Following public discussions and several scandals surrounding the drafts of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 (ACS), deliberations in key parliamentary committees and comments received from state institutions, Members of Parliament registered a revised draft anti-corruption policy document — Draft Law No. 15230-d. It takes into account the conclusions of committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), comments by the Main Scientific and Expert Department (MSED) of the VRU and other comments on the previous draft laws. The document also incorporates the interim benchmarks (IBMs) for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’.

According to the explanatory note to Draft Law No. 15230-d, the main provisions that have strengthened the revised draft ACS include:

1. cross-cutting alignment of the draft with the provisions of the Rule of Law Roadmap and the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’;
2. supplementing the Preamble with the principles underpinning the Strategy, which will help preserve its vision for the future;
3. supplementing the problem related to the identification, tracing and management of assets derived from corruption and other crimes;
4. supplementing subsection 2.1 (Judiciary and the Status of Judges) with the fundamental problem of financial support for the judiciary and transferring to this subsection the problem of the institutional resilience and capacity of the High Anti-Corruption Court;
5. systemic improvement of provisions in the areas of taxation and customs;
6. including corruption-related issues in the strategically important forestry sector in the draft;
7. revising subsection 2.16 (Education and Science) as a foundation for fostering Ukraine’s human and innovation capital.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is a document that defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy. Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan — the State Anti-Corruption Programme.

This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years effectively remained to achieve the expected results. The State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025 has been partially implemented and remains in force until a new one is approved.

In May, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 were registered in the Verkhovna Rada (Draft Law No. 15230, Draft Law No. 15230-1 and Draft Law No. 15230-2). ALI published its expert analysis of some of the differences between them and recommendations on the most appropriate ways to improve anti-corruption policy.

Following revision of these draft laws by the Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, a decision was taken (pursuant to Part 2 Article 110 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’) to submit the revised version of the Anti-Corruption Strategy to Parliament for consideration. An analysis of its key provisions is provided below.

The list of problems previously identified in this area remains unchanged. As in the previous versions, it is proposed, among other things, to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform the functions of the state or local self-government disciplinarily liable.

Some expected strategic results have undergone significant changes. Thus, previous versions of the ACS envisaged that, following legislative amendments, a person could be held disciplinarily liable if, in particular, a court found the corruption-related administrative offence committed by that person to be minor or closed the case because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty had expired. We have already noted that such an approach may lead to a violation of the presumption of innocence.

The revised version of the ACS no longer contains these grounds. It retains the provision that public servants are held disciplinarily liable on the basis of a final court decision holding the person administratively liable for a corruption-related administrative offence.

Pursuant to Part 2 Article 65-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’, an official who has committed a corruption offence or a corruption-related offence is subject to disciplinary liability where the court has not imposed on that person a penalty or sanction in the form of deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities related to the performance of state or local self-government functions.

In the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CC of Ukraine) and the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), deprivation of this right is defined as an additional penalty/sanction. Therefore, it is the court that, having assessed all the circumstances of the case, imposes the principal penalty or sanction (usually a fine) and may also impose an additional penalty/sanction where this is provided for by the sanction of the relevant article of the CC of Ukraine or the CUAO.

If the relevant article does not provide for such an additional penalty/sanction, or if the court has not imposed it, a disciplinary sanction should be imposed on the person.

The ACS proposes expanding the list of grounds for holding public servants disciplinarily liable for violations of anti-corruption legislation. ALI experts believe that such legislative amendments will not resolve the existing problem but, on the contrary, will exacerbate it (problem 1.9.1).

The brief description of this problem states that its causes include, in particular:

• imperfect legislation on the disciplinary liability of public servants and its inconsistency with anti-corruption legislation;
• failure by managers and bodies authorised to impose disciplinary liability to apply the above-mentioned provisions of Article 65-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’.

If laws establish that a separate ground for holding public servants disciplinarily liable is the entry into force of a court decision holding them administratively liable for committing a corruption-related offence, this is unlikely to affect the practice of applying disciplinary sanctions. Therefore, achieving this strategic result will not resolve the problem.

At this stage, it appears more appropriate to improve the time limits and procedures for holding persons disciplinarily liable and to provide guidance on applying anti-corruption legislation in relation to holding persons liable.

Previous versions of the draft ACS (expected strategic result 1.9.1.1 for problem 1.9.1) provided that a final court decision holding a person criminally, administratively or civilly liable should constitute an unconditional ground for dismissing that person from public service (office) outside the disciplinary procedure.

The MSED of the VRU Secretariat has already made a number of pertinent comments on this provision, including the observation that an attempt to circumvent disciplinary proceedings deprives a person of procedural safeguards ensuring individualisation of guilt and proportionality of the sanction. Court materials may be used in a disciplinary investigation rather than serving as an automatic and unconditional ground for dismissal outside the disciplinary procedure.

It should also be added that this dismissal procedure effectively negates the additional penalty/sanction of deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities in the context of violations of anti-corruption legislation.

The revised version of the Strategy states that the legislative grounds for disciplinary liability for violations of anti-corruption legislation should be improved, in particular by ‘establishing unconditional grounds for dismissal from service (office) outside the disciplinary procedure for any category of persons authorised to perform the functions of the state or local self-government’.

It should be noted that this wording is overly broad and vague compared with the previous version. In addition, unconditional grounds for dismissal from public service (office) are already defined both by the Labour Code of Ukraine (Articles 36 and 40) and by laws governing the specific features of particular types of public service (for example, Article 87 of the Law ‘On Civil Service’, Article 51 of the Law ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, etc.).

Therefore, this expected result needs to be clarified to specify that a public servant is subject to dismissal where a court has imposed an additional penalty/sanction in the form of deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities, as well as where the assets of that person, assets acquired by other persons on their instructions or assets in other cases provided for by Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine have been recognised as unjustified and recovered to the State.

The wording of expected strategic result 1.9.3.3 concerning the improvement of the procedure for holding persons administratively liable for corruption-related offences has also been changed in this section. Whereas previous versions of the ACS envisaged extending the time limits for imposing an administrative penalty, the current wording is less clear: reviewing the time limits for imposing a penalty for such offences.

In implementing the Anti-Corruption Strategy, this wording may result in these time limits being revised either upwards or downwards, which could, on the contrary, worsen the practice of holding persons administratively liable for corruption-related offences.

The new version of the ACS retains the expected strategic result concerning the Supreme Court’s generalisation of case law in cases of corruption-related administrative offences, about which ALI has already expressed reservations.

The section of the ACS devoted to these issues has undergone significant changes.

First and foremost, the problems identified in the activities of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) have been moved to this section. This is the right decision, as the HACC is part of the judiciary. The provisions concerning the anti-corruption court themselves have not changed and envisage introducing single-judge consideration of civil and administrative cases, mechanisms to prevent participants in criminal proceedings from abusing procedural rights and the possibility of continuing consideration of a case where one of the three judges on a HACC panel or the Appeal Chamber of the HACC is replaced. The draft ACS also emphasises filling vacant judicial positions and providing permanent premises for judges of the HACC at first instance and in its Appeal Chamber. Implementation of these measures is already under way.

The updated draft ACS somewhat changes the approaches to the participation of international experts in the selection of members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). Whereas the first version (Draft Law No. 15230) expressly provided international experts with a decisive vote, the revised ACS states that selection should be transparent, predictable and improved where necessary, ‘with the temporary involvement of independent experts delegated by international partners, in accordance with paragraph 23.2.1 of the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 “Fundamentals of the Accession Process”’.

Despite the obvious need to gradually move towards replacing international experts with national experts, at this stage it is still too early for Ukraine to take this step, as ALI has previously emphasised, primarily because judicial self-governance bodies have not yet been reformed. At the same time, the ACS draws attention to the need to fill all vacant positions of HCJ and HQCJ members within timeframes that ensure the uninterrupted functioning of these bodies.

The revised draft ACS changes the approach to addressing problems in the work of the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU), namely: ‘The mechanism for forming the Council of Judges of Ukraine is insufficiently regulated and needs to be improved by establishing the term of office of its members, increasing the transparency of candidate selection processes and defining mechanisms for involving the judicial community in discussing and electing members of the Council’. It is proposed to address the problem by increasing the transparency of the processes for selecting candidates for CJU membership (including through advance publication of information about candidates, etc.), determining the term of office of the Council and its members and establishing the grounds and mechanism for early termination of their powers. At the same time, this judicial self-governance body should be elected by secret electronic voting in which all judges participate. The revised version deserves support.

The main problems arising in the work of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) are formulated somewhat differently, although the substance of the original expected strategic results has been preserved. In particular, its activities need to be improved to strengthen mechanisms for accountability to the HQCJ, introduce competitive selection for management positions and ensure transparency in the NSJU’s activities. These provisions deserve support. Moreover, similar problems and ways of addressing them are described in the report of the TAIEX mission that audited the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre of Ukraine.

The problem of ineffective mechanisms for rotating judges who hold administrative positions in courts (primarily court presidents), which results in judges holding administrative positions for prolonged periods, is formulated more clearly. However, unlike some other provisions of the ACS, no specific proposals are made here for addressing the problem.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposed improving the work of the Public Integrity Council, which, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be given a statutory role in a system that balances public and state participation in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not substitute for the institutional decision of the judiciary. This provision is absent from the revised draft ACS, although it deserves the support of Members of Parliament during the plenary vote.

The revised draft ACS broadens the approach to ensuring the full functioning of e-justice. In particular, provisions have been added on ensuring electronic court proceedings through the development of the Unified Judicial Information and Communication System (UJICS) and the introduction of analytical tools to prevent, identify and respond to possible abuses (including in the automated distribution of cases, access to information in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions and atypical workloads of courts or individual judges in particular categories of cases).

At the same time, the ongoing development of the UJICS should be supported by adequate financial resources (from the State Budget of Ukraine) and human resources, taking into account the needs of courts and other bodies and institutions of the justice system. This approach deserves support.

The scope of publicly available information about the judicial system has also been expanded. In particular, regular publication of minutes (decisions) of meetings of judges and court statistics broken down by individual court should be ensured.

The revised draft ACS also contains a number of new but debatable proposals. For example, the draft proposes establishing a procedure for publishing practical assignments completed by candidates for judicial office and their criterion-by-criterion assessment. It is not entirely clear what purpose this serves. Candidates who disagree with their scores already challenge them before the Supreme Court. Candidates who are satisfied with their scores proceed to the next stage. What problems the publication of all assignments and all assessments is intended to resolve remains a matter for discussion.

It is also proposed to standardise the rules for interviewing candidates for judicial office. It should be borne in mind that procedures for selecting judges for different instances (and even for some jurisdictions) differ significantly. Therefore, interviews should be standardised within the same procedure.

A significant addition to the draft ACS is the problem of insufficient financial and human resources for the judicial system (problem 2.1.10). To address it, the draft proposes ensuring competitive levels of judicial remuneration and salaries for court staff and staff of other bodies and institutions of the justice system, taking into account workload and the importance and responsibility of the work.

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges’, judicial remuneration is calculated in multiples of the subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons established by the State Budget for the relevant year. Despite the increase in this indicator (UAH 3,328 in 2026), the base used to calculate judicial remuneration has remained unchanged since 2021, because laws on the State Budget establish a separate subsistence minimum for calculating judicial remuneration.

The judicial community itself raised this issue at the XX Regular Congress of Judges of Ukraine in March this year, while the Supreme Court submitted a constitutional petition to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine seeking to have such restrictions declared unconstitutional (registration No. 4/308(26) of 02.06.2026).

A comparison of the provisions of the revised ACS with the previous versions as regards the prosecution service shows continuity in the key ideas: most of the identified problems and expected strategic results have been retained without significant changes. At the same time, the new version clarifies certain provisions in light of European integration commitments and the interim benchmarks for Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ of Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’.

Whereas the previous version envisaged resuming competitions for positions of prosecutors at the Office of the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutor’s offices in accordance with the European Commission’s recommendations, the new version of the ACS directly links this result to paragraph 23.2 of the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’. The relevant requirement therefore receives a more specific normative basis within Ukraine’s negotiations with the European Union.

The mechanism and approaches to improving the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General have changed substantially in the revised ACS. The new version acknowledges that the current procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General carries risks of informal or political influence and needs to be improved in line with Ukraine’s European commitments. This time, however, the strategic result is formulated in general terms: it envisages ensuring a more transparent and merit-based procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General in accordance with paragraph 23.2 of the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’.

Unlike certain previous legislative initiatives, the ACS does not prescribe a particular model for implementing European integration commitments — an open competition for the position or another mechanism for reducing political influence. This approach gives the legislator greater scope to choose a specific mechanism for appointing the Prosecutor General, provided that the principles set out in the Strategy — transparency, merit-based selection and compliance with Ukraine’s European commitments — are observed. ALI analysed different models for improving the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, their compliance with European standards, constitutional aspects and possible implementation scenarios in Ukraine in the analytical note ‘Depoliticising the Procedure for Appointing and Dismissing the Prosecutor General: European Models, Constitutional Aspects and Possible Scenarios for Ukraine’.

Particular attention should be paid to the approach to improving the system for evaluating prosecutors’ performance. The revised version, like the previous versions, envisages using evaluation results to make personnel and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses.

Unlike Draft Law No. 15230-2, which envisaged the possibility of using evaluation results as grounds for disciplinary action, the revised ACS contains no such possibility. This is consistent with the nature of evaluation as a human resources management and professional development tool rather than a mechanism for imposing liability. ALI’s concerns on this issue have been taken into account.

As regards the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the expected strategic result concerning granting its Head the power to independently enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations on the possible commission of a criminal offence by a Member of Parliament of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge has undergone significant changes.

The wording itself is aligned with the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’. This indicates that the previously proposed concept of expanding the procedural autonomy of the Head of SAPO has been retained while being adapted to the European integration framework.

At the same time, criticism concerning the existing political obstacles has been taken into account. As a reminder, in its previous expert analysis ALI noted that ‘if there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may currently be removed from the draft, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is an actual set of cases in which the Prosecutor General has disregarded well-founded materials from the NABU and SAPO, or if a new convocation of the VRU does not feel “burdened” by the political compromise reached earlier’. A less categorical position makes it possible to secure political support for the revised Anti-Corruption Strategy.

As noted previously, the inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 reflects the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is addressed in the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the legal profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks existing within the Bar (obtaining a practising certificate, non-transparent budgets, etc.) and systemic problems (the ‘continuity’ of Bar self-governance bodies since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, etc.), it has become part of state policy on European integration, and the issue now also concerns anti-corruption policy and justice policy.

For the first time, the Bar appears in the draft ACS as a separate, fully fledged subsection — alongside the courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.

Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to the courts and the prosecution service. No matter how extensively the courts and prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in the State’s anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices across the system as a whole. Even from a formal perspective, under Section VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar forms part of the justice system alongside the courts and the prosecution service. Including the Bar in the ACS is therefore a logical and necessary step.

In the section on the Bar, the key problems and expected results have not changed and minor textual amendments do not require analysis. This reflects the consistent approach taken in all three previous drafts of the Anti-Corruption Strategy, which differed somewhat in the level of detail used to describe the problems and in the wording of the expected results, while the substance of the identified corruption risks and approaches to addressing them has remained unchanged.

The list of identified problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has not changed.

With regard to the NABU, the revised draft ACS largely contains the expected strategic results set out in Draft Law No. 15230-2, with minor adjustments. These concern strengthening the NABU’s independence and institutional resilience by building a highly professional and integrity-driven team through open and transparent competitions and establishing effective communication between the body and the public, including through the Public Oversight Council.

ALI has previously pointed out that these additions are not substantiated, as neither the media nor reports on the NABU’s activities nor the results of inspections of the body over the past five years mention problems with the openness and transparency of competitions for NABU positions or insufficient effectiveness of its communication with the public.

In June this year, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Communication Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption for 2026–2030 (Communication Strategy) and the Operational Action Plan for its implementation in 2026–2028. These documents are aimed at improving the effectiveness of communication in the anti-corruption sector as a whole and, in particular, of the NABU as part of that sector. The introductory section of the Communication Strategy states that, according to opinion polls, the public is most aware of the NABU’s activities (compared with SAPO and the HACC).

Adding problems or measures to the Anti-Corruption Strategy without proper substantiation is inconsistent with Part 4 Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’, under which a new ACS must be developed on the basis of an analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.

Problems with personnel selection in the NPU and SBI remain, but they have been separated into distinct items. Whereas previously the focus was exclusively on risks in the existing procedures for selecting the heads of these bodies, the revised ACS points to risks of non-transparent appointment and promotion within the NPU more broadly.

To address this problem, it is proposed to make a phased transition to appointments to managerial positions in the NPU, including in central and territorial bodies, exclusively through competitive selection with the involvement of independent experts.

These proposals dilute the proposed solution, because they concern different selection procedures (initial selection, selection for managerial positions and selection of the head of the body). Whereas previous versions proposed introducing a merit-based competition for the position of Head of the NPU and assessing candidates for other managerial positions against criteria of professionalism and integrity, the current proposal focuses on determining in advance the composition of competition (personnel) commissions rather than the key objective of improving competitive selection procedures. Competition commissions differ across bodies and there is no universal model.

Under the current provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’, the NPU already has competitive selection procedures involving police commissions. At both central and regional level, such commissions must include two representatives of the public delegated by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (for the central apparatus) or by a regional-level local self-government body (for a territorial body) — in other words, independent experts representing civil society.

However, competitions are mandatory only for persons entering police service for the first time. The transfer of a police officer to a higher position, including a managerial position, may take place on the basis of attestation or a competition, at the discretion of the manager authorised to make the appointment.

Moreover, the Law contains no direct requirement to assess candidates for service in the NPU or for promotion against the integrity criterion, nor does it define a procedure for selecting the Head of the NPU. This is precisely the problem that needs to be addressed in implementing anti-corruption policy.

However, the wording of the revised draft ACS does not make clear which independent experts are meant (national experts or experts delegated by international organisations) or whether competitive selection of candidates for central and territorial managerial positions should include a stage assessing their integrity and professional ethics. In this respect, therefore, the wording proposed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (Draft Law No. 15230) appears clearer and more achievable.

The problem of strengthening the institutional independence of the SBI is set out separately in the revised version, as it was in Draft Law No. 15230-2. In addition to improving the competition for the position of Director of the Bureau, it is also proposed to introduce periodic external audits of the SBI’s activities, with an adverse audit finding serving as grounds for the early dismissal of the body’s leadership.

This addition is appropriate and consistent with Ukraine’s European integration commitments, as well as with the general concept of oversight of specialised bodies investigating criminal offences under a similar model (the NABU and the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine).

Overall, the revised draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 incorporates a significant number of comments made by experts. The provisions of the ACS have largely been aligned with the Rule of Law Roadmap and the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’. However, some expected strategic results still require clarification.

It should be recalled that the Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy, but also one of Ukraine’s commitments to international partners, referred to in the conditions for EU accession, the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Extended Fund Facility programme.

The war has made weapons part of Ukrainian reality, and the state has a duty to address this. Even before 24 February 2022, experts estimated that civilians may have held between three and eight million illegal firearms. The number has since increased, with some weapons reaching civilians as a result of hostilities. Following the launch of the state firearms register in July 2023, citizens voluntarily declared around 22,000 firearms and the police seized a further 20,000. These measures, however, are only isolated responses to the circulation of weapons in Ukraine, a problem that will become more acute after the war. The central question is not whether weapons will be present in Ukrainian society, but whether the state can build a coherent and effective security architecture governed by law.

This is not only a domestic task, but also part of Ukraine’s EU integration commitments. On 14 July 2026, negotiations were opened with Ukraine on Cluster 6, ‘External Relations’, which covers foreign policy, security and defence. For a country at war, this is one of the most strategically important areas, as Ukraine’s resilience and defence capability depend directly on it.

Under this cluster, the EU expects Ukraine to adopt a national strategy and action plan to combat illicit trafficking in and possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, with clear deadlines, funding and a clear division of responsibilities among public authorities. Adopting the relevant documents alone will not be enough: Ukraine must demonstrate tangible progress in implementing them. In other words, the EU expects a new system capable of effectively controlling weapons and the risks associated with them.

Ukraine cannot limit the question to whether weapons should be permitted or prohibited. The principal challenge is how to bring their presence under effective control, so that one person’s right to protection does not conflict with another’s right to life and the freedom to own weapons does not become immunity from rules and responsibility.

This must form the basis of a new state policy. A law on civilian firearms is necessary, but it is only the first step.

It is commonly claimed that civilian weapons are prohibited in Ukraine. This is not entirely accurate. Civilians may legally own hunting firearms (both smooth-bore and rifled), less-lethal weapons, bladed weapons such as hunting knives, stilettos and daggers and gas pistols. No special permit is required to own airguns or certain types of small-calibre weapons (up to 4 mm) chambered for Flobert rounds. These rules are established by an order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

For the duration of martial law, legislation also allows civilians to be issued firearms or retain firearms they have found in order to repel and deter Russia’s armed aggression. The exceptions are rifled weapons exceeding 12.7 mm in calibre, smooth-bore weapons of 23 mm or more, weapons assigned to military personnel or law enforcement officers and weapons used to commit a criminal offence.

The debate focuses almost entirely on whether civilians should be permitted to acquire and carry short-barrelled firearms, namely pistols and revolvers.

A total ban and completely uncontrolled access to weapons are both extremes. A complete restriction of this right may deter law-abiding citizens, but criminals, who by definition break the law, will seek ways to circumvent or manipulate the rules.

Supporters of a total ban generally argue that violent crime will inevitably rise in proportion to the number of weapons held by civilians. There are, however, no comprehensive studies establishing a direct relationship between these figures. Nor is there a common methodology that would allow these questions to be studied regularly and the results compared over time. There are therefore no sound grounds for claiming that the number of civilian-held weapons either worsens the crime situation in the country or makes public spaces safer.

During the war and in the post-war period, a total ban would naturally drive firearms further underground and increase illicit trafficking. Law enforcement agencies would then find it more difficult to control weapons and ensure public safety.

The state’s task is to build a system of rules under which the right to own weapons does not threaten public order or deprive others of a sense of security. Civilian firearms legislation must be balanced and any expansion of related rights should be introduced gradually, taking account of the country’s current security situation.

In addition to the requirements under Cluster 6 described above, control over the circulation of firearms is part of Ukraine’s commitments under Chapter 24, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, of Cluster 1, ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’. Ukraine must improve the legal framework governing the circulation of firearms, cooperation among law enforcement agencies and international cooperation in this area. Criminal liability for illicit arms trafficking must also be brought fully into line with the EU acquis and international law. The acquis (in full, acquis communautaire) comprises all binding EU rules, laws, principles, decisions, case law and obligations applicable to Member States and candidate countries — editor’s note.

Adopting laws alone will not be enough. Ukraine must demonstrate tangible progress in implementing them. The EU expects a new security architecture that fits organically into the wider European security space. These processes will therefore remain under close and continuous scrutiny by European partners throughout Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

In the European Union, the general rules governing civilians’ acquisition and possession of firearms are laid down in Directive (EU) 2021/555. It defines categories of firearms that may lawfully be acquired, carried and used, including for hunting or sport, and establishes rules on marking, control over their circulation and movement between EU Member States.

The Directive requires a register through which firearms can be identified and traced. Each state must also establish a system regulating firearms manufacturers, dealers and gunsmiths, including checks of their personal and professional integrity.

A person may obtain a licence to acquire and possess a firearm if they have good cause, have reached the required age and do not pose a danger to themselves or others. Checking a person only once when a permit is issued is not sufficient. Under European rules, the licence must be reviewed at least every five years. The system therefore contains safeguards that not only grant access to firearms, but also respond promptly when an owner no longer meets the established criteria.

The Directive also allows EU Member States to introduce stricter rules than those it sets.

Firearms legislation across Europe ranges from relatively liberal regimes to strict restrictions. Weapons are generally permitted for hunting or sporting purposes. Common standards apply, particularly to categories prohibited for civilian use and weapons whose acquisition or carrying requires a special licence.

Croatia, for example, permits concealed carry with a special authorisation. Austria permits concealed or open carry but carrying a weapon must not cause public alarm. Civilian carry is effectively prohibited in Norway, where only limited numbers of firearms may be acquired for hunting or sport. Only a few countries, including Finland, Czechia and Poland, expressly recognise firearms in legislation as a means of personal security.

There is no universal formula for regulating firearms and fully protecting society from the risks they create. Each state develops its own mechanisms and procedures in light of its national context. In every case, the objective is to develop a shared security architecture across Europe, not merely to grant a right to own weapons.

Ukraine has debated and attempted to adopt a firearms law for decades, but has still failed to reach a consensus. At least 20 draft laws on the subject have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada over the past 30 years. Each initiative prompted intense debate that ultimately failed to produce a legislative solution.

Under the Rule of Law Roadmap, a law regulating firearms and strengthening liability for violations in this area must be adopted by the fourth quarter of 2026.

Draft law No. 5708, which is currently under discussion, was adopted at first reading shortly before the full-scale invasion. It partly reflects European requirements, but requires further revision to make the system more effective and eliminate risks and loopholes through which unscrupulous applicants could obtain the right to own weapons. The draft law also fails to provide clear answers on certain procedures for obtaining a firearms owner’s certificate, the rules for carrying weapons and the designation of areas where firearms may not be carried.

The law will create only a general framework, which will not function without institutions, resources and daily practice. Its adoption must be followed by a lengthy implementation process: developing infrastructure and a system of cooperation among public authorities, the firearms industry and firearms owners, conducting public information campaigns, strengthening the state’s capacity to trace weapons, identify risks in time and prevent violent crime.

The permit procedure and subsequent control must be designed to prevent corruption loopholes. Work is also needed to shape public attitudes through information campaigns and training in the safe and responsible handling of firearms.

Firearms owners and those seeking to acquire a weapon must regard it not only as a means of protection, but also as a source of heightened risk. Training, clear procedures, regular monitoring and the inevitability of sanctions for violations must become integral elements of responsible firearms ownership.

The regulation of civilian firearms does not exist in a vacuum: weapons have already become part of life in Ukraine. Without a resilient security architecture, however, any decision to expand the right to own and carry them would be premature.

A firearms law would form the first level of that architecture. The second would consist of systemic changes in society that allow freedom and the right to protection to coexist with control and responsibility.

Ukraine must first improve and codify the existing rules without undermining the foundations of public safety. Once the system has been established and tested, the country can return to the debate on liberalising the carrying of handguns.

The well-known firearms manufacturer Samuel Colt is credited with saying that ‘the most important part of any firearm is its owner’s head’. A responsible attitude to weapons must become the foundation of Ukraine’s new reality.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is contributing to the development of a new mechanism for the pre-trial settlement of tax-related criminal offences. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the Law and Order Area at ALI, has joined the thematic working group organised by the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU).

The group will develop amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, as well as other legislative acts, to introduce a mechanism for settling such offences. The proposals prepared by the group will subsequently be submitted to the Government for consideration.

According to Yevhen Krapyvin, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine currently provides an alternative means of resolving criminal-law disputes in tax-related criminal offences — a ‘tax compromise’. In practice, however, its application is significantly limited, so it should either be improved or other instruments should be sought.

For example, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform for 2023–2027 provides for an instrument known as ‘transactions’. This is a form of ‘criminal fine’ for businesses willing to cease the offence, pay the taxes due and make the corresponding payment. The Netherlands and Belgium have experience with this type of fine, so their models could serve as a basis for a similar mechanism in Ukraine.

The working group was established by ESBU Order No. 301 of 22 June 2026. Its members include the Agency for Legislative Initiatives as well as representatives of the ESBU, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Business Ombudsman Council, the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine, the European Business Association, the Ukrainian Bar Association, ICC Ukraine, the Kyiv School of Public Administration named after Serhiy Nyzhnyy and other expert organisations and institutions.

The Bureau had previously held a series of consultations with representatives of business, the legal community, state authorities and civil society on introducing a new mechanism for the pre-trial settlement of tax offences.

In Ukraine, the office of Prosecutor General is regarded as one of the offices most subject to political considerations. Questions about appointments, powers and insufficient independence have surrounded almost everyone who has held the post.

Prosecutors General have consistently faced accusations of lacking professional experience, political bias, persecuting activists and even participating in the July 2025 attempt to eliminate the independence of the anti-corruption institutions. There is no avoiding the truth: Ukraine has often appointed politicians, unqualified individuals or people of questionable reputation as Prosecutor General. Sometimes all three at once.

The possibility of early termination does not guarantee the Prosecutor General sufficient independence. A resolution of no confidence supported by a majority of MPs, or 226 votes, is enough to remove the office holder. This makes the Prosecutor General a hostage to political forces and creates scope for pressure while the office holder remains in post.

The European Commission has noted the politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General. It requires a transparent and objective process that takes account of the views of prosecutors themselves.

There is now active discussion of introducing competitive selection for the position: the relevant draft law No. 15343 was registered on 22 June 2026. Ukraine’s scope for far-reaching legislative change is limited, however, because the Constitution cannot be amended during martial law.

If elements of the chosen model are found unconstitutional, its further implementation will be called into question. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) has assessed how these processes could unfold in Ukraine’s circumstances.

Can the office of Prosecutor General be made less politicised during the war and, if so, how? How can Ukraine meet the European Commission’s requirement now and improve the procedure further once martial law ends? This article examines the options.

Under the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor General with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada. Yet the appointment procedure does not provide for transparent selection, prior assessment of a candidate’s professional competence or the participation of prosecutorial self-governance bodies through a merit-based selection process. The President’s unrestricted discretion over whom to nominate increases the risk that candidates will be politically dependent.

The Prosecutor General may be dismissed either for a breach of the law, under the professional criterion, or on political grounds through a vote of no confidence. The first mechanism does not work in practice, as all attempts to hold a Prosecutor General to disciplinary account have come to nothing. This leaves a vote of no confidence by political forces, which may be a direct response to the Prosecutor General’s efforts to combat political corruption and economic offences involving MPs themselves. It can therefore become a tool of political pressure and has repeatedly led Prosecutors General to submit a resignation pre-emptively. As early as 2014, the Venice Commission recommended ‘abolishing the vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General’.

At first glance, a competitive procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General appears to be one possible mechanism for strengthening prosecutorial independence, reducing political influence over the office and increasing public trust in the prosecution service.

The Government does not support competitive selection. The prosecution service is not an executive authority and the Prosecutor General is not a member of the Government appointed on political grounds. The office is nevertheless part of the political system. Since competitive selection would restrict the President’s and Parliament’s discretion over whom to appoint, they are also likely to oppose such a solution.

The main constraint, however, is the constitutionality of such a step. Introducing it would require amendments to the Constitution, which cannot be made during martial law.

The Constitution clearly provides that appointing the Prosecutor General is currently the exclusive competence of the President and Parliament. This means that no competition, consultation or other appointment procedure is presently possible.

There are as many arguments that competitive selection would be constitutional as there are arguments to the contrary. Few people, however, are prepared to ask Parliament to support a risky legislative initiative that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) may soon declare unconstitutional.

In my view, the CCU would ultimately adopt a purposive interpretation. It would reason that, because the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General did not change even when the prosecution service became part of the justice system in 2016, the legislature did not intend to introduce such a change. A competition was introduced for judges, but not for the Prosecutor General. The Court would therefore conclude that any restriction of the powers of the joint appointing authority, the President and the Verkhovna Rada, would be unconstitutional. The President’s powers to appoint judges and the Prosecutor General are thus part of the system of checks and balances that, among other things, safeguards the rule of law.

Ukraine could reduce the politicisation of the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, and thereby meet the European Commission’s requirement, as early as 2026. The first step would be to await the Venice Commission opinion referred to in Ukraine’s EU integration commitments.

Any legislative initiative adopted must avoid risks that could subsequently lead to the procedure being declared unconstitutional. A transitional model is therefore unavoidable: it will be a compromise rather than an ideal arrangement. Once martial law ends or is lifted, MPs will have a much wider range of options, although no one knows when that will happen.

One temporary solution could require the President, before submitting a nominee for Prosecutor General, to obtain an opinion on the candidate from the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine. This would require a genuinely independent Council. The Rule of Law Roadmap provides for the Council’s transformation and for its institutional independence to be strengthened through legislation by the end of 2026. This should include its complete separation from the Office of the Prosecutor General, a review of its functions and members’ working arrangements, its establishment as a separate legal entity and provision of its own secretariat.

Would the opinion be binding? Not as a matter of law, because the President’s and Parliament’s discretion cannot be restricted without constitutional amendments. Under the transitional model, respect for the opinion would therefore depend on political convention. Even so, the procedure would clearly increase transparency and trust, demonstrate the criteria on which the President nominates a candidate and allow the self-governance body to provide a considered assessment. Making the process public would reduce the politicisation of the appointment.

After the war, when the Constitution can be amended, such an opinion could become binding and the Council of Prosecutors could conduct a competition or apply another procedure at its discretion. It could, for example, select the strongest candidate from among prosecutors on the basis of predetermined criteria, including integrity.

Without amending the Constitution, the dismissal procedure could involve a Temporary Investigation Commission (TIC) of the Verkhovna Rada. A TIC exercises parliamentary oversight by investigating matters of public interest. It would therefore be logical for MPs serving on the commission to examine failures by the Prosecutor General to perform functions and tasks that do not amount to a criminal offence or disciplinary misconduct and do not otherwise create grounds incompatible with holding office.

Once martial law ends, Ukraine could consider fully abolishing the political procedure for dismissing the Prosecutor General, namely a vote of no confidence. The law should retain only professional grounds for dismissal, such as the commission of a criminal offence or disciplinary misconduct.

Ukraine’s European partners are not demanding competitive selection, the involvement of international experts or the complete removal of the office of Prosecutor General from politics. They require the appointment and dismissal procedures to be open and transparent and the prosecutorial community to be involved. European standards for prosecution services do not prescribe a single mandatory model for appointing a prosecutor general. They focus on the quality of the procedure, candidates’ professionalism and minimising political influence.

Ukraine should therefore not risk introducing potentially unconstitutional selection and dismissal mechanisms in the name of openness. There are viable ways to update the procedures, including a model involving an institutionally strengthened Council of Prosecutors. The focus should be on realistic mechanisms capable of producing a constitutionally acceptable result and delivering change now, during martial law. Otherwise, the goal of depoliticising the office of Prosecutor General will remain at the level of ambitious declarations rather than be translated into functioning procedures, drawing Ukraine into a politically unproductive dispute with no practical outcome.

Who should appoint and dismiss the Prosecutor General, and how? Today, that decision rests almost entirely with those in power: the President appoints the head of the prosecution service with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada, while removal can be secured through a parliamentary vote of no confidence — a majority of MPs’ votes.

The consequence is chronic institutional instability: in all the years of Ukraine’s independence, no Prosecutor General has served a full term of office, and the average tenure falls short of even two years.

The dismissal procedure was criticised as far back as 2014 by the Venice Commission, yet the 2016 constitutional amendments on justice left the office of the Prosecutor General untouched. Ukraine has therefore already committed to depoliticising the procedure as part of its accession to the European Union. The agenda now features a draft law that would introduce an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General with the involvement of international experts — a proposal that has stirred public debate.

In a new policy paper, the experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives examine the substance of Ukraine’s European integration commitments, the relevant European standards and the models adopted by EU member states; weigh the arguments for and against an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General through the lens of constitutionality; and set out concrete scenarios — from the most far-reaching to the most modest — for both appointment and dismissal.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives sets out its own vision: which option is best in the long term, and what can realistically be done right now — under martial law, when amendments to the Constitution are not possible.

Read the policy paper to understand how the office of the Prosecutor General can be depoliticised — and why this is one of the key preconditions for the rule of law in Ukraine.

On 10 June, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Draft Law No. 6506-1, which provides for changes to police remuneration. It is currently awaiting the President of Ukraine’s signature. A wave of public discontent followed, with claims that ‘police officers received a pay rise, but military personnel did not’. The headlines are striking, but only partly reflect the substance of the adopted changes. The draft law establishes a guaranteed minimum remuneration threshold rather than increasing the base salaries of all police officers. This distinction has largely been overlooked.

What, then, is the full picture of police remuneration under the adopted draft law?

The draft law on increasing payments to police officers had been ‘stuck’ in Parliament since January 2022. It was adopted at first reading only in March 2025 and then underwent almost a year of revision. The first version of the draft law did indeed concern the base salary, from which all additional payments, including allowances and bonuses, are calculated. However, the approach had changed by the second reading.

The adopted version concerns total remuneration rather than only the base salary, or the ‘bare’ rate. In other words, it establishes a minimum threshold below which a police officer’s total remuneration may not fall. Police remuneration comprises the base salary, a special-rank supplement, a length-of-service allowance, an allowance for access to state secrets, an academic degree supplement and bonuses.

In other words, the media conflated the initial version of the draft law with the final version that Parliament adopted. The former would indeed have almost doubled the remuneration that police officers take home. The adopted version, however, only establishes a minimum threshold that will not affect most police officers.

Under the adopted changes, total remuneration must amount to at least ten subsistence minimums, currently UAH 33,280. The changes provided for in draft law No. 6506-1 will enter into force on 1 January 2027, when the projected subsistence minimum is UAH 3,482. The guaranteed minimum salary for a police officer will therefore be UAH 34,820.

Different categories of police officers already receive payments close to or above this level. According to Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko, the average remuneration of a police officer at the beginning of 2026 was UAH 34,000–36,000.

Patrol officers, investigators, inquiry officers and psychologists working in the National Police receive UAH 25,000–30,000 or more once additional payments are included. In the Patrol Police, for example, the average salary is approximately UAH 20,000, with a further UAH 10,000 paid under an order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) for the duration of martial law. These funds are not paid during sick leave or annual leave, however, and therefore do not constitute a regular allowance. This is why the MoIA presented the draft law primarily as a means of regularising payments so that they would no longer depend on martial law, rather than as an increase in remuneration as such.

The current level of actual payments does not therefore mean that it is guaranteed to remain in place after martial law ends. The adopted draft law permanently establishes a minimum level of remuneration that does not depend on martial law.

Ukraine currently has approximately 98,000 sworn police officers. The changes will not affect all of them. For example, some senior officers in the central administration with long service will be unaffected because they already receive more than the established minimum.

Assume that 50,000 police officers are paid less, including patrol officers, district police officers, juvenile prevention officers and others. Once the law enters into force, the additional burden on the budget would then be approximately UAH 5,000 per officer. This would cost the State Budget around UAH 250 million per year, or UAH 20.8 million per month.

If the same funds were distributed not to police officers but among serving military personnel, of whom there are approximately one million in the Armed Forces alone, each service member would receive only about UAH 208 more per month. Would that be fair? The question is rhetorical. The military must undoubtedly remain the priority, but an increase of around 5% would simply look insulting to society.

For Ukraine, now in the fifth year of a defensive war, military personnel’s remuneration, clear terms of service, appropriate accountability for military offences and mobilisation remain critically important, even if politically sensitive. Ukrainian military personnel do need higher remuneration and must be properly compensated for their service.

These measures should not, however, be set against establishing a minimum level of remuneration for the police, which maintain public security, combat ordinary crime and perform a range of other functions.

Shortly after draft law No. 6506-1 was adopted, the President announced an increase in military salaries, with personnel serving in rear areas to receive at least UAH 30,000. This confirms once again that increasing remuneration in the internal security sector, including the police and the State Emergency Service, and increasing military service pay are two separate and equally important tracks.

The discussion should remain focused on the relevant policy issues and take place in the context of higher taxes and levies, spending optimisation and the reallocation of expenditure. News headlines should also have been different: not ‘The Verkhovna Rada raised police salaries’, but ‘The Verkhovna Rada established a minimum salary threshold for the police’. This is the main substance of the adopted changes. Did someone deliberately manipulate Ukrainians, or did they simply read the initial version of the draft law rather than the adopted one? The question is rhetorical. This is reminiscent of the story of ‘mass labour migration’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation provide for unifying the legal framework for organising the system of law enforcement agencies, by establishing criteria for distinguishing the areas of activity of law enforcement agencies and other state bodies based on their exclusive functional focus. A similar measure is also set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap.

This concerns the development and adoption of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’, which should define:

1. the system of law enforcement agencies;
2. the unified foundations for their organisation and functioning, the main criteria for delimiting their competence and areas of activity;
3. the entrenchment of the principles of integrity, gender equality and non-discrimination in their activities;
4. the development of their analytical capacities, including criminal analysis and the ILP model;
5. the consolidation of their institutional independence, an adequate level of financial, logistical and technical support and guarantees of social and legal protection for employees of law enforcement agencies;
6. forms of inter-agency cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service, including information exchange, as well as interaction with other public authorities and local self-government bodies.

In addition, state policy documents on the reform of all law enforcement agencies provide for improving internal control and anti-corruption mechanisms, applying uniform integrity criteria and standards to vet employees of all law enforcement agencies and monitor them on an ongoing basis, as well as introducing common ethical principles for employees of law enforcement agencies.

These measures are aimed at addressing problems related to duplication of functions, more clearly delimiting the powers of law enforcement agencies, strengthening their independence, increasing their effectiveness and improving mechanisms for interaction as well as legal and social guarantees for their employees.

• 2.1. Key Definitions

For several decades, legal scholarshipFor example: A. V. Lapkin. Prosecutor in Criminal Proceedings: Theoretical, Legal, Organisational and Methodological Problems: monograph. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2020, pp. 98, 122–123, 287; O.S. Tarasenko. On the Concept of Law Enforcement Bodies of Ukraine. Scientific Bulletin of Public and Private Law. Issue 3, 2025, pp. 246–260; A.V. Stolitnii. Legislative Collisions in Defining ‘Law Enforcement Bodies’ and ‘Law Enforcement Agencies’ in the Context of Prosecutorial Supervision: Ways to Unify Terminology. Current Problems of Innovative Economy and Law. 2026. No. 1, pp. 27–31 etc. has debated the meaning and relationship between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agenciesIn Ukrainian «правоохоронні органи» and «органи правопорядку» properly — first is the ‘law defending/securing bodies’ and second is ‘law and order bodies’ (this semantic difference is not obvious in English, but reflects some conceptual aspects of the Ukrainian legislation development during past years)., a debate that intensified after the 2016 amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.

At that time, the concept of law enforcement agencies appeared in the text of the Basic Law as an object of prosecutorial supervision: in accordance with the new functions of the prosecutor’s office, it supervises covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies (Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

In view of this, it may be concluded that, according to the constitutional functions of the prosecutor’s office, law enforcement agencies are vested with powers to carry out covert and other investigative and search actions. Therefore, from the perspective of constitutional regulation, law enforcement agencies primarily include bodies authorised to conduct pre-trial investigations of criminal offences and covert investigative (search) actions, as defined respectively by the CPC of Ukraine (Articles 41 and 216) and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Operational-Search Activities’ (Article 5).

At the same time, Section I of the Constitution of Ukraine uses the concept of law enforcement bodies: ‘ensuring state security and protecting the state border of Ukraine shall be entrusted to the relevant military formations and law enforcement bodies of the state, the organisation and procedure for whose activities shall be determined by law’ (Article 17 of the Constitution). However, this wording is more likely an artefact of outdated terminology, as indicated by two circumstances: (1) law enforcement bodies are mentioned in the general section of the Constitution in the context of national security, rather than in special provisions concerning the activities of executive authorities and justice; (2) amendments to Section I of the Constitution are extremely difficult, unprecedented and, in practice, almost impossibleA draft law amending Section I ‘General Principles’, Section III ‘Elections. Referendum’ and Section XIII ‘Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’ is submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine or by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and, provided it is adopted by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is approved by an all-Ukrainian referendum called by the President of Ukraine (Article 156 of the Constitution of Ukraine). There are no known cases of amendments to Section I in the history of the current Constitution of Ukraine., because this section defines the general principles of the state system, while constitutional amendments introduced after 2014 were primarily aimed at reforming the justice system and defining the state’s European integration and Euro-Atlantic course.

Practising lawyers often refer to the Law of Ukraine ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, which allegedly defines the list of law enforcement bodies. However, this Law expressly states that the list contained in it may be used only for the purposes of regulation by this Law. Under it, ‘law enforcement bodies’ are the prosecution authorities, the National Police, the security service, the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, state border protection bodies, the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, penitentiary bodies and institutions, pre-trial detention centres, state financial control bodies, fish protection bodies, state forest protection bodies and other bodies exercising law-applying or law enforcement functions (Part 1 Article 2 of the Law).

The problem is, first, that this concept applies precisely for the purposes of that Law, as expressly stated in its text; second, that there is no clear criterion by which those particular bodies are included in the list; and third, that the list is not exhaustive, while defining law enforcement bodies through law application and law enforcement functions expands it to a state of complete uncertainty because the features and the subject of the definition repeat each other. Law enforcement bodies cannot be defined as bodies that perform law enforcement functions, since this definition adds nothing to the content of the concept and does not make it possible to understand what such functions consist of.

The law enforcement function is an extremely broad concept. In theory, it includes not only any activity of public authorities involving the application of legal norms but, in some views, even the activity of any person who obeys legal norms and therefore applies them. In other words, reliance on the definition contained in the Law ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’ is impossible under any circumstances except where practical issues of applying its provisions are being resolved. Moreover, the legal uncertainty of the list of law enforcement bodies is disorientingWhite Paper on the Depoliticisation of Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor’s Office: Appointment/Dismissal of Leadership, Y.O. Krapyvin. Centre for Policy and Legal Reform. Kyiv: O.D. Buria, PE. 2023, p. 46..

In 2023, the Supreme Court resolved an exceptional legal problem consisting in the absence, at the legislative level and in case law, of clear criteria for defining the concepts of ‘law enforcement body’ and ‘employee of a law enforcement body’. This had led to inconsistent application of substantive and procedural law and had an extremely negative impact on the implementation of the principle of legal certainty. The subject of divergent case law was the determination of the victim who enjoys enhanced protection by the state (an employee of a law enforcement body) in the relevant elements of criminal offencesA law enforcement officer is designated as a victim of such criminal offences as resistance (Article 342 of the CC of Ukraine), interference with activities (Article 343 of the CC of Ukraine), threat or violence (Article 345 of the CC of Ukraine), intentional destruction or damage to property (Article 347 of the CC of Ukraine), attempt on life (Article 348 of the CC of Ukraine), taking hostage (Article 349 of the CC of Ukraine) and failure to take security measures (Article 380 of the CC of Ukraine)..

According to the legal position of the Supreme Court in case No. 633/195/17 (proceedings No. 13-39ks23), law enforcement bodies should include: (1) public authorities defined in the laws of Ukraine as law enforcement bodies or (2) those exercising a law enforcement function assigned to them at the legislative level. When resolving whether a person is an employee of a law enforcement body, it is necessary to proceed from a systemic analysis of: the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences and normative legal acts regulating the legal status of the relevant public authority with which the person is in an employment or service relationship; the employee’s powers under their job description, which provide for the exercise of a law enforcement function, including the application of preventive measures and coercive measures defined by law, as well as measures provided for by criminal procedure legislation and legislation on administrative offences; and legislation on pension provision for the relevant category of employees.

Attention should also be paid to work by auxiliary bodies of Parliament. In 2024, the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine published a document entitled ‘Scientific Concept of Legislative Support for the Activities of Law Enforcement Agencies of Ukraine’. It rightly notes that the existing conceptual and legislative uncertainty regarding the concept, fundamental principles, status, tasks and functions of law enforcement agencies as a separate autonomous system, as well as their delimitation from other state bodies performing related functions, has a negative impact on combating crime and on the effectiveness of the relevant state policy in this field. As a result, this legal uncertainty leads to inconsistency and imbalance in the work of the relevant state institutions, ineffective performance of their functional powers and, consequently, failure to ensure guarantees for protecting citizens from criminal and other unlawful encroachments, failure to observe the rule of law and failure by state bodies to perform their main task of protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen.

In general, imperfect legal regulation has a negative impact on determining the status of a particular state body and its place in the system of public authorities, and leads to inconsistent law enforcement practice, including in criminal proceedings concerning offences against the authority of public authorities.

In our view, the most productive approach to distinguishing between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies is a functional approach, based on the main tasks and functions of the relevant bodies. This approach is fully consistent with the Constitution of Ukraine and corresponds to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

This approach makes it possible to define:

1. the relationship between these concepts. It appears most appropriate to distinguish between law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies as a broader and a narrower category: every law enforcement agency is a law enforcement body, but not every law enforcement body may be classified as a law enforcement agency;
2. the criteria for classifying a particular state body as law enforcement, including functions and corresponding powers, namely: 1) functions: protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments; protection of public order; ensuring public and national security; 2) powers: prevention, detection, solving and investigation of criminal offences; conducting operational-search measures and covert investigative (search) actions; application of direct coercive measures on behalf of the state, including the use of firearms.

• 2.2. The Concept of a ‘Law Enforcement Agency’ and Its Features

Legal order is a term widely used both in legal scholarship and in national and international law. Thus, Part 1 Article 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that the legal order in Ukraine is based on principles according to which no one may be compelled to do what is not provided for by legislation.

Therefore, legal orderTheory of State and Law: textbook for students of higher legal education institutions / O.V. Petryshyn, S.P. Pohrebniak, V.S. Smorodynskyi et al.; edited by O.V. Petryshyn. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2014, p. 337. is the actual state of ordering of social relations through legal means. The latter formulation effectively emphasises three components of this concept: (a) law; (b) coercion; and (c) order. In all cases, therefore, it concerns, in one way or another, the coercive application of the law to protect legal order by the bodies responsible for its protection.

In view of this, the following definition is proposed:

Law enforcement agencies are central executive bodies and structural units of state bodies and military formations whose main functions under the law are to protect the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protect public order and ensure public and national security.

This definition takes into account situations where these functions are not the main functions of a state body or military formation, but its structure includes units that perform such functions, for example the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The main features of law enforcement agencies may be considered to include:

1. performance of functions related to protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protecting public order and ensuring public and national security;
2. the organisation and procedure for the activities of such agencies and their administrative and legal status are defined by law;
3. belonging to the security and defence sector;
4. powers to prevent, detect, suppress, solve and investigate criminal offences;
5. powers to conduct operational-search activities and/or covert investigative (search) actions;
6. the right to apply direct coercion on the grounds and in cases defined by law, including the right to use firearms;
7. prosecutorial supervision over the activities of such agencies in countering offences and carrying out covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies.

• 2.3. Subject Matter of the Law

The following state bodies and military formations that could be classified as law enforcement agencies, or whose units could fall within the scope of the relevant law, were analysed* for compliance with the features listed above: the National Police of Ukraine (NPU); the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI); the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU); the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU); the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU); the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS); the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU); the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine (UDO); penitentiary bodies and institutions and pre-trial detention centres of the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine (SCES); the intelligence body of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine); the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MLES AFU); units of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU); the State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCS); and the Court Security Service (CSS).

The list of bodies and military formations was formed on the basis of Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Laws of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’ and ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

Compliance with the above features is established on the basis of the provisions of the laws of Ukraine regulating the activities of these bodies.

In addition, the analysis identified certain shortcomings in legislation that will need to be addressed.

• 2.3.1. Status of state bodies

The NPU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS have the status of central executive bodies, while the NABU is a central executive body with special status. Under Ukrainian legislation, these bodies belong to the executive branch.

The SBI is a law enforcement body, while the UDO and the SBGS are special-purpose law enforcement bodies. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On Intelligence’, the SBGS is also classified as an intelligence body.

The SSU has the status of a special-purpose state body with law enforcement functions.

The Court Security Service is a state body within the justice system.

The FISU is defined as an intelligence body with the status of a separate state body that is not an executive authority.

The NGU is a military formation with law enforcement functions, while the MLES AFU is a special law enforcement formation within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The status of a central executive body means that such bodies are established in accordance with the Law of Ukraine ‘On Central Executive Bodies’ and that this Law applies to their activities insofar as it does not contradict special laws. Under Article 16, central executive bodies are established to perform specific functions related to implementing state policy. Their activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the relevant ministry. Special status of a central executive body provides for a special procedure for forming the composition of such a body, if it is collegial, or a special procedure for appointing its head, as well as a special form of interaction with the Government.

The concept of a ‘state body’ has a broad and generalising meaning. The Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’ defines this concept as follows: a public authority, including a collegial state body, or another public-law entity, regardless of whether it has the status of a legal entity, which is vested by legislation with powers to exercise authoritative managerial functions on behalf of the state and whose jurisdiction extends to the entire territory of Ukraine or to a separate administrative-territorial unit. Accordingly, this concept covers legislative, executive and judicial bodies.

• 2.3.2. Functions and tasks

The laws regulating the activities of the state bodies and military formations included in the list show different approaches to defining the functions and tasks of these bodies, as well as to the content of the concepts of ‘task’ and ‘function’. However, the prevailing approach is that a body’s function is its main purpose, while its tasks are specific areas of activity.

Protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments is, in essence, a function of all the bodies on the list. Such protection means ensuring the right to life, liberty, inviolability, personal security and private property, preventing crime, combating terrorism and organised crime and protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of its borders.

Ensuring public and national security is also among the functions of all state bodies on the list.

National security is the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the democratic constitutional order and other national interests of Ukraine from actual and potential threats.

Public security and order means the protection of interests vital to society and individuals, as well as the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, the safeguarding of which is a priority task of the security forces, other state bodies, local self-government bodies, their officials and the public, which implement coordinated measures to realise and protect national interests from the impact of threats.

Five bodies on the list have powers to conduct pre-trial investigations: the NPU, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU and the SSU. In addition to these five bodies, operational-search activities may also be conducted by the SBGS, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine. In view of Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, all these bodies are subject to prosecutorial control. However, the FISU and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine cannot be classified as law enforcement agencies, since their main function is intelligence rather than law enforcement activity.

All bodies on the list have the right to use physical force, special means and firearms on the grounds and in cases defined by law. At the same time, the provisions of the laws regulating the activities of the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, the NGU and the Court Security Service are blanket provisions and refer to the relevant provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’.

• 2.3.3. Belonging to the security and defence sector

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS are not included in the security and defence sector.

Three of the listed bodies have almost identical legal status: the NABU, the ESBU and the SBI. In our view, however, their exclusion from the security and defence sector is erroneous.

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the security and defence sector is a system of public authorities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, special-purpose state bodies with law enforcement functions, civil protection forces, the defence-industrial complex of Ukraine, whose activities are subject to democratic civilian control and, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, are functionally aimed at protecting Ukraine’s national interests from threats, as well as citizens and civil society associations that voluntarily participate in ensuring Ukraine’s national security.

Thus, an important criterion for classifying a particular state body as part of the security sector is its functional focus on protecting the national interests of the state from threats.

Ukraine’s national interests are the vital interests of the individual, society and the state, the realisation of which ensures Ukraine’s state sovereignty, its progressive democratic development and safe living conditions and welfare for its citizens.

Accordingly, threats to Ukraine’s national security are phenomena, trends and factors that make impossible or complicate, or may make impossible or complicate, the realisation of Ukraine’s national interests and the preservation of its national values. Crime is among such threats.

The SBI, the NABU and the ESBU were established to counter specific categories of criminal offences. Moreover, the Law ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’ states that this body counters corruption and other criminal offences committed by senior officials authorised to perform state or local self-government functions and constituting a threat to national security. Under the Law ‘On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine’, this body is tasked with countering threats to Ukraine’s economic security, which is a component of national security. Therefore, the SBI, the NABU and the ESBU should be classified as part of the security and defence sector as security forces.

2.3.4. Law enforcement agencies and the list of issues to be regulated by the law

a) the following public authorities, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply in full:

• the National Police of Ukraine;
• the State Bureau of Investigation;
• the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
• the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine.

b) structural units of the following state bodies and military formations, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply partially:

• the Security Service of Ukraine;
• the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine;
• the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine;
• the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine;
• the National Guard of Ukraine;
• the State Customs Service;
• the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
• the Court Security Service.

In the future, the State Bureau of Military Justice and customs may be added to the list of law enforcement agencies to which the provisions of the Law would apply in full.

It is proposed that the subject matter of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ include the following issues:

1. the concept of a law enforcement agency and other definitions related to the activities of such agencies;
2. the organisational and legal status of law enforcement agencies and the features of special status within the executive branch;
3. an exhaustive list of law enforcement agencies;
4. the foundations for the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles of activity, functions, powers, tasks, guarantees of independence, organisational foundations, model structure and the overall authorised staffing level of each agency;
5. the foundations for analytical activity, including the use of the ILP model, consideration of criminal policy in the activities of law enforcement agencies, application of the SOCTA and IOCTA systems, regular assessment of the crime situation through crime surveys and victimisation surveys, as well as public trust in these agencies, including the sense of security as a key component of trust;
6. the foundations of service in law enforcement agencies, including the principles and procedure for appointing heads, candidate requirements, terms of office of heads, grounds and procedure for early termination of their powers, a list of typical positions such as detective and analyst, the procedure for appointing and dismissing employees, requirements for candidates for positions, general principles for wearing uniforms, general principles for awarding special ranks, social protection and guarantees of material support;
7. the grounds and procedure for using physical force, special means and firearms;
8. the foundations for international and inter-agency cooperation and coordination of the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles, coordination and cooperation arrangements, the role of the MIA, the procedure and forms of cooperation and specific features of interaction between law enforcement agencies during martial law;
9. the foundations of integrity and professional ethics for employees of law enforcement agencies, including ethical principles for interaction with participants in criminal proceedings;
10. the audit and internal control system and the foundations for whistle-blower protection;
11. the general procedure and grounds for holding employees disciplinarily liable;
12. external control over the activities of law enforcement agencies, including parliamentary and public oversight.

Unifying the key foundations for the activities of the above-mentioned bodies would make it possible to eliminate gaps in legislation, clarify the place of these bodies in the overall system of public authorities and their status, strengthen guarantees of their independence and improve the system of interaction between them so that they can perform their main functions more effectively.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy (ACS) defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU). The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.

Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan for its implementation — the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP).

This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant Law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years in practice remained to achieve the expected results.

At present, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which is an unprecedented situation. Previously, Parliament adopted a government draft law, with certain amendments, while alternative drafts were not even submitted.

This time, the initiators are Anastasiia Radina, Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy (Draft Law No. 15230), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Draft Law No. 15230-1) and a group of MPs who are members of the European Solidarity faction (Draft Law No. 15230-2).

Given the volume of the documents and the relatively short timeframe for their consideration and adoption, since, according to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Strategy must be adopted no later than the second quarter of 2026, it is advisable to draw attention to both the positive provisions and the shortcomings of all three versions. This is particularly important in the most significant areas: countering corruption and corruption-related offences, the judiciary and the status of judges, the prosecution service, the Bar and law enforcement agencies.

In this area, the identified problems concern disciplinary, administrative, criminal and civil-law liability for corruption and corruption-related offences. The annexes to all three draft laws contain identical provisions, which may indicate consensus among the subjects of legislative initiative as to these problems and the expected results of resolving them.

In particular, it is proposed to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform state or local self-government functions disciplinarily liable:

• for violating the requirements of anti-corruption legislation or rules of ethical conduct;
• where a court decision imposing an administrative penalty on a person for a corruption-related offence has entered into force;
• where a person has been released from administrative liability due to minor significance or the case has been closed because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty expired.

These provisions have essentially been carried over from the ACS for 2021–2025. Since the defined results were not achieved, the necessary amendments were not introduced into legislation.

At the same time, the issue of holding public servants disciplinarily liable where an administrative offence case is closed because the time limit has expired should be approached carefully. As studies of case law show, when courts apply this ground for closing a case, they rarely establish the fact that the offence was committed and the guilt of the person concerned. Accordingly, imposing disciplinary liability on the basis of a court decision that has not found the person guilty will lead to such decisions being challenged. This leads to an obvious conclusion: the quality of court decisions needs to be improved.

In parallel, the draft ACS for 2026–2030 provides for increasing the time limits for imposing administrative penalties for corruption-related offences, which should reduce the number of cases closed by courts on this ground.

The provision of the draft ACS concerning the consolidation of Supreme Court (SC) case law in cases on corruption-related administrative offences appears somewhat questionable.

Under the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), the Supreme Court considers this category of cases where the ECtHR finds a violation of Convention rights during the consideration of the relevant case by a national court and, as a court of appeal, cases concerning offences under Article 185-3 of the Code (contempt of court). The CUAO does not provide for cassation review of cases, and the ruling of the appellate court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 294 of the CUAO).

Since it began operating in December 2017, the Supreme Court has considered eight cassation appeals against appellate court decisions in administrative offence cases. In all cases, the Court refused to open proceedings, referring to Article 294 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences. Therefore, achieving this strategic result is impossible, at least until legislation on a prejudicial request mechanism is adopted, which would enable the SC to express positions in cases not subject to cassation appeal and ensure consistency of case law in such cases.

A general analysis of all three draft ACSs shows that the problems of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences were largely not resolved during 2023–2025 and require further measures. At the same time, it is also important to analyse the reasons why similar expected results of the ACS for 2021–2025 were not achieved.

In the judicial sphere, the draft ACSs focus on discretion in the formation of judicial governance bodies: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as on ensuring their continuous operation. The latter is a significant step forward in the state’s understanding of one of the basic principles of good governance: the work of a body cannot be suspended without transferring its powers to other bodies. The history of judicial reform over the past 12 years shows that Parliament has twice suspended the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ, which led to a significant shortage of judges in courts and, consequently, worsened public access to justice. The differences in wording between the three draft laws are not substantial, so they should be supported by Parliament in any version.

The difference between Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1 and No. 15230-2 on the formation of judicial governance bodies lies in their approaches to granting a decisive vote to independent experts delegated by international partners within competition commissions selecting members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. The first two draft laws preserve this right for them for the next period, while the initiators of Draft Law No. 15230-2 believe that such experts should have voting rights equal to those of Ukrainian members of the competition commissions.

Although the idea of equal weight for the votes of international and national experts in Ukrainian competitions is correct, at this stage Ukraine is not yet fully ready to abandon the decisive vote of experts delegated by international partners. This is primarily because Ukrainian appointing entities require further reform and currently do not enjoy public trust, which is what led to the need to apply the formula involving international experts with a decisive vote.

The initiators also differ somewhat in their views on the specifics of electing the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU). The ACS in the versions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 proposes introducing electronic voting by all judges for the new composition of the CJU, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 provides for voting by all judges but does not specify the method of voting. Given that Ukraine is facing a full-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation and that Ukraine’s movement towards the EU envisages full digitalisation of the judiciary as one element of an effective court free from corruption, electing new compositions of the CJU through electronic voting appears more appropriate.

At the same time, the provisions of Draft Law No. 15230-2 aimed at minimising corruption risks in the activities of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and expanding additional mechanisms to ensure trust in judicial career procedures, primarily through rotation in administrative positions in courts, deserve support. These provisions are much more detailed than those in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. Implementing the relevant provisions is extremely important for fulfilling European integration commitments, particularly in view of the critical TAIEX report on the functioning of the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre, which was recently provided to Ukraine.

The need for rotation of judges in administrative positions has long been discussed, but there is no consensus. At the same time, hundreds of court presidents and their deputies continue to hold their positions beyond the six-year term provided by law, successfully manipulating gaps in legislation.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 adds an expected strategic result concerning the role of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which is absent from the other versions of the ACS for 2026–2030. It provides that: ‘the Public Integrity Council, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be legally embedded in the system of mutual balance between civil society and the state in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not replace the institutional decision of the judiciary’. This addition also deserves the support of MPs during consideration of the draft laws.

The problems of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in the draft ACSs are included in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’ and do not contain fundamental differences.

The problems identified in the prosecution service, and the expected strategic results for addressing them, concern procedures for selecting prosecutors, material support, internal management processes within prosecution bodies, issues of procedural guidance by groups of prosecutors, criteria for determining the optimal staffing level of prosecution bodies and other matters.

All three draft ACSs differ to some extent in this part.

Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not contain the problem of risks of informal or political influence on the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, nor the corresponding expected strategic results. Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 contain such provisions, although with different levels of detail.

While the main draft has a clear focus on selecting candidates for the position of Prosecutor General with the involvement of a competition commission, the second alternative draft uses the general and evaluative concept of ‘best European practices’ and refers to the Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka. This wording makes the expected strategic result less measurable and less achievable.

In different European countries, the status of the Prosecutor General, their role in the system of state bodies and their level of political weight vary depending on the institutional model of the prosecution service. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to determine which practices are the best.

As regards improving the procedure for expressing a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, Draft Law No. 15230 proposes defining the grounds for this, as well as the body that would have the authority to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position through disciplinary proceedings. Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains no reference to the relevant bodies, which is a significant shortcoming given the existing practice of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP).

By its decision No. 97dp-18 of 28 February 2018, following consideration of disciplinary proceedings concerning Prosecutor General Y. Lutsenko, the QDCP established that there was no legislative mechanism for implementing a disciplinary sanction against the Prosecutor General. This made it impossible to hold him liable for a disciplinary offence. The absence of clear mechanisms and procedures effectively nullifies the institution of disciplinary liability of the Prosecutor General and lowers the level of control over performance in this position.

Therefore, on issues concerning the improvement of procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, the ACS in the version of Draft Law No. 15230 best corresponds to the principles of strategic planning.

The other provisions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 do not differ on these issues. Draft Law No. 15230-2, however, contains a clarification regarding the consequences of the new system for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work: it proposes that, based on such an assessment, not only staffing and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses, but also decisions on disciplinary sanctions, may be taken. This approach is flawed and creates additional corruption risks. Issues of disciplinary liability and assessment cannot be mixed within one procedure.

Assessing the quality of a prosecutor’s work concerns the effectiveness of their performance, which should be taken into account in promotion, informing the prosecutor’s professional profile, influencing bonuses and similar incentives. However, it cannot in any way be used as an instrument of punishment for poor work results, since this would essentially amount to a return to the quota-driven ‘stick system’ of assessment, where the dynamics of statistical indicators automatically leads to punishment if they are negative. This system has de facto existed since Soviet times, and its harmful effects have been minimised only in isolated cases.

The subject of disciplinary liability is a specific disciplinary offence, namely culpable non-performance or improper performance by a prosecutor of their duties. The list of disciplinary offences and the grounds and procedure for holding prosecutors disciplinarily liable are defined by law and provide for such liability for a specific case.

Assessment of the quality of work is a procedure that helps determine how effectively a prosecutor performs the official duties assigned to them over a certain period. Under the current assessment procedure, this period is one year. It is therefore more of an incentive-based tool and serves as motivation for professional development. It helps the manager form a more objective understanding of the team’s potential, form a staff reserve and make decisions on bonuses or other incentives more transparent.

Accordingly, if the results of assessing the quality of work can be used to impose disciplinary liability, this may turn into an instrument of administrative influence over prosecutors and undermine their procedural independence.

Improving the activities of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is addressed in all three draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’. However, it would be advisable to consider it as one of the specialised prosecutors’ offices within the unified system of prosecution bodies.

Both alternative draft laws exclude the provisions of the ACS for 2026–2030 that would grant the Head of SAPO the right independently to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPTI) on the possible commission of a criminal offence by an MP of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge.

At present, this is the exclusive power of the Prosecutor General. It is the result of a political compromise reached in 2019, when parliamentary immunity, meaning immunity from criminal prosecution without the consent of the VRU, was replaced by a special procedure for bringing MPs to criminal liability under the exceptional procedural control of the Prosecutor General. For the Government and MPs, the existence of this political compromise, reached by parliamentarians of the same IX convocation that must consider the ACS for 2026–2030, is a key argument against changing it.

It should be noted that, under the new procedure for bringing MPs to liability, more than 40 MPs have been notified of suspicion, and the number of criminal proceedings may be higher. The Head of SAPO has not stated that there is a direct conflict with the Prosecutor General over problems with entering information into the URPTI and approving motions, from which it may be concluded that the practical problem is rather potential in nature.

If there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may be removed from the draft at this stage, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is a real set of cases in which the Prosecutor General ignores substantiated materials from the NABU and SAPO or if a new convocation of the VRU does not consider itself ‘burdened’ by the political compromise previously reached.

The inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 is due to the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is covered by the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the advocate’s profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks that exist within the Bar, such as obtaining an advocate’s certificate and non-transparent budgets, as well as systemic problems including the continued tenure of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies) since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one member to the QDCP and other issues, the Bar has become part of state policy in the field of European integration. At present, it is also a matter of anti-corruption policy and justice policy.

Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to courts and the prosecution service. No matter how much courts and the prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in state anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices at the level of the entire system. Even from a formal perspective, under Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar is part of the justice system alongside courts and the prosecution service, which means that including the Bar in the ACS is a logical and necessary step.

For the first time, the Bar appears in the Anti-Corruption Strategy as a separate substantive subsection alongside courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.

The problems of the Bar identified by the NACP and the corresponding expected results are included unchanged in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. At the same time, Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains certain changes that do not affect the substance of the proposed state policy measures. They concern clarification of the wording of certain problems, detailing their consequences and similar refinements.

For example, the problem concerning the formation of BSG bodies is supplemented, in addition to the issues already listed above, by ‘the absence of real electoral competition, effective appeal mechanisms, representation of alternative professional groups, the formation of informal stable centres of influence and a lack of leadership rotation’, as well as the corresponding consequence: complicating access to the profession and limiting the ability to ensure disciplinary control and high professional standards.

Certain details that do not affect the substance are also clarified. For example, the wording is not simply ‘online voting’ but ‘secure online voting’, although, in substance, any online voting should have an appropriate level of protection against interference and guarantee data security. Another example is the addition of the word ‘periodic’ to ‘electoral cycle’, although a cycle, by definition, implies periodicity.

Therefore, all three documents contain the initial concept of the drafters of the ACS for 2026–2030, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes certain stylistic amendments and clarified wording that may be discussed as amendments at the stage when the ACS is finalised in the lead Committee.

All draft ACSs for 2026–2030 identify problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).

The version of the ACS appended to Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not address the problem of legal regulation of selection procedures for the heads of the NPU and the SBI, as well as the corresponding expected strategic results, although the need to introduce transparent merit-based competitions for these positions has been repeatedly noted by national experts and international partners.

Given that the subjects submitting Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 are MPs, it can be hoped that these provisions will be preserved in full during parliamentary discussions.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 additionally contains problems relating to the institutional independence of the SBI and the absence of clear criteria for determining the investigative jurisdiction of this body. It states that resolving these problems would allow the following strategic results to be achieved:

• introduction of a mechanism for a comprehensive staffing and institutional reset of the SBI, including an open competition for the position of Director with the involvement of independent experts with a decisive vote, as well as mandatory periodic attestation of Bureau employees;
• ensuring a clear focus for the SBI on its original mission: combating torture, unlawful detention and other criminal offences committed in office in the justice sector, as well as introducing a system of periodic external independent audits of the Bureau’s activities, where a negative conclusion would constitute grounds for early dismissal of its leadership;
• developing the analytical capacity of the SBI to shift towards strategic prioritisation of its activities based on verified data, using European tools such as SOCTA, which would help avoid selective application of the law and pressure on other state bodies.

These proposals reflect urgent problems in the activities of the SBI that have been highlighted by experts and international partners. During 2025–2026, the SBI was repeatedly used as an instrument of political pressure and inter-agency confrontation, diverting the Bureau’s resources away from its core tasks and undermining trust in it. Developing the analytical capacities of the SBI corresponds to European integration changes under which national law enforcement agencies must be integrated into the European system for countering crime.

In addition, the text of Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes that, within 30 days after the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030’ enters into force, the Verkhovna Rada should hear the report of the Director of the SBI on the Bureau’s performance in 2025 and, if its work is found unsatisfactory, the President should dismiss the Director of the Bureau. This proposal is fully consistent with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.

Although, in general, we agree that these issues are relevant, it should be noted that the problems in the activities of the SBI are more complex and require a balanced and well-considered solution.

At present, in accordance with the Rule of Law Roadmap, a comprehensive study is being conducted that should determine the need and feasibility of further reforming the SBI in line with best European practices and should lead to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a law taking into account the necessary recommendations.

The Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka notes that a draft law on SBI reform will be presented by December 2026 based on the results of the study. In preparing such a law, broad discussions involving experts and civil society must also be held.

As in the current ACS for 2021–2025, the drafts do not examine problems in the activities of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) that have a corruption-related nature. While the current ACS has a different structure, the draft ACSs for 2026–2030 should pay attention to the institutional independence and capacity of the Bureau as one of the law enforcement agencies.

In particular, the work of the ESBU internal control units needs to be strengthened, since the integrity and transparency of the Bureau depend to a certain extent on their effectiveness. Attention has also repeatedly been drawn to the uncompetitive level of remuneration of ESBU employees, which prevents the Bureau from attracting the best specialists and creates corruption risks in its activities.

Issues related to the functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine are included in the draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’.

The versions of all three draft ACSs largely share a common view of the problem of the institutional resilience and independence of the NABU, except for certain targeted changes proposed in Draft Law No. 15230-2. It states that one way to ensure the Bureau’s resilience and independence is to build a highly professional, integrity-driven team through open, transparent competitions, and to communicate the NABU’s activities effectively through the Public Oversight Council.

Both proposals appear questionable. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’, the Public Oversight Council at the NABU is an instrument for ensuring transparency and civilian oversight of the Bureau’s activities. As stated in the Report on the Results of the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of the Effectiveness of the NABU’s Activities, conducted from March 2023 to November 2024, the members of the Public Oversight Council themselves noted a fairly high level of interaction between the Bureau and the Council. Such interaction takes the form of involving Council members in competition and disciplinary procedures, providing information and semi-annual reports on NABU activities, assessing the amount of public information disclosed by the Bureau and other measures. This indicates a considerable level of transparency of the body.

The openness of competitions for NABU positions is ensured both by involving representatives of civil society in competition commissions, namely persons selected by the Public Oversight Council, and by regularly publishing announcements on the NABU website, which allows any candidate who meets the requirements to take part in the competition.

All three draft ACSs for 2026–2030 contain sound proposals but also leave important issues unaddressed. Compared with previous anti-corruption strategies, before voting in the plenary composition of the Verkhovna Rada, these draft laws must be considered by all parliamentary committees, whereas previous ACS drafts were examined by only five committees.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy. It is also Ukraine’s commitment to international partners, reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Roadmap. The Joint Statement by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka of 11 December 2025 states that the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for its implementation is one of the priorities for 2026 that should demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to strengthen its institutions, achieve substantial progress in reforms under the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster of the EU accession process and continue moving forward on its European path.

On 15 May 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine registered the Draft Law ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office” on Aligning the Functions of the Prosecution Service with the Constitution of Ukraine Regarding Representation of the Interests of the State in Court’ (Reg. No. 15253 of 15.05.2026).

The explanatory note to the draft law states that the relevant amendments to the law were developed to regulate the cases in which a prosecutor may represent the interests of the state in court and to eliminate the unconstitutional expansion of the functions of the prosecution service.

In view of this, the Draft Law proposes to:

1. set out Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ in a new version, providing for representation by a prosecutor exclusively of the interests of the state and only in exceptional cases defined by law;
2. specify the scope of such exceptional cases, in particular in the field of objects of civil rights that are withdrawn from or restricted in civil circulation;
3. align the prosecutor’s procedural powers with procedural legislation and the principles of justice;
4. remove from legislation provisions on the prosecutor’s representation of the interests of citizens.

The Draft Law was developed to implement Decision of the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine No. 6-r(ІІ)/2025 of 3 December 2025, which found the function of representing the interests of the state in court to be inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine because an exceptional function had turned into a general rule, as the grounds for its exercise were not clearly defined by law.

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine states that ‘the failure to define in the Law the limits of discretion for the prosecutor and the court, which decide whether there are grounds for the prosecutor to represent the interests of the state in court, results in the possibility for these bodies to be guided essentially only by their own subjective understanding of what “does not exercise” or “improperly exercises” means. This indicates that the discretion of the prosecutor and the court arising from the content of the relevant provisions of the first paragraph of Part 3 Article 23 of the Law is such that its limits are not clearly and comprehensibly defined by the Law. As a result, an exceptional procedural instrument of the prosecution service has been transformed into a universal mechanism for representing the interests of the state in court, thereby expanding the content of the relevant constitutional function of the prosecution service’ (para. 7.2 of the Decision).

In turn, ‘[this] entails an out-of-court assessment by the prosecutor of the effectiveness of actions or the establishment of inaction by other public authorities outside the field of criminal law, whereas, in particular, in the field of criminal law there are already relevant mechanisms for the prosecution service to respond to cases where public authorities do not exercise or improperly exercise their functions to protect the interests of the state. This has created a mechanism, not provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine, through which the prosecution service may influence the exercise of powers by state authorities, local self-government bodies or other public authorities whose competence includes the relevant powers, and has nullified the requirement of Article 6 of the Constitution of Ukraine that each body exercise its powers independently within the limits defined by the Constitution of Ukraine’ (para. 7.3 of the Decision).

The issue of the constitutionality of these provisions in relation to the prosecutor’s representation of citizens’ interests in court remained outside the scope of this constitutional proceeding, in accordance with the principle of non ultra petita: the conclusions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) did not extend to this aspect of the representative function. At the same time, current legislation still contains provisions on the prosecutor’s representation of the interests of citizens in court, although after the 2016 constitutional reform, such a function is not provided for by Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Therefore, retaining these provisions in the Law violates the principle that the constitutionally defined functions of the prosecution service are exhaustive and contradicts the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine prohibiting their expansion.

In the operative part of its Decision, the CCU postponed the loss of force of the provisions found unconstitutional until 1 January 2027. Within this period, the legislator must clearly define the grounds for representation; otherwise, the prosecution service will lose the possibility of representing the interests of the state.

The prosecution service’s representation of the interests of the state in court remains one of the debated issues in the context of prosecution reform and alignment of its functions with European standards.

Under paragraph 3, Part 1, Article 131 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the prosecution service represents the interests of the state in court in exceptional cases and in the manner defined by law. This constitutional model was introduced in 2016 as part of justice reform with the aim of substantially limiting powers that are not inherent in the prosecution service but had previously existed.

Historically, the representative function of the prosecution service in Ukraine developed as an element of the Soviet model of the prosecutor’s office, which provided for broad supervisory powers outside criminal justice. Within this model, the prosecution service acted as a universal instrument for protecting state interests in various areas of public administration.

In fact, the Venice Commission issued an opinion on the function of prosecutors in representing the interests of the state and citizens in court as early as 2013, when analysing the then draft of the current Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’.

The Venice Commission drew attention to the fact that the function of representing the ‘interests of the state in court’ was formulated too broadly, since such interests could theoretically cover any matter that, in the opinion of the state authorities, concerns the performance of their functions or is of significance for the state in general, even where it concerns specific legal rights and obligations of private persons or organisations.

Although Article 24 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ to some extent limits the scope of this provision in cases where this function is delegated to a state authority other than the prosecution service, the range of interests that the prosecution service may represent remains undefined.

Thus, until this function is fully abolished, the Venice Commission considers it appropriate to clearly define the range of interests that the prosecution service may represent. To this end, the functions of the prosecution service should be limited to representing interests concerning only matters of a moral or public-policy nature, exclusively in cases where it is necessary to protect specific rights of the state provided by law.

In addition, the Venice Commission drew attention to the absence of any indication that representation by prosecutors of the interests of the state is excluded in the case of state-owned companies. This provision may therefore be interpreted as allowing prosecutors to act on behalf of such companies, which would be entirely inappropriate given the role assigned to their management.

Accordingly, even at the stage when the modern legislative model of the prosecution service was being formed, the Venice Commission expressed a rather restrained and, in a certain sense, sceptical position regarding the granting of a broad representative function to the prosecution service. The proposed approach envisaged its significant narrowing and the clearest possible definition of the limits of its application.

In modern democratic systems, this model is gradually being recognised as incompatible with the principle of separation of powers and the role of the prosecution service as an institution of criminal justice.

International standards also proceed from the need to limit the functions of the prosecution service to the field of criminal prosecution. In particular, Recommendation No. 1604 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe states that prosecutors’ functions should be focused on prosecuting persons guilty of committing criminal offences, while separate competent bodies should be created to perform other functions.

At the same time, Opinion No. 3 (2008) of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) recognises that, in some states, prosecutors may perform functions outside criminal justice. However, in such cases these powers must be clearly defined by law, be exceptional in nature and must not create a privileged position for the prosecutor in court proceedings.

A similar approach is reflected in Recommendation Rec(2012)11 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal justice system, which emphasises that such powers must be clearly regulated, exercised in compliance with the principle of equality of arms and must not disturb the balance between participants in court proceedings.

The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), when analysing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2015, also emphasised that representation of the interests of the state by a prosecutor should remain a residual and exceptional power, applied only where other mechanisms for protecting state interests are absent or ineffective.

Thus, the constitutional model of the prosecution service introduced in Ukraine in 2016 effectively provides for a subsidiary role of the prosecutor in representing the interests of the state. The prosecution service should intervene only where the relevant state authorities or other entities authorised by law to protect such interests do not exercise or improperly exercise their powers.

In practice, the function of representing the interests of the state continues to be applied quite broadly, although it is regarded as a temporary or transitional mechanism stemming from the particular features of the development of the state’s institutional system. In the long term, protection of the interests of the state should be carried out primarily by the relevant state authorities, which are the holders of these interests and have the necessary powers.

At the same time, the data in the 2025 Report of the Prosecutor General’s Office show that, in conditions where authorised bodies were ineffective or inactive, prosecutors filed claims concerning financial assets worth more than UAH 33.8 billion. The value of assets in respect of which courts issued decisions satisfying prosecutors’ claims amounted to UAH 1.5 billion, while the value of assets whose alienation was prevented in satisfied and closed cases amounted to UAH 13 billion. The value of assets in respect of which actual enforcement of court decisions was secured amounted to UAH 215.2 million. During 2025, particular attention was paid to protecting the interests of the state in budgetary legal relations, where the effectiveness of the measures taken has a direct impact on the ability of the state and local self-government bodies to finance priority needs. In other words, the representative function is actively performed by the prosecution service, while at the level of state policy no plans to limit it have been voiced since 2016.

As already mentioned, in Decision No. 6-р(ІІ)/2025 of 3 December 2025, the CCU stated that cases of representation must be objectively exceptional, clearly defined by law, reduced to the minimum necessary and perceived precisely as exceptions, rather than as a general rule for the prosecution service’s participation in court proceedings.

The Constitutional Court also drew attention to the fact that current legislative regulation does not ensure sufficient legal certainty regarding the limits of the prosecutor’s discretion in deciding whether to apply to court in the interests of the state. In particular, the possibility of representation in cases where the relevant state authority or local self-government body ‘does not exercise’ or ‘improperly exercises’ protection of the interests of the state effectively leaves the prosecutor and the court with excessively broad scope for subjective interpretation of these grounds. In the Court’s view, this uncertainty results in the exceptional procedural instrument of the prosecution service being transformed into a universal mechanism for representing the interests of the state in court, thereby expanding the content of the relevant constitutional function.

In view of this, the Court found unconstitutional certain provisions of the first paragraph of Part 3 Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ in the part allowing the prosecutor to represent the interests of the state in connection with the failure or improper exercise of their protection by other public authorities. At the same time, the Court postponed the loss of force of these provisions until 1 January 2027, taking into account, in particular, the need to ensure continuity in the performance of the prosecution service’s functions under martial law.

Problems in defining the limits of the prosecution service’s representative powers are also evident in case law. Thus, in the ruling of the Commercial Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 15 January 2026 in case No. 921/190/25, it was confirmed that specialised prosecutors’ offices in the defence sector may represent the interests of the state only within legal relations related to the defence sector. The Court emphasised that subordinate acts, including orders of the Prosecutor General, may not expand the powers of prosecution bodies beyond the limits defined by law. Accordingly, the claim filed by a specialised prosecutor’s office in the defence sector in a case concerning environmental damage and the interests of a local self-government body was found to have been submitted by a person without proper authority.

4.1. A positive aspect of the draft law is the very attempt to specify in legislation the list of cases in which a prosecutor may represent the interests of the state (the proposed wording of Part 2 Article 23 of the Draft Law). This approach generally corresponds to the legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the need for a clear and predictable algorithm for determining exceptional grounds for the prosecution service to exercise this function. The draft law exhaustively and specifically defines the grounds and sources from which a prosecutor may obtain the information necessary to represent the interests of the state in court and establishes a clear procedure for the prosecutor’s actions.

4.2. The proposed exclusion from legislation of provisions on the prosecutor’s representation of the interests of citizens in court also deserves a positive assessment. Although this component of the representative function is mentioned in Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, it falls outside the scope of constitutional regulation and is a remnant of the previous powers of prosecution bodies.

After the 2016 constitutional reform, the function of representing the interests of citizens no longer belongs to the constitutionally defined functions of the prosecution service provided for in Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Therefore, further preservation of the relevant provisions in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ effectively contradicts the principle that the constitutional powers of the prosecution service are exhaustive and is inconsistent with the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the inadmissibility of expanding the functions of the prosecution service by law.

In this respect, the draft law demonstrates the correct approach to aligning legislation with the Constitution of Ukraine and the logic of the 2014–2016 prosecution reform, which was aimed at gradually abandoning non-criminal functions not inherent in the prosecution service.

In addition, removing the function of representing the interests of citizens is consistent with Council of Europe international standards and the recommendations of the Venice Commission, according to which the prosecution service should focus primarily on functions in the field of criminal justice, while protection of the rights and interests of private individuals should be ensured through the free legal aid system, the Bar and other specially authorised institutions.

4.3. Concerning the cases in which the representative function may be exercised.

Despite certain positive aspects of the draft law, namely the attempt to specify the grounds for representation in legislation and to align certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ with the Constitution of Ukraine, the proposed wording as a whole gives rise to a number of significant reservations and requires further revision.

Despite formally enshrining the ‘exceptional’ nature of representation, the proposed list of cases in which a prosecutor may represent the interests of the state in court covers an extremely broad range of legal relations and largely restores the possibility of systemic intervention by the prosecution service in public administration outside criminal justice.

In particular, this concerns such grounds as ‘violation of fundamental national interests’, ‘strategic nationwide priorities’, ‘a conflict of powers’ between authorities, the ‘inability independently to protect’ the interests of the state by the relevant body and the prosecutor’s detection of facts indicating a violation or threat of violation of the interests of the state while exercising procedural guidance over a pre-trial investigation.

In effect, this model contributes to an even greater expansion of the limits of the prosecution service’s participation outside criminal justice.

The proposed wording of Part 2 Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ defines nine cases in which a prosecutor may represent the interests of the state:

1. violation or threat of violation of the fundamental national interests of Ukraine or strategic nationwide priorities defined by law;
2. violation or threat of violation of the interests of the state concerning objects of ownership of the Ukrainian people or objects of civil rights that are under special state protection, whose preservation is guaranteed by the state and which, under the law, are withdrawn from civil circulation or have limited transferability;
3. absence of a state authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law that is authorised by law to protect the interests of the state in court, or absence of powers of such entities to apply to court with the relevant procedural document in the disputed legal relations;
4. violation of the interests of the state by a state authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law whose powers include judicial protection of such interests of the state;
5. existence of a conflict of powers between state authorities, local self-government bodies and other legal entities under public law regarding their protection of the interests of the state within their competence;
6. damage caused to the interests of the state by a criminal offence or other socially dangerous act where a civil claim in criminal proceedings was not or could not be filed or was left without consideration;
7. detection by the prosecutor, while exercising procedural guidance over a pre-trial investigation or participating in criminal or administrative proceedings regardless of their outcome, of facts indicating a violation or threat of violation of the interests of the state requiring judicial protection;
8. an application by a state authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law requesting the filing of a claim due to its inability independently to protect the interests of the state;
9. cases concerning the recognition of assets as unjustified and their recovery for the benefit of the state.

Within this list, particular reservations arise in relation to paragraph 5, which allows a prosecutor to represent the interests of the state where there is a conflict of powers between state authorities, local self-government bodies and other legal entities under public law concerning their protection of the interests of the state.

In essence, a conflict of powers is the result of imperfect legislative regulation of the delimitation of competences of the relevant public authorities. Identifying and eliminating such conflicts should be carried out primarily at the normative level by clarifying legislation and properly delimiting the powers of the relevant entities, rather than being resolved in each specific case on the basis of a discretionary decision by the prosecutor that there are grounds to represent the interests of the state in court.

Given the absence of clear criteria for the concept of a ‘conflict of powers’, this ground is excessively evaluative in nature and creates a risk of further expanding prosecutorial discretion beyond the constitutional model of exceptional and subsidiary representation of the interests of the state.

Paragraph 7 of Part 2 Article 23 of the Draft Law provides that a ground for the prosecutor’s representation of the interests of the state is the prosecutor’s detection, while exercising procedural guidance over a pre-trial investigation or participating in criminal or administrative proceedings, of facts indicating a violation or threat of violation of the interests of the state requiring judicial protection.

In effect, the proposed model legalises the possibility for a prosecutor to initiate representation of the interests of the state in virtually any area of public-law relations if the prosecutor independently detects a potential violation of the ‘interests of the state’ while exercising other prosecutorial powers.

Taking into account the extremely broad and evaluative nature of the concept in paragraph 1 of Part 2 of the same Article, namely ‘violation or threat of violation of the fundamental national interests of Ukraine or strategic nationwide priorities’, this model creates a risk of significantly expanding prosecutorial discretion and effectively returning the prosecution service to quasi-supervisory functions.

In essence, this creates a mechanism whereby any criminal or administrative proceedings could potentially become a basis for further intervention by the prosecution service in the activities of state authorities, local self-government bodies or other public-law entities through the mechanism of representing the interests of the state in court.

4.4. Concerning the grounds for representation.

Part 3 of the proposed wording of the above-mentioned Article of the draft law provides an exhaustive list of triggers for initiating the establishment of grounds for representing the interests of the state in court:

1. information obtained in the course of exercising the prosecutor’s powers;
2. information received by prosecution bodies from state authorities, local self-government bodies and other legal entities under public law;
3. applications by individuals and legal entities, MPs of Ukraine, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, members of local councils and associations of citizens;
4. public information and publications in the media.

The provision allowing a prosecutor to exercise representation where facts indicating a violation of the interests of the state are identified from public information and media publications as a trigger for verifying whether grounds exist for representation deserves particular attention. Despite the formal prohibition on independent information searches, this model effectively endows the prosecution service with a function of monitoring the legality of the activities of authorities and other public-law actors. It brings the prosecution service closer to the functionality typical of so-called ‘general supervision’, which Ukraine officially abandoned as a result of the 2014 prosecution reform and the 2016 constitutional amendments.

As a result, there is a risk that instead of implementing the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on narrowing and clearly limiting the representative function of the prosecution service, the proposed draft law will effectively create a new, much more detailed yet broad model of prosecutorial participation in protecting state interests in court.

4.5. Additional reservations also arise in relation to paragraph 8 of Part 2 Article 23 of the Draft Law, under which a prosecutor may represent the interests of the state on the basis of a request by a state authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law due to its inability independently to protect the interests of the state.

The proposed construction creates a risk of formally legitimising the prosecutor’s involvement in any category of disputes at the prosecutor’s own initiative.

In particular, a prosecutor may independently identify, at their own discretion, a potential violation of the ‘interests of the state’ while exercising other powers, after which the prosecution service’s further entry into the case may be formally justified by obtaining the relevant letter or request from a state authority or other public-law entity.

In the absence of clear criteria for the concept of ‘inability independently to protect the interests of the state’, this model effectively allows the application of the relevant body to be used not as an exceptional mechanism but as an instrument for procedurally legitimising an intervention already initiated by the prosecution service.

As a result, there is a risk that the representative function of the prosecution service may be transformed from a subsidiary and exceptional mechanism into a universal form of prosecutorial participation in public-law disputes.

4.6. Analysis of the proposed amendments shows that the actual focus of the draft law does not fully correspond to the legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which determined that the purpose of further amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ should be precisely to narrow and clearly limit the grounds for the prosecutor’s representation of the interests of the state in court, minimise prosecutorial discretion and ensure the exceptional and subsidiary nature of this function.

Even at the stage of preparing the current Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, the Venice Commission drew attention to the excessive breadth of the concept of ‘interests of the state’, which creates a risk of unduly expanding the role of the prosecution service outside criminal justice. Council of Europe international standards consistently proceed from the premise that criminal prosecution should remain the main function of the prosecution service, while the performance of other functions is permissible only in exceptional cases and provided that they are clearly regulated by law.

The 2014–2016 constitutional reform of the prosecution service was aimed precisely at transforming the prosecution service into a criminal justice body that operates as closely as possible to European standards, while taking into account the domestic specificities of the justice system. In this context, representation of the interests of the state in court was intended to become exceptional, subsidiary and residual in nature.

Therefore, further legislative regulation of the representative function of the prosecution service should not proceed by normatively defining the broadest possible range of grounds for representation but, on the contrary, by substantially narrowing them, defining them clearly and minimising prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and international standards.

In the long term, representation of the interests of the state by a prosecutor in court should be regarded as a temporary, exceptional and residual mechanism that will gradually lose its significance as the prosecution service of Ukraine continues its institutional evolution and moves closer to the European model of a criminal justice body. Although European standards do not prohibit the prosecution service from performing functions outside the criminal justice system, such functions should be minimal. Instead, executive authorities, administrative justice and other instruments outside the field of public prosecution should meet the need to protect human rights.

We consider that Draft Law No. 15253 of 15.05.2026 requires further revision in terms of narrowing the grounds for representation. The proposed detailed list of grounds for representation does not narrow them compared with the current Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’; rather, it preserves them in the same scope or even expands them, which was the very subject of the unconstitutionality established by the CCU in Decision No. 6-r(ІІ)/2025 of 3 December 2025. The relevant grounds may be narrowed during finalisation of the Draft Law for the second reading or by withdrawing the Draft Law and submitting a revised version in its place.

In 2024, Ukraine was shaken by news of a wave of prosecutors with disability status among prosecutors in Khmelnytskyi region. It emerged that almost 500 prosecutors in the country were receiving disability pensions, and nearly half of them worked in Khmelnytskyi and Cherkasy regions. Because of this scandal, Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin resigned. Later, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) abolished Medical and Social Expert Commissions (MSECs), and attention to this story subsided.

Already in the summer of 2025, the new Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko, promised to deal with the problem. Yet prosecutors have still not faced criminal liability and have barely faced disciplinary liability; some lost managerial positions and moved to rank-and-file positions.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has already written about why the hasty decisions of the new Prosecutor General, who is filing disciplinary complaints against prosecutors en masse, will do more harm than resolve the problem comprehensively. This is confirmed, among other things, by an article by NGL.media on how prosecutors are restoring their disability status through court after the notorious scandal. I suggest looking at this story in a broader context.

Prosecutors whose disability status was cancelled or changed underwent re-examination at the Research Institute of Medical and Social Problems of Disability (RI) in Dnipro. Some decisions are being cancelled because of inconsistencies in the procedure at the secondary legislation level and the lack of lawyers at the RI. Prosecutors are restoring their previous status through administrative courts and are also recovering monthly payments. At the same time, they continue to work, because they lost only the payments, not their positions. In other words, these prosecutors have not faced any accountability and have even restored the disability status that was cancelled or changed as a result of re-examination. How did this happen?

In July 2025, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko reported that 484 prosecutors with disability status worked in prosecution authorities, 41 of whom had applied for voluntary dismissal. At the same time, the Prosecutor General referred the issue of holding 348 prosecutors with disability status accountable to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). After all, the head of a prosecution authority cannot simply dismiss a subordinate. Only an independent body — the QDCP — has the right to dismiss a prosecutor.

The status of prosecutors who have had disabilities since childhood, people who have sustained irreversible health losses, acquired disability as a result of the war or have cancer was not in doubt and did not require confirmation. There are 136 such people in prosecution authorities, so they were not subject to re-examination.

All other prosecutors were required to confirm their disability status before the designated Medical and Social Expert Commissions.

Two months after the scandal, in September 2025, Ruslan Kravchenko reported the first results:

• 57 prosecutors with disability status were dismissed from prosecution authorities;
• 56 prosecutors were dismissed from administrative positions;  
• 228 disciplinary complaints were opened and are awaiting consideration by the QDCP.

After that, the leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office did not report any progress in this case, and these figures in fact raise doubts.

As of 13 May 2026, the register of QDCP decisions contains only 29 decisions on dismissal from prosecution authorities. The reason was the unjustified acquisition of disability status and an increased pension amount. This is a disciplinary offence — actions that discredit the title of prosecutor, may cast doubt on their objectivity, impartiality and independence and violate the rules of prosecutorial ethics.

This is half the number of dismissed prosecutors announced by the Prosecutor General. Fourteen prosecutors were banned from holding higher positions and being transferred to a higher-level prosecution office for one year. Three more prosecutors received reprimands. There are no other legal grounds to dismiss a prosecutor, unless they choose to leave voluntarily or through dubious reorganisation schemes.

However, 246 of the 292 prosecutors whose cases the QDCP has already decided have not been punished for their actions. In other words, the QDCP did not see elements of a disciplinary offence in their actions and closed the proceedings. This is more than 80% of the total number of disciplinary proceedings concerning prosecutors with disability status.

Why were disciplinary proceedings closed? Most often, the internal investigation found insufficient information to confirm that there was a disciplinary offence in the prosecutor’s actions when they obtained the status of a person with a disability and applied for and received a pension. In addition, it was impossible to confirm that the prosecutor used official powers or official status and the related opportunities to obtain disability status.

In this case, it concerned a change in the disability group or the duration of its validity, as determined by the Research Institute of Medical and Social Problems of Disability (because the QDCP cannot assess the accuracy of a diagnosis — it is responsible only for the legal component). In other words, the prosecutor has confirmation from the healthcare system: ‘Everything is fine, the doctors simply made a mistake with the disability group and/or its duration’.

The limitation period in disciplinary cases is only one year. In other words, the QDCP had to put ordinary complaints about prosecutorial violations (situations where citizens complained about prosecutorial arbitrariness) aside in favour of these cases to meet such a short deadline. Most QDCP decisions since the beginning of 2026 concern prosecutors with disability status, while other cases have been pushed into the background. I am certain that this has negatively affected the quality of decisions adopted in haste, which may become a weak point if they are challenged before the High Council of Justice or in court.

Unjustified disability status and benefiting from it are not only a violation of ethical rules but also the result of a criminal offence. All these cases must be investigated by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), and the court must hold the guilty prosecutors accountable.

SBI press releases show that five criminal proceedings concerning prosecutors with disability status are being investigated. Indictments in some of them have already been sent to court. There are no separate statistics on this, and judgments, at least publicly, have not yet been published.

Yes, not all prosecutors who have been held disciplinarily liable should be convicted. However, the unjustified acquisition of disability status and pension payments is either corruption, that is, a bribe paid to an MSEC for a decision, forged documents to establish a false diagnosis, or simply buying disability status or receiving it as a gift (we know of such examples too — as a birthday present). Ultimately, it may involve direct participation in a criminal organisation or group scheme. The proceedings investigated by the SBI concern precisely such cases.

Thus, in response to the scandal over unjustified disability status among prosecutors, the prosecution service sent everyone for re-examination to the Research Institute of Medical and Social Problems of Disability. Some prosecutors underwent re-examination, while others avoided it, since it is not required by law. More than 300 disciplinary complaints against all prosecutors were then referred to the QDCP.

Depending on the prosecutor’s conduct, the consequences are as follows:

29 prosecutors were dismissed from prosecution authorities on the grounds of committing a disciplinary offence, that is, violating the rules of ethics. These are those who refused re-examination at the RI or whom the SBI notified of suspicion of committing a crime.

56 prosecutors who, according to Kravchenko, were dismissed from managerial positions. In other words, they moved to ordinary posts. There are no obstacles to their further appointment to a managerial position, and they have not faced legal liability.

Several prosecutors are suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings. The SBI is investigating the unjustified acquisition of disability status and pension payments.

Most prosecutors who went for re-examination are, in the view of the healthcare system, persons with disabilities because they confirmed their status. This concerns at least 246 prosecutors. Or their diagnosis was reduced — from disability group II to group III, or from indefinite status to time-limited disability status. Legally, therefore, this is only a matter of a medical system error in establishing the diagnosis. There are no elements of an offence in the prosecutor’s actions. Some prosecutors are recovering pension payments through court on the basis of procedural violations. Whether they found a way to ‘resolve’ the issue with the relevant institution of the Ministry of Health or whether the system really made a mistake remains an open question.

The key issue remains the state of the criminal proceedings being investigated by the SBI. Procedural guidance in them is provided by prosecutors of the relevant units supervising SBI investigators. But the entire chain of their work is organised vertically by the Prosecutor General, especially since his supervisory powers were expanded in July 2025. If he is serious about solving the problem of prosecutors with fictitious disability status, there is a reasonable question for him and the SBI. What is the status of criminal investigations? Why, after a year and a half, do we have only a few indictments? These are precisely the matters on which the Prosecutor General should report, because public interest has not disappeared.

Finally, a separate component of the problem is the response of the Ministry of Health and the haste in implementing the NSDC decision without real verification mechanisms. If doctors write that the diagnosis is correct, no evidence against it will stand.

However, this is already a question for the state leadership: what is the status of implementation of this decision? After all, unjustified disability status harms not only the budget, from which money goes into the pockets of prosecutors or other unscrupulous people, but also our country’s defence capability. It is no secret that this is a huge problem in the authorities responsible for mobilisation. The issue of criminal liability should be raised not only for prosecutors but also for all organisers, perpetrators and beneficiaries of these criminal schemes. This should be a priority for the Prosecutor General.