On 29 August 2019, MPs of the Verkhovna Rada’s 9th convocation took the oath of office. Seven years later, the newly elected — and not so newly elected — representatives still hold their mandates, as martial law remains in force and parliamentary elections cannot be held.

So, what will this Verkhovna Rada be remembered for? The Agency for Legislative Initiatives invites you to look back at Parliament’s journey through the lens of time.

Eighty-four — that is the number of women MPs in the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation as of August 2026. Women chair committees, parliamentary factions and groups, as well as parliamentary delegations. Since 24 February 2022, they have also been actively advancing parliamentary diplomacy.

This is the result both of consistent state policy — including requirements for party lists and additional funding for political parties that complied with the gender quota — and of growing public demand for women’s representation in politics.

One of the first laws adopted by MPs of the 9th convocation abolished parliamentary immunity.

The idea, supported in the all-Ukrainian referendum of 2000, was finally implemented almost two decades later. Since the law was adopted, dozens of MPs have been notified of suspicion of criminal offences. Yet alongside the possibility of holding MPs accountable came the risk of political pressure on them from law enforcement agencies.

‘Button pushing’ had long been an integral part of parliamentary ‘culture’, and even its criminalisation failed to eliminate the problem completely. Finally, in 2021, the touch-sensitive button of the Rada-3 electronic voting system became operational in the Verkhovna Rada.

The voting principle is straightforward: for ten seconds, an MP must keep the voting button pressed with one hand while simultaneously keeping the other hand on the touch-sensitive button. In other words, both hands of the MP are occupied. That put an end to the possibility of multiple voting.

The story of ‘button pushing’ is also an example of how criminalisation does not always work. Adopting a law did not solve the problem; the best solution — a technical one — had been within reach all along.

The electoral victory of the Servant of the People party enabled it, for the first time in independent Ukraine’s history, to form a coalition on its own. Or, more precisely, to become the coalition itself.

In political vocabulary, the phenomenon became known as the ‘mono-majority’. As a result, all power within the ‘Parliament – Government – President’ triangle was concentrated in one political force. Today, however, the mono-majority can hardly adopt any decision without ad hoc support from other factions and groups.

The media dubbed the beginning of the 9th convocation’s work ‘turbo mode’, but the Verkhovna Rada set its real records for adopting legislation during the first months of the full-scale invasion. Between 24 February and 2 April 2022, Parliament sat in plenary on five days, while MPs spent a total of around 2 hours and 23 minutes in the session hall. They devoted roughly 57 minutes directly to considering draft laws and adopted a total of 70 laws and 3 resolutions during that time.

At the same time, the data show a slowdown: draft laws now take longer to pass than at any other point in the convocation, with more than a year elapsing between registration and adoption.

A total of 63 laws were adopted during the 14th session — the lowest figure for the 9th convocation. Given the record-low number of registered draft laws, this points to a substantial decline in legislative activity.

During the term of the Verkhovna Rada’s 9th convocation, Ukraine opened negotiations on accession to the European Union. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis). Yet deadlines for fulfilling all of Ukraine’s EU membership commitments keep being postponed, while MPs are voting for fewer and fewer European integration initiatives.

Parliament appears to have become a hostage to its own ambition: despite its declared readiness to adopt the European integration legislation required, it has still failed to establish a separate accelerated procedure, limiting itself to two half-measures in the form of resolutions.

What the data show: only two European integration laws were adopted during the 14th session. This is the lowest number and the lowest share of adopted European integration laws since the 7th session. Such a pace poses a serious risk to Ukraine’s European integration prospects.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada has extended martial law 20 times.

At the beginning of the convocation, 424 MPs were serving; today, there are 392. Few of them can have expected at the start of their term to hold a mandate for longer than five years, still less under wartime conditions. With no prospect of elections in the near future, MPs are effectively ‘stuck’ in their seats.

The years of the full-scale invasion have shown that the Verkhovna Rada is adaptable to external change and capable of acting when circumstances demand it. At the same time, the overall pace of legislative work has declined over the years. Yet despite this slowdown, and despite debates about Parliament’s agency and capacity, the institution remains central to major state processes. Foremost among them is steering Ukraine along its path towards membership of the European Union. Both the preservation of democratic order and the trust of international partners depend on the Verkhovna Rada’s ability to function effectively.

On 11 August, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) presented a study on the functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’s parliamentary groups on interparliamentary relations at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation. This is the first comprehensive overview of how these groups operate during the full-scale war, aimed at documenting how parliamentary diplomacy functions at the systemic level and identifying the key challenges in this area.

Volodymyr Skrypets, Analytics Lead at ALI, noted that the study combines three components: ALI experts interviewed Members of Parliament of Ukraine, parliamentarians from partner countries and Ukraine’s ambassador to an EU Member State; analysed 43 annual reports of friendship groups with EU countries for 2022–2025; and examined international experience.

The increased activity of friendship groups following the start of the full-scale invasion has produced tangible results — in particular, the geography of interparliamentary engagement has expanded. Ukraine has obtained, or begun the process of obtaining, observer status in parliamentary assemblies to which Ukraine previously had limited access. The work of friendship groups has also helped maintain the international coalition in support of Ukraine, advocate for decisions on military, political and humanitarian assistance and organise visits by foreign parliamentarians to de-occupied territories and frontline regions.

At the same time, ALI identified five risks in the functioning of the groups — (1) funding, (2) reporting, (3) coordination, (4) competence and (5) communication and competition. All of them require more sustainable institutional practices to ensure that the progress made is not lost.

The most effective resource of Ukrainian parliamentary diplomacy is MPs’ personal contacts.

Another challenge for parliamentary diplomacy is the overall weakness of the reporting system and the absence of a single reporting standard. MPs tend to regard reporting as a formality, while Parliament loses the opportunity to accumulate and pass on institutional memory and better coordinate further action. To address this, ALI has developed ready-to-use reporting templates.

Oleksandr Merezhko, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, emphasised the value of standardising the reporting format for parliamentarians.

ALI also provided recommendations to the Verkhovna Rada on embedding institutional solutions in the field of parliamentary diplomacy: for Members of Parliament and friendship groups, for the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada and for the parliamentary committees responsible for foreign policy and European integration.

The study was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. This material represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Following the start of Russia’s invasion, parliamentary diplomacy has become one of the key channels of Ukraine’s foreign policy advocacy. Whereas inter-parliamentary cooperation had previously been unsystematic and unstructured and was perceived as parliamentary tourism rather than an instrument for advancing national interests, since 2022, the voice of the Verkhovna Rada has carried significantly greater weight. MPs have substantially broadened the range of platforms on which they appear and the geography of their presence, and have improved coordination — both internally and with other foreign policy actors.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives is publishing the first comprehensive account of how the inter-parliamentary relations groups of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have operated under conditions of full-scale war and amid the growing role of parliamentary diplomacy.

The study draws on 17 semi-structured interviews with the heads and active members of these groups, Ukraine’s Ambassador to an EU member state, and representatives of the parliaments of partner countries.

The study will be of value to MPs as a basis for reflection on parliamentary diplomacy and its potential; to future convocations as a guide to developing and institutionalising this form of cooperation; and to all those researching parliamentarism, foreign policy and Ukraine’s path to the EU.

Documenting and analysing this experience is a way to preserve institutional memory and to place parliamentary diplomacy on a more sustainable footing for future convocations.

This study was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 15 June, the European Union opened the first and most difficult negotiating cluster in its accession talks with Ukraine. This not only recognises the progress Ukraine has made during the full-scale invasion, but also reminds us of the scale of the ‘homework’ that remains on the path towards EU membership.

Ukraine’s further progress on EU integration depends largely on the Verkhovna Rada’s ability to adopt legislation. Some laws are directly linked to tranches of macro-financial assistance. Others concern the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law. In particular areas, Ukrainian rules must therefore correspond to those of the EU, including through common terminology, mechanisms and instruments for exercising the rights conferred.

The authorities’ plan is ambitious: to complete legislative alignment in 2027. This will require the preparation and adoption of almost 300 new EU integration laws. The National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law sets out this task and is intended to guide the Government on what must be adopted and when. The Verkhovna Rada generally supports the document, but problems arise when it comes to voting.

At the same time, Ukraine has no modern framework law on European integration. The Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted as far back as 2004, is not adequate for this task. Although it defines general approaches and institutional mechanisms, it has not been amended to reflect Ukraine’s accession process. In other words, Parliament has not developed new rules since Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and accession negotiations began.

A gap has therefore emerged between the scale of the new tasks and the tools available to perform them. A modern law defining responsibilities for state policy on European integration would end MPs’ endless search for their place in the process and could strengthen their oversight of the Government. Since the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution in 2019, there has been ample time to regulate an area in which the scale of legislative approximation is unprecedented.

It is therefore unsurprising that both society and MPs are sceptical about the prospect of adopting all EU integration legislation by the end of 2027. In 2026, Parliament adopted only eight EU integration laws, counting only those with the relevant designation in their draft law records. If the pace of the past year continues, Ukraine may join the EU in 75 years.

The slow pace reflects both institutional fatigue and flawed Government initiatives that MPs have to revise in Parliament. They appear trapped. They can either become scapegoats by voting for poor-quality laws and unpopular decisions, or refuse to vote, jeopardising Ukraine’s access to loan financing and disrupting the legislative alignment timetable. Yet the issue is not only the speed or number of legislative initiatives adopted. The quality of Parliament’s legislative work and the organisation and planning of the process are equally important.

The Verkhovna Rada appears to lack a common vision for a procedure to adopt EU integration legislation that reflects the positions of all political forces represented in Parliament. MPs themselves have different views of Parliament’s role. This was also demonstrated by the registration of a draft resolution to dismiss the chair of the relevant European integration committee. It was, however, withdrawn almost immediately after registration.

The Verkhovna Rada has failed even partially to address the problem by amending its Rules of Procedure to introduce a separate procedure for adopting EU integration draft laws. Draft law No. 8242 did not seek to accelerate the legislative procedure but proposed stricter requirements for the supporting documents for EU integration draft laws and a more thorough assessment of compliance with Ukraine’s EU integration commitments. Although registered in November 2022 and recommended by the committee, it was never brought forward for consideration. Draft law No. 13653 and its alternative, which propose an expedited procedure by shortening the time allowed to prepare EU integration draft laws for consideration, have not even received a committee opinion. They would effectively give EU integration laws priority and allow them to be adopted in a single reading if neither the parliamentary committee on European integration nor the Government has objections. Parliament evidently lacks the political will to consider these draft laws, despite the declared need and the initiatives already registered. As a result, around one hundred EU integration draft laws are waiting for their turn on the agenda.

Instead of introducing a comprehensive separate procedure for EU integration legislation, the Verkhovna Rada has relied on half-measures in the form of resolutions. Such resolutions generally address individual organisational issues, whereas a law establishes a coherent regulatory framework for an entire field.

After Ukraine was granted candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX in July 2022 to improve the legislative process. It identifies the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law as one of the Verkhovna Rada’s priorities and the Government as the principal initiator of EU integration draft laws. The Resolution introduced an expert assessment of draft laws’ compliance with EU law before the second reading and required parliamentary committees to establish European integration subcommittees. The effectiveness of these subcommittees is, however, open to question. The Verkhovna Rada also instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to ensure official translations of EU legislation and create a single information database on legislative approximation. Although the Resolution introduced an EU compliance review mechanism for draft laws, it is no substitute for a full legislative procedure established by the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada.

In early June 2026, MPs supported Resolution No. 4912-IX, which is intended to strengthen cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. MPs had often complained that the Government did not inform them of forthcoming EU integration plans. The Resolution therefore appears to be a compromise between the Cabinet and Parliament aimed at increasing MPs’ involvement in the process. It provides for ‘parliamentary support’ for the Government’s work on EU integration draft laws and partly addresses Government officials’ accountability to Parliament.

Under the Resolution, the Government must agree amendments to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Legislation to EU Law with the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada or a Deputy Chairman, taking into account the positions of the relevant sectoral committee, the European integration committee and the relevant negotiating group for the chapters concerned. The Cabinet of Ministers must also cooperate more closely with them, including by informing them of the results of consultations with the European Union. In addition, the Resolution requires the Government to submit quarterly reports to the Verkhovna Rada on implementation of the National Programme and the current state of EU accession negotiations. Such reports are unlikely to be considered at a plenary sitting, however, as Resolution No. 4912-IX does not impose this obligation on the Government.

The adoption of laws is unquestionably the exclusive power of the Verkhovna Rada, which may choose whether and how to regulate its own activities under the principle of parliamentary autonomy. Yet all these decisions remain fragmented. Parliament is effectively trying to adapt to new tasks through a series of isolated, targeted measures. The workload on the EU integration track will only increase, creating a need for a comprehensive legislative procedure that reflects the specific features of preparing, considering and adopting EU integration draft laws. This would allow Parliament to address a much broader set of tasks systematically instead of wasting time patching up outdated tools.

Parliament’s success on the EU integration track does not depend solely on its ability to press a few buttons. MPs do not have the Government’s bureaucratic resources to prepare article-by-article concordance tables and assess draft laws’ compliance with EU law. The Verkhovna Rada’s progress also depends on the Cabinet’s ability to prepare substantively sound draft laws and make the case for their adoption, a task at which the Government has so far performed poorly. For example, the Kos-Kachka plan, agreed in December 2025, does not yet have a single item completed in full.

Only the Verkhovna Rada can adopt laws, however, so it should have the strongest interest in creating conditions for the smooth and swift adoption of EU integration legislation. A dedicated EU integration legislative procedure would help. It should define what constitutes an EU integration draft law and establish requirements for its supporting documents, including assessments and tables of compliance with EU law. At the same time, an expedited parliamentary procedure must include safeguards against abuse: a minimum period should be set to give MPs and committees sufficient time to examine the text.

Experience also shows that rules and procedures may not be enough. Breaching the Rules of Procedure is commonplace in the Verkhovna Rada. Even today, a significant share of EU integration initiatives remain ‘stuck’ in committees despite their priority status. The effectiveness of the EU integration track will therefore depend not only on the existence of a special legislative procedure, but also on MPs’ genuine willingness to follow it. Otherwise, the ambitious goal of joining the EU in 2027 will remain yet another piece of empty rhetoric.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives attended a meeting about the regulation of parliamentary majority and opposition powers in Ukraine. Organised by the National Democratic Institute, the event was also attended by Members of Parliament, representatives of political parties, civil society organisations, academics and experts. An Analytical Note on the regulation of the powers of the parliamentary majority and opposition was also shared at the event.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, the ALI’s Deputy Executive Director for Analytics, outlined the concept of legislative enshrinement of the opposition’s status. This concept was originally designed in 2022 by the Sub-group on Regulating the Status of the Opposition, which was part of the Working Group on Parliamentary Reform. The ALI was a member of this Sub-group.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi highlighted that the Sub-group’s key insight was the rejection of the perception that the opposition is a unified entity, given that Ukrainian parliamentary practice is far more intricate. In fact, it is more accurate to refer to a pluralistic opposition, or even to opposition factions that may collaborate ad hoc, rather than to the opposition as a unified whole.

In terms of the definition of the word ‘opposition’, the Sub-group had set out several potential criteria:

• Factions in which the majority of registered members did not vote in favour of the Government’s appointment (or of the majority of Government members) — a mandatory criterion;
• Factions in which the majority of registered members did not vote in favour of the Government’s programme — an optional criterion;
• Factions that have declared themselves to be in opposition or have signed an opposition list — an optional criterion.

The concept also acknowledges the separation of responsibilities between the majority and the opposition. The majority is responsible for policymaking, while the opposition focuses on parliamentary oversight. The opposition must have access to the necessary tools and levers, including the appointment of committee chairs with clear oversight responsibilities.

Members of Parliament of the 9th convocation must address the issue of regulating the status of the parliamentary opposition alongside other long-awaited decisions. Among these tasks are adopting the Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament, passing the Parliamentary Service Law, and establishing a framework for a special oversight committee on intelligence matters for the next parliamentary convocation.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is far from the strongest in the ninth convocation in terms of quantitative performance — as evidenced by data from the parliamentary Monitoring conducted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. This is not about a single unsuccessful week or a few failed votes. It reflects systemic problems in the work of the Verkhovna Rada, confirmed by a combination of indicators and data.

The parliamentary crisis has already been widely discussed. MPs themselves are also speaking about it. Andrii Motovylovets, First Deputy Head of the ‘Servant of the People’ faction, stated that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure votes for draft laws required for budget formation and the fulfilment of international obligations. Moreover, according to him, around 40 MPs are ready to resign their mandates — approximately 10% of the total composition of Parliament.

Let us compare the figures with the realities described by MPs themselves and consider how Parliament can overcome this crisis and restore its lost pace of work.

The Ukrainian Parliament is not paralysed, but its effectiveness has noticeably declined. Committees, Temporary Investigative Commissions (TICs) and plenary sessions are held regularly. Decisions are still adopted. So where, and how, does the crisis manifest itself?

1. Slow pace. On average, it takes Parliament 382 days to adopt a law at second reading — the slowest rate of the entire ninth convocation. 
2. Low-priority initiatives. A significant share of adopted laws consists of ratifications and minor amendments, while key European integration legislation has not progressed — only two European integration laws have secured sufficient votes. 
3. A sharp decline in output. Between September 2025 and February 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted only 63 laws — the lowest figure of the entire ninth convocation. This is four times less than during its most productive period, when Parliament adopted 229 laws between February and August 2022.

If such a pace continues, Ukraine may end up celebrating its accession to the EU alongside the beginning of the 22nd century (assuming accession takes place only after all European integration laws are adopted). This is how long — 75 years — it would take to pass all 300 European integration draft laws referred to by Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka. (If two such laws are adopted per session, which lasts half a year, this results in four laws per year. 300/4 = 75. These calculations do not  account for the likely expansion of the acquis communautaire.)

Such a pace appears particularly striking given that the first 100 days of the new Government fell in autumn 2025 — a period when the Cabinet of Ministers would be expected to operate at peak intensity, including, for example, approving its Programme of Activities.

Why has this crisis emerged? In numerous interviews with various media outlets, MPs point to a range of factors:

• lack of communication between Parliament and the Government, as well as within the mono-majority;
• backlash over ‘Mindichgate’ and its consequences;  
• internal conflicts;
• developments surrounding NABU/SAPO;
• as well as a series of notices of suspicion issued to MPs by anti-corruption bodies.

What can be stated with confidence is that this crisis began in the summer, not in the winter — this is clearly reflected in the data.

Talk of EU accession in 2027, international support linked to meeting structural benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund, as well as compliance with the Ukraine Facility Plan, can all be set aside unless the situation changes (that is, unless the Verkhovna Rada begins adopting the laws envisaged by the Ukraine Facility Plan and required for Ukraine’s accession to the EU).

There is no alternative to the Verkhovna Rada in this process. Neither the Cabinet of Ministers nor the President has the authority to adopt laws. Yet it is precisely legislation that is required — both for European integration and for securing financing under the ‘funding in exchange for reforms’ model. Without it, Ukraine will struggle to finance even the most critical budget items, such as defence expenditure, let alone programmes such as national cashback schemes.

A functioning Parliament is essential for maintaining democratic order and the trust of international partners. While criticism of the Verkhovna Rada’s low productivity is justified, undermining the institution itself is dangerous.

Even a weakened Parliament is preferable to an institutional vacuum. An empty Verkhovna Rada will not pass a budget or adopt laws. Nor is it desirable to imagine a scenario in which someone decides to dissolve Parliament and assume its powers. It is better not to describe in detail a sequence of events involving a coup d’état, a cascading collapse of state institutions, the spectre of a Libya-style civil war, or a rapid occupation of Ukrainian territory…

The good news is that the Verkhovna Rada still has 393 sitting MPs, full legitimacy and even a formally existing coalition (a parliamentary faction in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that holds the rights of a coalition of parliamentary factions). Parliament can still be revitalised.

All scenarios for overcoming the crisis share one common element — restoring dialogue within the Parliament – Government – President triangle. The question is how exactly this can be achieved.

The first scenario is the formation of a national unity coalition, which was discussed in 2022 and could improve the situation in 2026. What was previously seen as a ‘desirable option’ is now becoming a practical necessity due to the lack of votes. This scenario may be complemented by a reconfiguration of the Government, the adoption of compromise draft laws and the signing of a formal coalition agreement. However, it requires genuine dialogue and mutual concessions involving parliamentary minority factions and groups.

The second scenario is to improve interaction between the current Government and Parliament. MPs point to:

• chaotic communication;
• lack of accountability;
• exclusion from decision-making processes.

These issues could be addressed by the Cabinet of Ministers led by Yuliia Svyrydenko, provided it finds effective ways of engaging with the Verkhovna Rada.

The third scenario is a reconfiguration of the Government. If the root cause of the crisis lies in poor communication between the Government and Parliament and the current Cabinet is unable to improve it, it may be worth giving a new one a chance. Formally, this step could be taken by the Servant of the People faction alone, although securing support from other factions appears more realistic. A key principle in this process should be ensuring that Parliament has a genuine influence over the selection of ministerial candidates — this would shape MPs’ attitudes towards the new Government.

The fourth scenario is to restore internal dialogue within Parliament. This could lead to mutual support for draft laws (so-called logrolling). It could also result in a review of MPs’ remuneration (if the issue indeed lies in the removal of informal top-up payments, as suggested by journalists). Alternatively, it may expand the scope of consensus voting — as is currently the case with votes on decrees extending martial law and mobilisation.

These scenarios may appear difficult to implement, but the alternative should not be overlooked — further deterioration during wartime could ultimately threaten statehood. Ultimately, overcoming the parliamentary crisis is possible. There are grounds for cautious optimism in the experience of the Verkhovna Rada two years ago (autumn 2023). At that time, the situation was similar: during the 10th session, Parliament adopted only 64 laws, of which just four were related to European integration. Yet by spring 2024, the situation had improved — albeit not as significantly as one might have hoped. Perhaps the desired progress can be achieved in 2026.

Experts in governance, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and electoral processes joined the discussion. Participants discussed medium-term tendencies, potential avenues for Canada to support reforms, and opportunities for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction.

Close attention was drawn to the work of the Ukrainian Parliament. Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, the ALI’s Deputy Executive Director for Analytics, referred to the parliamentary Monitoring report for the 14th session when analysing trends in the Verkhovna Rada’s activity and the challenges it is currently experiencing. The expert highlighted institutional fatigue as one of the reasons for the recent decline in legislative output, adding that the 9th convocation is the longest in the Verkhovna Rada’s history. Other factors influencing this decline include issues surrounding NABU and SAPO, as well as other corruption scandals and internal conflicts. 

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi remarked that the slowdown in Parliament’s work is affecting the implementation of necessary reforms, notably the adoption of EU-related legislation. If Ukraine is to join the European Union by 2027, the passage of all the necessary regulations requires greater attention and a steady pace. 

For Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, an active civil society carries on playing a vital role in developing state institutions and national identity. However, he also raised particular concerns about troubling tendencies within civil society. Civil society organisations often find themselves having to work in place of institutions, rather than alongside them. In the long term, this will inevitably undermine their capacity, says Oleksandr Zaslavskyi. Therefore, it would be wise for civil society organisations to focus on approaches that engage institutions, public officials and decision-makers as deeply as possible in their work. This will empower us to preserve and reinforce the functioning of state institutions, especially those overseeing European integration. 

During the 14th session, 7 ‘Government Question Hours’ were held — in total, MPs and ministers spent more than 8 hours asking questions and providing answers.

The largest number of questions raised by MPs concerned the implementation of state social policy under martial law and the fulfilment of Ukraine’s European integration commitments.

Members of Parliament terminated the activities of 8 temporary commissions and established 5 temporary investigative commissions.

During the 14th session, MPs submitted 218 parliamentary questions — almost half as many as during the 13th session, and on a par with the 10th session. All inquiries addressed to the President concerned the conferment of titles.

‘Government Question Hour’ is an instrument of parliamentary oversight through which Members of Parliament may ask questions to members of the Cabinet of Ministers on a defined topic and receive answers. During the ‘Government Question Hour’, only issues related to the designated topic may be raised. As a rule, responses are delivered from the rostrum by the minister responsible for the relevant area, although questions may also be addressed to the Prime Minister and other ministers. 

During the 14th sessionMPs may often yield the floor to another MP during the Government Question Hour to ask a question. Therefore, remarks by MPs lasting less than 10 seconds were removed from the data, as these were most likely such transfers of the floor., 7 ‘Government Question Hours’ were held — in total, MPs and ministers spent more than eight hours asking questions and receiving answers.

MPs may ask several questions during a single intervention, while ministers may respond to several questions, or several ministers may respond to a single question. Considering these features of the ‘Government Question Hours’, the data obtained illustrate MPs’ interest in particular topics or even specific ministers. 

Compared to the 13th session, the data on the ‘Government Question Hours’ demonstrate a decrease in MPs’ activity, which is generally consistent with the overall trends of this session. 

*It should be noted that the ‘Government Question Hour’ is divided into two parts: 1) questions from parliamentary factions (parliamentary groups) to members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and responses thereto; 2) questions from Members of Parliament to members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and responses thereto — up to 30 minutes. 

As in previous sessions, the largest number of questions (interventions) came from the Servant of the People faction — its representatives accounted for almost one third of all questions.

During the 14th session, questions from Members of Parliament were most frequently answered by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuliia Svyrydenko, and the Minister of Education and Science, Oksen Lisovyi. This distribution is expected, given the role of the Prime Minister in coordinating the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers and the fact that the Minister of Education served as the main speaker during the ‘Government Question Hours’. 

The Verkhovna Rada may establish temporary bodies: temporary special commissions and temporary investigative commissions, which are formed for a period not exceeding one year. During the 14th session, the Parliament voted to establish five temporary investigative commissions and terminated the activities of eight temporary commissions (of which five were special commissions). Their list is provided in Annex 7.

Members of Parliament have the right to submit parliamentary inquiries and MPs’ appealsSince MPs’ appeals do not require announcement at a plenary sitting and there is no information about their registration, which complicates data collection, they are not the subject of this monitoring.. The former constitute a requirement by an MP to provide an official response on matters within the competence of a body or institution, while the latter constitute a request to provide an official clarification or present a position on matters within the competence of a body or institution.

During the 14th session, MPs submitted 218 parliamentary inquiries — almost twice fewer than during the 13th session and at the level of the 9th session. All parliamentary inquiries addressed to the President concernedThe conferral of titles and awards falls within the powers of the President; therefore, a parliamentary inquiry addressed to the President regarding the awarding of service members and other individuals (most often with the title of Hero of Ukraine) has become one of the instruments for recognising the contribution of service members, alongside citizens’ appeals and electronic petitions. the conferment of titles.

The decrease in the number of submitted parliamentary inquiries, as well as the number of ‘Government Question Hours’ held and MPs’ activity during them, confirms the conclusion that the 14th session is one of the slowest and least active sessions since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

During the 14th session, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure in the adoption of laws amounted to 38%, which is 30% lower than during the previous session.

The share of violations at the second reading of draft laws decreased by half compared to the 13th session.

The overall share of violations of the constitutional time limit (15 days) for the signing of laws by the President during the 14th session again amounted to 44%. The time limit for signing (or submitting proposals) was violated for 20 laws, while another 8 laws were neither signed nor vetoed.

The volume of violations of the legislative procedure during the 14th session decreased significantly and almost reached the level observed before the full-scale invasion. The overall share of draft laws adopted with violations is lower than during all other sessions under martial law, due to the significant decrease in violations at the second reading.

This section provides information on violations of the Rules of Procedure during the 14th session.

The 14th session demonstrated a decrease in the share of violations across all categories. During the 14th session, approximately 38% (more than one third) of laws were adopted with violations of consideration procedures, compared to 68% during the 13th session.

During the 14th session, the dynamics of the frequency of violations of the Rules of Procedure are similar for both the first and second readings. For the first reading, the share of violations decreased compared to the 13th session. Overall, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure at the first reading has continued to decline since the 11th session.

Since the 9th session, the share of violations at the second reading had been increasing. During the 14th session, however, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure at the second reading decreased almost twofold across all three types of violations monitored for the second reading.

These are among the lowest indicators for the entire IX convocation. The volume of violations at both the first and second readings continues to gradually approach the levels observed before the full-scale invasion.

In the charts and table, data on the share of draft laws adopted with specific types of violations of the Rules of Procedure are presented by session.

*The Rules of Procedure of the VRU do not contain a direct and clear requirement regarding the mandatory nature of opinions of the MSED. Alongside Article 103(4), which provides that in the absence of opinions within 14 days there are deemed to be no comments, there are also provisions requiring MSED opinions:

1. Article 112 establishes that accompanying documents to a draft law shall be provided to MPs no later than seven days before the day of consideration of the draft law at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.
2. Article 99(2)(3) provides that expert opinions on a draft law form part of the accompanying documents.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Rules of Procedure of the VRU are imperfect and contain contradictory provisions. For example, the MSED may provide an opinion after the 14-day deadline (due to workload), and in such a case it is unclear what the main committee should do — treat the absence of timely opinions as meaning there are no comments or consider the comments submitted after the deadline. 

**The opinion of the MLD was absent for the draft state budget, but this was not considered a violation due to the established practice of the absence of MLD opinions on budgets in different years.

In addition to standard violations of the Rules of Procedure, monitoring was carried out of violations of the Constitution related to breaches of the 15-day time limit for the signing of adopted laws by the President (Article 94 of the Constitution). The monitoring covered 63 laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the 14th session. The time limit for signing (or submitting proposals) was violated for 20 laws, i.e. in 32% of cases (compared to 43% during the 13th session). In addition, a further 8 laws were neither signed by the President, nor vetoed, nor accompanied by proposals (although the deadline for their signing had already expired). If all violations are combined, this amounts to 44% of all laws adopted during the 14th session, which is lower than the results of the 13th session (47%). Thus, almost half of all laws adopted during the 14th session involved violations of the time limits established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

Of course, the extent of the delay — whether 2 days or 102 days — does not change the fact that both constitute a violation. If one considers the most extreme cases, the longest recorded time for signing was 83 days.

Violations of the constitutional procedure began to increase with the introduction of martial law. The 11th and 13th sessions recorded the highest number of such violations, while the 12th and 14th sessions showed only a slight decrease. However, it is premature to conclude that the trend has changed. Despite significant improvements in the process of adopting laws, the timeframes for signing remain a major issue. These violations also cannot be explained byAccording to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President has 15 days to sign a law and officially promulgate it, or to return it with his reasoned and formulated proposals to Parliament. At the decision of the President, the Government organises an expert review of the law submitted for signature. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Government has a maximum of seven days to submit its proposals regarding the signing of the law by the President or reasoned and substantiated proposals on the expediency of the President exercising the right of veto. The time spent on preparing generalised comments and proposals depends both on the scope and complexity of the law and on other factors — the day of the week and time when the copy of the law was received, the number of ministries involved in the review, differences in their positions regarding the adopted law, internal bureaucratic procedures in the ministries, technical reasons, etc. Any combination of these factors may delay the Government’s submission of proposals on the law and, accordingly, the President’s decision to sign the law or return it to Parliament. deficiencies in the regulatory or procedural framework, as the relevant provisions have not changed.

During the 14th session, the President, within the established 15-day time limit (i.e. without violation), vetoed one draft law and submitted his proposals. The draft law had been initiated by representatives of the Servant of the People faction, which suggests that, in this case, the positions of the initiators and the President were not aligned or that the draft law was technically flawed. The Verkhovna Rada has not yet considered this draft law.

• The most heavily burdened committees are the Committee on Economic Development (34 opinions), the Committee on Finance (25 opinions), the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Social Policy (24 opinions each).
• In terms of the number of draft laws per MP, two committees had the highest workload during the 14th session — the Committee on Economic Development and the Committee on Social Policy. Both committees account for more than 2 assigned draft laws and provided opinions per MP. In nine committees, the workload (number of provided opinions) does not exceed 0.5 per MP.

During the 14th session, committees of the Verkhovna Rada continued to operate in conditions of a slight decrease in the number of registered draft laws compared to the 12th session. The total number of provided opinions decreased to 260, which is 32 fewer than during the corresponding 12th session. The uneven distribution of workload among committee members, which in some cases differs by as much as 17 times, raises the issue of redistributing responsibilities or revising the composition of MPs and secretariat staff within committees.

Information on the timeframes for the provision of committee opinions is presented in the section on the speed of passage of draft laws.

During the 14th session, 38 opinions of main committees recommending the rejection of draft laws were prepared. Opinions recommending rejection may indicate both the political alignment of committees and the level (at least minimal) of the quality of draft law preparation. At the same time, as during the 11th session, two-thirds of the rejected draft laws are alternative draft laws. Presidential draft laws appear to meet both criteria, as none received opinions recommending rejection (it should be noted, however, that the number of presidential draft laws was limited and they are often ratifications and decrees). Government draft laws also appear largely unproblematic: during the 14th session, they did not receive any opinions recommending rejection. Most rejection opinions were issued for draft laws initiated by MPs from the Servant of the People faction, which is logical given the number of MPs and their legislative activity. 

When assessing committee workload, it should be borne in mind that this monitoring primarily calculates workload based on the number of opinions by main committees. This method is used due to data availability (open data format). Information on the opinions of main committees is consistently available on the website of the Verkhovna Rada, is regularly updated and covers all such opinions. At the same time, committees perform many other functions and tasks beyond providing opinions as main committees. Three committeesBudget Committee, Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, Committee on European Integration. are required to provide mandatory opinions on all draft laws; committees may also be tasked with preparing opinions as supporting committees; they consider and adopt decisions within the framework of the oversight function; review letters and appeals; and organise conferences, round tables and other events. These limitations should be considered when reviewing the information presented below, which is based on the opinions of main committees. 

The presented chart includes two indicators. First, it shows the number of opinionsThe number of opinions does not correspond to the number of draft laws considered. A committee may provide several opinions on a single draft law, for example: an opinion on inclusion in the agenda, opinions for the first and second readings, for repeated readings, or on revised versions of the draft law, etc. provided by the main committees. The second indicator reflects the number of draft laws assigned to each committee as the main committee in accordance with its remit. Together, these indicators illustrate the distribution of legislative work related to the preliminary consideration of draft laws.

The highest workload in terms of the number of opinions (34) falls on the Committee on Economic Development. Three other committees also demonstrate a relatively high workload (compared to other committees): the Committee on Finance (25 opinions), the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Social Policy (24 opinions each). While the Committee on Economic Development was not among the leaders in terms of the number of provided opinions in recent sessions, for the other committees, this distribution is relatively typical for the last seven sessions under martial law (7th–13th sessions).

The total number of opinions decreased to 260, which is 32 fewer than the number provided by committees during the corresponding 12th session.

The largest decreases (compared to the corresponding 12th session) in the number of opinions provided during the 14th session were recorded by the Committee on Legal Policy (−32 opinions) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−29 opinions).

At the same time, for some committees, the number of opinions increased compared to the 12th session. In particular, the largest increase was recorded by the Committee on Economic Development (+18 opinions).

The number of draft laws assigned to committees, as compared to the 12th session, changed within a range from −28 to +15 assigned draft laws.

The potential workload (i.e. the number of assigned draft laws) of committees during the 14th session decreased most significantly (as compared to the 12th session) for the same committees that also experienced a decrease in actual workload: the Committee on Legal Policy (−28 assigned draft laws) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−27 assigned draft laws).

At the same time, the potential workload increased most significantly for the Budget Committee (+15 assigned draft laws) and the Committee on Social Policy (+10 assigned draft laws).

Another dimension of committee workload is illustrated by the chart above, which shows how many opinions or registered draft laws fall per MPNumber of MPs at the end of the 14th session; during the 14th session the number of MPs in committees changed. who is a member of a committee. A high workload (where the number of assigned draft laws and provided opinions exceeds 2 per MP) during the 14th session is observed only in one committee — the Committee on Social Policy (5.1 draft laws per MP and 2.4 opinions per MP). Two other committees (the Committee on Economic Development and the Committee on EU Integration) have a workload exceeding 1.5 opinions and draft laws per MP.

In nine committees, the number of provided opinions per MP does not reach 0.5 (during the 12th session, this indicator also did not reach 0.5 for nine committees). The lowest number of provided opinions per MP is recorded for the Budget Committee (0.14 opinions per MP) and the Committee on Agrarian Policy (0.23 opinions per MP). Three other committees, despite having assigned draft laws, did not provide any opinions.

When comparing the 14th session with the corresponding 12th session, a noticeable difference in workload can be observed, as the difference in the number of provided opinions per MP ranges from −1.78 to +1.43. The number of assigned draft laws also varies significantly — within the range from −1.56 to +1.

The actual workload (i.e. the number of provided opinions per MP) decreased the most for the Committee on Legal Policy (−1.89 opinions per MP) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−1.32 opinions per MP). The largest increase in actual workload was recorded for the Committee on Economic Development (+1.43 opinions per MP).

The potential workload decreased the most (compared to the 12th session) for the Committee on Legal Policy (−1.56 assigned draft laws per MP) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−1.23 draft laws per MP). At the same time, the largest increase in potential workload was recorded for the Committee on EU Integration (+0.88 assigned draft laws per MP) and the Committee on Social Policy (+1 assigned draft law per MP).

Overall, the trends in actual and potential workload per committee member correspond to the general data on committee workload.

When comparing the least and most heavily burdened committees, their workload differs by a factor of 17. This situation observed during the 14th session, as well as persistent trends in committee workload across sessions, raises the issue of redistributing either MPs or the areas of competence among committees.