZ695EvKLE9
3. court staff and everyone interested: https://forms.gle/yFmPM4r1arqNfHFW8 

Your responses will help develop evidence-based recommendations and ensure a high-quality analytical basis for further decisions. Verified data will form the foundation for change. Last year, more than one thousand court office staff took part in the study. It was their active participation that made it possible to describe all existing problems at the level of courts of first and second instance accurately.

Research into the work of court offices is one of ALI’s priorities. After all, it is civil service and patronage service staff who ensure the daily operation of the judicial system. Without proper attention to their problems, needs and motivation, judicial reform will remain superficial, inconsistent and incomplete.

Your experience matters and can become a catalyst for change — join the survey. The deadline for completing the survey is 17 May 2026 inclusive.

The research and survey are being carried out by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives with the support of the Supreme Court and the High Council of Justice.

All questionnaires are completed anonymously, and the data are used in an aggregated form. All information received is processed by ALI experts.

The study is being implemented within the project ‘Reinforcing the European Dimension of the Ukrainian Civil Service in Law-Making, Judiciary, Finances’, implemented by ALI with the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

The issue of Bar self-governance has become so critical in recent years that it was included among the priorities of the Rule of Law Roadmap approved by Ukraine in May 2025. This is also reflected in last year’s Shadow Report to the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine.

In other words, the matter goes beyond the internal ‘kitchen’ of Ukrainian Bar self-governance — and directly affects the entire justice sector and all European integration processes in Ukraine.

Let us examine what exactly has ‘gone wrong’ in Ukrainian Bar self-governance.

Let us begin with the pressing issue — the elective nature of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies). This is a key element of the institutional independence of the Bar and, consequently, one of the fundamental guarantees of the rule of law and access to justice.

It is precisely the BSG bodies that determine the rules governing the profession in Ukraine. Therefore, the system for their election is of key importance. The highest body is the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, whose delegates are elected at the Conferences of Advocates of the Regions (CAR) according to established quotas. However, this electiveness is merely formal, as the processes within the BSG bodies have for a long time been under the centralised monopoly of the Bar Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) — since their establishment in 2012 following the adoption of the current Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. In other words, for 13 years the BSG bodies have remained under the leadership of the same individuals, headed by Lidiia Izovitova, who, according to numerous reports, has close ties with Viktor Medvedchuk, accused of high treason. It is the BСU that determines representation quotas and approves the procedure for nominating and electing delegates both to the Conference of Advocates of the Region (CAR) and to the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine.

This effectively preserves Bar self-governance in its existing form and turns it into a closed system with features of manual control, bearing little resemblance to transparency or openness. As a result, the monopoly has produced predictable ‘results’: the term of office of the leadership of the BCU expired as far back as November 2022 (the Law provides for a five-year term, which may be extended only once), yet the Congress of Advocates has not been convened. Everything is attributed to the full-scale war and the alleged impossibility of gathering advocates in one place for security reasons. This not only blocks the re-election of the Bar leadership but also prevents the exercise of constitutional powers — in particular, the delegation of two representatives to the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and one representative to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) under the advocates’ quota.

Instead, the BCU, contrary to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’, unilaterally extended its mandate until the end of martial law, referring to institutional continuity — that is, the principle of continuity of activity.

At the same time, congresses of judges, academics and prosecutors have been held repeatedly, even under conditions of full-scale invasion, although they too could have relied on similar wording and continued to operate in their previous compositions. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also continues its work despite current realities. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, does not consider the reference to continuity to be legally justified as a basis for failing to convene the Congress of Advocates after 2022. Particularly given that, for example, prosecutors have already held more than one All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors during the full-scale war.

The expert notes that the ‘principle of continuity’ invoked by the UNBA does indeed exist. However, its meaning is interpreted depending on the branch of law in which it is applied. It may refer to the continuity of the state in international law, the preservation of constitutional institutions during the transition from one legal regime to another, territorial continuity and so forth. Accordingly, if legislative norms are to be invoked, they should be applied in full rather than selectively, and not limited solely to those formulations that are convenient for extending the powers of the BSG bodies.

Over nearly four years of full-scale war, the BCU has repeatedly had the opportunity to initiate changes to the mechanism for holding the Congress of Advocates. For example, through online voting via Diia or other means of simplifying the procedure for electing delegates, as the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has previously written. However, the leadership of the Bar has not done so.

Instead, Lidiia Izovitova seeks reasons why this would not work: ‘Proposals are being made regarding electronic voting. Let us return to our realities: front-line territories… electronic warfare systems — they jam communications, you cannot transmit information — that is the first point… The second — lack of electricity and, as a consequence, lack of internet access. What kind of electronic voting can we speak of?’. At the same time, regions with (potential) hostilities — Kherson, Odesa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia — have once again been cited among the reasons why elections cannot be held. Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, has noted that such reasoning is at the very least contradictory, as the UNBA previously held large-scale events without difficulty, including in Kharkiv in 2024 at the premises of the Law University.

A de facto non-functioning system of Bar self-governance leads to problems of another nature — disciplinary ones. Among other functions, the work of the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine is also directed at disciplinary matters, as it elects the Head and Deputy Heads of the High Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar (HQDCB), as well as the composition of the High Audit Commission of the Bar (HACB).

According to Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation gives rise to serious concerns regarding the disciplinary system of the Bar. These concerns were brought into sharper focus by the formation of the competition commission for the selection of senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

Oleksii Shevchuk, a lawyer, was appointed to the commission. According to journalistic investigations, he has been linked to high-profile cases, including a corruption scheme involving the unlawful departure of men abroad and the disappearance of 10,000 military first-aid kits from the United States, worth over UAH 33 million. Notably, in 2023, Oleksii Shevchuk participated in the competition for the High Council of Justice (HCJ), during which he received a negative opinion from the Ethics Council, meaning that he was found not to meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity. Although such an opinion is not binding for other competitions and does not entail legal consequences of a different nature, it nevertheless established facts of unethical conduct in the past. In the same year, the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of the Kyiv Region (QDCB) attempted to deprive Oleksii Shevchuk of his right to practise law for violating the Rules of Legal Ethics. However, the decision was overturned, and Shevchuk subsequently assumed the position of spokesperson of the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA).

This raises the question of why the disciplinary system did not function properly in this case. ‘There is no possibility of reviewing all decisions adopted in the relevant disciplinary proceedings, which once again underscores the urgent need to establish a comprehensive public register of disciplinary decisions’, notes Daria Pysarenko.

According to the Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation demonstrates the necessity of strengthening the independence of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar. As is known, the Head of the HQDCB is currently appointed by decision of the Bar Council of Ukraine, whereas the law expressly provides that he or she must be elected exclusively by the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine. ‘Such interference in the activities of a disciplinary body is unacceptable and undermines trust in the entire system of professional self-governance’, the expert emphasises.

The prolonged absence of genuine electiveness and the artificially frozen composition of the governing bodies of the Bar systematically harm the entire sector. Instead of transparent and democratic practices, the UNBA and the BCU pursue advocates for criticising the leadership, while disciplinary practice has become a closed instrument of influence. All of this is justified by reference to the war and to the principle of continuity.

Moreover, the consequences have long extended beyond the Bar itself and directly affect — and damage — the entire justice system. The opacity of disciplinary practice and of the BSG bodies as a whole, the failure to exercise constitutional powers, the blocking of the Congress of Advocates and the deliberate disregard of the obligation to delegate representatives to the HCJ and the QDCP paralyse the renewal of the judiciary and the reform of law enforcement bodies. Accordingly, they also hinder Ukraine’s European integration.

It is therefore logical that the state cannot remain on the sidelines when the governing bodies of the Bar have, since 2019, blocked any attempts to reform the sector. The actions of the Ministry of Justice, in particular the establishment of a working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and practice of law, constitute a necessary and logical response to a deep institutional crisis which the Bar itself has long refused to address. Although the Bar is a self-governing profession, the element of state regulation is significant — it is sufficient to examine the relevant Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. Given that the Bar occupies a central place within the justice system alongside the courts and the prosecution service, it is impossible to speak of reforming the justice sector without reforming the Bar.

These are precisely the European integration obligations concerning the Bar, which each year become more specific and more clearly defined. Whereas previously the European Commission would diplomatically hint, in a single sentence, at the need for reform, the most recent Enlargement Report stated unequivocally: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’. Moreover, given Ukraine’s inability to independently formulate a reform agenda, the EU has gone so far as to propose substantive directions for change in its reports — something the European Commission would not ordinarily be expected to do. At the same time, European partners have emphasised that ‘Re-elections of Bar self-governance bodies have not been conducted despite the expiry of their mandates’. In essence, they have made it clear that the war is not a reason to postpone the Congress of Advocates and the re-election of the Bar leadership, nor to refrain from reforming the sector.