Five days remained until the first anniversary of Yuliia Svyrydenko’s Government. Instead of a public assessment of its performance, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a change in political strategy and a Government reshuffle. The following day, the Prime Minister submitted her resignation to the Verkhovna Rada, and Parliament accepted it. This automatically entailed the resignation of the entire Cabinet.

The public was never told why these changes were being made. It could only speculate as to whether the Government had fulfilled its tasks, what criteria had been used to assess it and whether state priorities were changing or the authorities were simply trying to salvage their reputation and approval ratings.

The news also came as a surprise to those required to give the decisions legal effect: MPs. They said they had learnt of the Government reshuffle from the President’s social media posts and the media.

The episode once again exposed not only poor communication between branches of government, but also the gap between Parliament’s role under the law and actual practice, in which political initiative is centred on the President.

Following procedure and making decisions transparent allow society to understand who decided what, how and why and who will be held responsible. The way personnel changes, including Government reshuffles, are conducted affects not only trust in new appointees, but also the state’s ability to continue working effectively through changes in personnel. This article considers what these processes reveal and what consequences they may have for the state.

The President of Ukraine cannot appoint or dismiss the Cabinet of Ministers single-handedly. The Verkhovna Rada appoints the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the President’s submission. It appoints the other members of the Government on the Prime Minister’s submission.

The Government is responsible to both the President and Parliament, but it is controlled by and accountable specifically to the Verkhovna Rada. Parliament should assess the Government throughout its term, not only on the day it resigns. MPs should monitor the fulfilment of commitments, hear reports from ministers, analyse decisions and demand explanations. Ultimately, they should determine whether the executive is performing its tasks.

With proper parliamentary oversight, the Cabinet’s performance would not be assessed within a closed circle of political leaders. MPs themselves would conduct that assessment.

This is difficult, however, in a system where the President is perceived as the main centre of decision-making by both Government officials and, often, MPs themselves. In such a configuration, accountability becomes an open question: why report to Parliament if it does not, in practice, determine whether a minister remains in office? Parliamentary oversight instruments exist, but in practice they do not ensure that the Government is accountable to the Verkhovna Rada.

Society is consequently given a political verdict without a public analysis of the Cabinet’s performance, clear conclusions or an explanation of what the new Government is expected to change.

The problem is not only that MPs do not assess the Government systematically. They may also be excluded from shaping personnel decisions that they will later be expected to approve with their votes.

By law, the Government is formed with the participation of the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the candidate for the post of Prime Minister. Informal negotiations are a normal part of a democratic process. The problem arises when they entirely replace a substantive and open procedure and Parliament becomes merely the technical implementer of a decision taken elsewhere.

It remains unclear whether parliamentary committees were consulted before the reshuffle was announced or who prepared the list of candidates. Another unanswered question is whether the President, the future Prime Minister and the parliamentary majority divided among themselves the right to nominate candidates and, if so, how.

Judging by public and private reactions, MPs received no explanation for the Government reshuffle. This leaves them hostage to the situation and subsequently accountable to society for personnel changes over which they had little or no influence. Their votes, after all, turn the President’s initiative into a formal appointment.

Supporting the personnel changes proposed by the President will amount to an informal vote of confidence in the presidential strategy. Responsibility for that vote, however, cannot be transferred entirely to the President and his team.

Symbolically, Svyrydenko’s resignation coincided with the end of her first year in office, equivalent to the one-year protection from dismissal that the Government would have received had its Programme been approved. Even if the authorities had sought to justify the resignation by reference to the Svyrydenko Government’s performance, another problem would have arisen: on the basis of which documents could its performance be assessed?

This Cabinet submitted its Programme of Activities to the Verkhovna Rada in September 2025, but Parliament never approved it. There are therefore no objectives endorsed by Parliament against which the Government’s effectiveness can be measured.

It is, of course, possible to analyse priority action plans, the State Budget, implementation of international commitments, draft laws prepared and public promises. Such an assessment would, however, be based largely on public commitments that are not binding and do not assign responsibility.

Without an approved Programme, the Government’s resignation does not complete a proper cycle of accountability. The Government simply changes. Society is not shown the shortcomings that need to be addressed. These are lost amid speculation and rumours.

The new Cabinet’s first priority should therefore be to prepare a comprehensive Programme of Activities with measurable objectives, deadlines and responsible authorities. It should be presented publicly and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on time. Approval of the Programme would give the new Government one-year immunity from dismissal and would allow MPs and society to understand exactly what the Cabinet is responsible for and how its performance will be assessed.

The imbalance between influence and responsibility is only one aspect of a personnel reset. The other is its cost to the public administration system.

Personnel changes in Ukraine are regularly accompanied by changes to the architecture of the executive itself. Ministries are merged, divided or renamed and their functions transferred from one authority to another.

Such a decision can be announced in a day, but its implementation takes months — usually around six. The ministry continues to operate during this period, but a substantial share of its resources is diverted to restoring and stabilising processes.

The Ministry of National Unity is a good example of poor management practice: a ministry that lasted only six months. At a time when Ukraine’s resources are limited, substantial resources were spent on an experiment that delivered no results.

Reorganisation requires a new regulation governing the ministry and the redistribution of functions, areas of responsibility, staff, budgets and other matters. Some decisions must be agreed again with other authorities.

Part of the new Government’s first year may therefore once again be spent on internal restructuring rather than policy implementation. Even a competent team cannot instantly recover lost time, restore disrupted working relationships or rebuild processes. The more complex another restructuring becomes, the more important a proper handover from the outgoing Government to its successor will be.

The quality of that handover will determine whether the new Cabinet can continue work already under way or must again spend months reconstructing the context, reviewing decisions already prepared and building its own teams. The true legacy of a Government is therefore not only a list of successes and failures or the Prime Minister’s final social media post, but a clear account of the state in which key policy areas are handed over to the new leadership.

Handover books for the new Prime Minister and each minister could be one tool for this transfer. They should record the current state of affairs, critical deadlines for meeting commitments, draft laws and secondary legislation in progress, potential risks and other relevant matters. They should separately identify processes that must not be interrupted by a change of leadership and decisions that cannot be postponed.

Ukraine has already attempted to introduce this practice, but it unfortunately failed to take root. As a good governance tool, it helps ensure that institutional memory is not lost when leadership changes. It would also allow Parliament to determine which measures proposed by the new Cabinet are genuinely new and which continue work begun by its predecessors.

A change of Government will force some Government draft laws to begin their parliamentary journey again. This concerns all 142 draft laws introduced by the Svyrydenko Cabinet that had not been adopted as a basis at first reading, according to calculations based on open data. For Parliament, this effectively means a new cycle of committee consideration, opinions and another first reading.

The previous work does not disappear entirely, but repeating the procedure will take time. This may slow processes on which the fulfilment of EU integration commitments and Ukraine’s access to international financial support often depend. During a reshuffle, the state must therefore preserve its ability to perform hundreds of interconnected daily tasks without repeatedly returning to the starting point.

Personnel changes are sometimes necessary. It is reasonable to revise the structure of the executive if it is not delivering results. Every such decision, however, has a price: time, resources, lost momentum in meeting international commitments, the need to rebuild processes and the risk of new crises.

Ukraine has very few of these resources during wartime. Political decisions should therefore be assessed not only in terms of political expediency or the desire to satisfy personal political ambitions, but also in terms of whether they can realistically be implemented.

Even the best objective does not release the authorities from their duty to explain the reasons for personnel decisions, what state policy will look like following changes in personnel and what will ensure its continuity. Nor does it remove the obligation to follow the procedure established by law. The issue concerns not only the stability of state institutions, but also public trust and the country’s ability to move forward without another return to the starting point.

Ukraine is already at that starting point, forming a new Government. This time, it should at least try to do things properly: adopt a Programme of Activities and avoid another radical reshuffling of ministries. The new Cabinet may then avoid the fate of its predecessor.

Ukraine’s decentralisation reform began in 2014. Newly established communities received new powers and new sources of local budget revenue. Yet stronger financial capacity was not accompanied by a clear system of institutional change defining the distribution of functions and responsibilities. The law never established a clear boundary between the powers of the central authorities and those of communities, districts or regions. The new chain of authority built around temporary military administrations during the full-scale war has made the problem even more acute.

A law delimiting powers among levels of public governance was supposed to resolve the problem and clarify who is responsible for what. It has still not been adopted, although Ukraine was required to do so by the end of March 2026 under the Ukraine Facility.

Moreover, how clearly the state defines the responsibilities of different levels of government will determine not only the further development of decentralisation, but also whether Ukraine meets some of its EU integration commitments. The debate around draft law No. 14412 ‘On the Principles of Delimitation and Distribution of Powers among Levels of Public Governance’ is therefore no longer solely a domestic discussion about the architecture of government. With the opening of the first negotiating cluster, ‘Fundamentals’, the issue has become part of a broader task: aligning Ukrainian legislation with European standards and fulfilling the commitments that will accompany the accession negotiations.

The European system of local self-government is based on a simple principle: decisions should be taken as close to the individual as possible. In EU law, this is known as subsidiarity. The European Charter of Local Self-Government, for example, gives communities the discretion, within the law, to determine how they exercise their powers. Ukraine’s system of local self-government, despite its declared commitment to European principles, remains heavily shaped by centralised administrative practices and a blurred division of powers, which constrain communities’ capacity.

Draft law No. 14412 is intended to change this in part. It creates a framework for further reform by classifying powers and introducing rules for their distribution among the state, regions, districts and communities. A separate law, together with amendments to more than 150 existing laws and other legal acts, is expected to define the powers conclusively.

Draft law No. 14412 should bring the system closer to a model in which communities perform their functions without state interference while receiving funding both from the State Budget and from revenues generated through the exercise of their own powers. This includes, for example, building schools, hospitals and sports facilities. The change should improve the quality of public services and reduce conflicts between local self-government bodies and local executive authorities.

At first sight, draft law No. 14412 should resolve a problem left unaddressed for years by determining who is responsible for what within the system of public governance. In its current form, however, the draft law creates risks. Some provisions may expand the central authorities’ ability to influence how local self-government bodies exercise their powers and may jeopardise communities’ autonomy. This contradicts the logic of decentralisation, which involves transferring not only resources and responsibilities, but also the freedom and capacity to make decisions locally.

For example, draft law No. 14412 contains a proposal that is inconsistent with the Constitution: some powers of local self-government bodies would be defined by secondary legislation rather than by laws. This would allow the Government or other executive authorities to change the rules without going through the full parliamentary procedure. A community might, for example, introduce an innovation that falls within its formal powers. The Cabinet could then change the implementation procedure through secondary legislation, forcing the community to revise or postpone the decision. For residents, the result is straightforward: what was promised was not delivered or did not become operational on time.

The draft law also proposes allowing legislation to prescribe exactly how local self-government bodies must perform the powers and functions assigned to them. This would not only conflict with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which grants communities autonomy in such matters, but would undermine the very essence of self-government. If a community is responsible for maintaining local roads, for example, it rather than the law should decide whether to establish a municipal enterprise, hire contractors or combine different approaches.

In addition, the draft law introduces ‘optional powers’ that executive authorities may ‘pass down’ to the executive bodies of local councils ‘on a contractual basis’. It is unclear who would be responsible for these tasks or how they would be financed. This is inconsistent with both the Constitution and Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1748 and is generally alien to European law.

The draft law also provides for limited judicial review, meaning that communities would have little practical ability to protect themselves against interference by other public authorities. Some matters they currently decide — including permits, certificates and approvals, setting rates for local taxes and fees such as property tax, tourist tax and parking fees and granting exemptions — could therefore remain within their competence only formally, without any effective means of exercising those powers or defending them in court.

Adopting draft law No. 14412 in its current form could disrupt the balance among branches of government, create conflict between Parliament and the Government over the model of public governance, slow EU integration and eventually lead to the law being declared unconstitutional.

As Ukraine seeks to answer the question of who is responsible for what, the draft law intended to provide that answer risks leaving communities dependent on the centre once again. The new rules for distributing powers should not reproduce a post-communist centralised model but should reflect European practices. They should support a transition to a system in which communities are not passive implementers of central government decisions, but full participants in public governance within the limits established by law.

Following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, the return of combatants to civilian life and their full reintegration has become one of the key challenges of state policy. Ukraine already has over 2 million veterans, and once the active phase of the war ends their number will rise significantly. At the same time, the current system of support for veterans remains fragmented and is largely based on approaches formed back in the early 1990s.

The principal legislative act in the field of support for veterans and their families is the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection’, adopted in 1993. This Law does not establish a coherent system of state veterans policy; it regulates matters of status and sets out more than 20 benefits, only a few of which work in practice. The regulation of other aspects of veterans support is scattered across dozens of laws and items of subordinate legislation. This leads to the duplication of provisions, gaps in legal regulation and difficulties in accessing services and support.

A further problem is the absence of a legally regulated mechanism for the transition from military service to civilian life. As a result, veterans often face difficulties in accessing medical assistance, mental and psychological support, professional retraining, employment, the launch of their own business, the receipt of social services and participation in community life.

The situation is compounded by insufficient coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies, healthcare institutions, employment services and other actors that provide services to veterans.

The existing system does not take into account the importance of communities as the principal actor in delivering veterans’ reintegration measures. There is also uneven access to services depending on the community of residence, a shortage of trained specialists — particularly in psychological support, rehabilitation and social care — and the insufficient adaptation of many state services to the specific needs of veterans.

The need to create a comprehensive state veterans policy and a system for the transition from military service to civilian life is reflected in the Veterans Policy Strategy until 2030.

The need to develop a comprehensive state veterans policy corresponds to Ukraine’s commitments in the spheres of social policy, employment and inclusion within the process of accession to the European Union.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 Report points to the need to promote the integration of veterans into the labour market and to safeguard the rights of persons with disabilities, whose number is growing as a result of the war.

The need to develop a comprehensive system of support for veterans and their reintegration is also noted in the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) briefing ‘Ukraine’s Veterans Policy’ (2026), which regards veterans as one of the key resources for the country’s post-war recovery.

In June 2026, the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was expanded, addingCouncil of the European Union. ‘EUAM Ukraine: Council broadens the Mission’s mandate to counter hybrid threats and support veteran reintegration’. Press release, 11 May 2026. EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). ‘EUAM Ukraine Starts Operating under Expanded Mandate’. News release, 15 May 2026. new priorities to its work that include support for the rehabilitation and reintegration of veterans.

At the same time, the Ukraine Facility Plan expressly provides for a reform of the transition from military service to civilian life, encompassing rehabilitation, psychological support, professional retraining, employment and support for veteran entrepreneurship, with a completion deadline in the third quarter of 2026.

• a fragmented and outdated model of veterans support oriented towards a system of benefits and payments;
• limited access to medical and rehabilitation care and to mental health support and psychosocial support;
• reduced employment and economic self-sufficiency owing to the underdevelopment of employment and entrepreneurship-support mechanisms;
• heightened risks of social exclusion, deterioration of psycho-emotional wellbeing and the loss of human capital;
• ineffective use of veterans’ potential for economic recovery, community development and strengthening societal resilience;
• the persistence of fragmented regulation and insufficient coordination among authorities, local self-government and service providers;
• a mismatch with contemporary international approaches to veterans policy and the reintegration of veterans.

In March 2025, Law of Ukraine No. 4285-IX was adopted, setting out priorities for creating a system of support for war veterans, members of their families and the families of fallen Defenders of Ukraine, in particular through the streamlining of veterans policy.

These priorities are to be implemented in a corresponding legislative act. Several draft acts have been developed so far: the draft Law of Ukraine ‘On the Fundamental Principles of State Veterans Policy regarding Veterans Who Took Part in Repelling the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ (registration No. 13696, dated 25 August 2025). The draft was prepared to implement step 7.4 of the Ukraine Facility Plan.

In parallel, the Government has drafted the Code of Ukraine on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (the Veterans’ Code) (registration No. 14265, dated 28 November 2025), which aims to codify legislative acts into a single legal instrument.

The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights has prepared its own (alternative) version of the draft Code on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (registration No. 14265-1, dated 17 December 2025).

All of the above draft legislative acts enshrine veterans’ rights in the areas of:

• rehabilitation and medical care, including psychological assistance;
• training, retraining and professional development programmes;
• the conditions necessary for the employment of veterans as a distinct category;
• measures to support veteran businesses.

Persistence of a Fragmented Veterans Policy System

Legislation in the veterans sphere remains scattered across a large number of laws and items of subordinate legislation. In the absence of a comprehensive legislative act, individual aspects of support for veterans and their families continue to be governed by different instruments.

This creates risks of:

• duplication of the functions and powers of public authorities;
• inconsistency among state veterans-support programmes;
• difficulty for veterans in accessing services and support programmes;
• the uneven application of state policy at community level.

Absence of a Coherent System for Transition from Military Service to Civilian Life

Despite the development of individual veterans-support programmes, Ukraine still lacks a legally defined, coherent system for the transition from military service to civilian life that would ensure continuous support for a service member both before and after their discharge.

This increases the risk that:

• veterans will not receive timely information about available services and support;
• veterans’ needs in the spheres of rehabilitation, mental health, education and employment will go unidentified;
• state and local support programmes will operate in isolation from one another;
• the reintegration of veterans will depend largely on their place of residence and the capacity of the particular community.

Loss of Human Capital and of Potential for the Country’s Recovery

Veterans are one of the key groups on which Ukraine’s post-war recovery will largely depend. The absence of an effective system of support and reintegration may limit veterans’ opportunities for employment, education, entrepreneurial activity and participation in community life.

This creates risks of:

• a decline in veterans’ economic activity;
• increased social isolation;
• growing demand for social support in the future and an excessive burden on the social assistance system;
• the underuse of veterans’ potential for community development and the country’s recovery.

Risk of Failing to Meet Commitments under the Ukraine Facility

The entry into force of a legislative act on state veterans policy is defined as one of the steps of the Ukraine Facility Plan. The purpose of this step is to build a comprehensive system of support for veterans, particularly in the spheres of rehabilitation, medical and psychological assistance, professional adaptation, employment and veteran entrepreneurship.

A delay in adopting or implementing the relevant legislation may:

• complicate the fulfilment of the indicators of the Ukraine Facility Plan;
• negatively affect the assessment of reform progress by European partners.

Short-Term (Urgent Legislative Actions)

• Adopt a legislative act on state veterans policy.

A single legislative act should enshrine the foundations of state veterans policy and create the legal basis for forming a system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

In doing so, it is advisable to:

• define the principles and objectives of state veterans policy;
• establish a system for the transition from military service to civilian life;
• define the powers of state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons involved in ensuring the transition;
• provide for mechanisms to identify the individual needs of veterans and members of their families and to introduce case management approaches;
• ensure inter-agency coordination in the field of veterans support.

Medium-Term

• Establish a fully fledged system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

The introduction of such a system should go beyond individual support programmes and provide for the continuous support of a service member from the moment preparation for discharge begins until the reintegration process is complete, engaging numerous stakeholders and ensuring coordination among them.

In particular:

1. introduce a mechanism for assessing a service member’s needs prior to discharge;
2. define the procedure for inter-agency cooperation between the security and defence sector and civilian authorities;
3. ensure continuity of access to medical, rehabilitation, social, educational and other services;
4. create mechanisms for informing veterans about available support programmes;
5. establish a system of coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons that provide support to veterans and their families.

• Strengthen the role of territorial communities in implementing veterans policy.

The reintegration of veterans takes place primarily at community level, so state policy should provide appropriate tools to support the local level.

To this end, it is advisable to:

1. define minimum standards for supporting veterans in communities;
2. ensure the development of a system of veteran-support specialists;
3. create mechanisms for coordination among communities, veteran spaces and service providers;
4. help strengthen communities’ capacity to provide services to veterans and members of their families.

• Ensure the transition from a benefits model to a model of restoring human capital.

The further development of veterans policy should be aimed not only at social protection but also at creating conditions for veterans’ active participation in the life of the state and communities.

In particular, it is necessary to:

• expand opportunities for vocational education and requalification;
• improve veteran employment-support programmes;
• develop tools to support veteran entrepreneurship;
• ensure the necessary level of health recovery;
• integrate mental health issues into all stages of reintegration;
• introduce mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of state veterans policy on the basis of veterans’ outcomes and needs.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

European integration assessmentThis refers to (1) the assessment of a draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s international commitments in the field of European integration and (2) the verification of a draft law’s compliance with EU law (the EU acquis). is designed to verify whether a draft law complies with European Union law (the EU acquis). Such an assessment makes it possible to evaluate how far the proposed regulation aligns with the relevant act of EU law and to identify, in good time, provisions that may conflict with EU law and slow down the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation.

The obligation to carry out European integration assessment of draft laws is set out in several legal acts of differing legal force, each governing different stages of the legislative process. This approach does not foster a single, unified mechanism for conducting European integration assessment, since its individual elements are regulated in different ways.

Parliamentary assessment is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (hereinafter, the Committee on European Integration). Current legislation does not oblige other committees to respond to the observations and proposals set out in the Committee’s opinions. The absence of any statutory definition of a ‘European integration draft law’, or of the criteria for one, limits the scope for the relevant committee to carry out European integration assessment.

The requirement to assess draft laws for compliance with international commitments on European integration and with EU law is established by several legal acts.

Law of Ukraine No. 1629-IV ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004, remains in force. Law No. 1629-IV provides for the mandatory assessment of all draft laws by the parliamentary committee on European integration. The committee is required to determine whether a draft law falls within an area, the legal relations of which are governed by EU law. Draft laws falling within such areas are referred to the authorised central executive authority for the preparation of an expert opinion on their compliance with the EU acquis.

This Law, however, has not been amended following the enshrinement of the European integration course in the Constitution of Ukraine or the granting to Ukraine of EU candidate status. In practice, although the Law remains formally in force, it is not applied.

Instead, the assessment of European integration laws is governed by several other acts. A draft law initiated by the Government undergoes assessment before it is even registered in Parliament. The Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers require every draft law to undergo a mandatory assessment of its compliance with Ukraine’s European integration commitments and with EU law.

Assessment of European integration laws is provided throughout a draft law’s passage through the Verkhovna Rada: from registration to consideration in the second and subsequent readings.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that, after registration, every draft law must be referred to the Committee on European Integration, which assesses the draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s commitments in the field of European integration and issues an expert opinion. The Committee is required to deliver this opinion within 21 days. In practice, given the volume of draft laws registered in Parliament, meeting this requirement of the Rules of Procedure is unrealistic. Since the start of the ninth convocation, more than 9,000 draft laws have been registeredAs at 01.06.2026, 9,145 draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. in the Verkhovna Rada.

In July 2022, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which provided for additional assessment of European integration draft laws. When preparing such draft laws for the second and subsequent readings, parliamentary committees are required to refer them to the Committee on European Integration and to the Government for additional assessment.

As a result, the mechanism for European integration assessment of draft laws is established by acts of differing legal force, which undermines the development of a consistent practice in assessing European integration draft laws. Moreover, neither the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada nor Resolution No. 2483-IX places main committees any obligation to respond to the observations expressed in the expert opinions of the Committee on European Integration.

At the same time, legislation contains no definition of what constitutes a European integration draft law, which somewhat diminishes the role of such assessment. A draft law may be designated as a European integration draft law at different stages of its passage through the Verkhovna Rada (at registration or after its adoption in the first reading), creating a risk that the relevant committee or the Government may become involved and deliver its opinionFor example, the Committee revised its opinion on Draft Law No. 13071 — determining that the draft law was aimed at implementing a measure under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions — only after the draft law had been adopted in the first reading and after the comparative table for the second reading had been submitted. The Committee on European Integration had not provided an opinion before the first reading. Draft law card, registration No. 13071 of 11.03.2025. only at a late stage. Where a draft law is revised after it has been designated as a European integration draft law, bringing it into line with EU law may require additional time.

For a long time, draft laws were designated as ‘European integration’ by the Committee on European Integration, acting at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative. In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to Membership of the European Union’, which provides that the special ‘European integration’ marker is assigned by the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Law of the European Union. Other draft laws may acquire ‘European integration’ status on the basis of an opinion of the Committee on European Integration.

Whether or not a draft law has been designated as a European integration draft law determines the extent of the Committee on European Integration’s involvement. If a draft law prepared for the second reading is, in substance, contrary to EU law but has not been designated as a European integration draft law, the Committee on European Integration has no right to deliver its opinion.

To strengthen the role of European integration assessment in the consideration and adoption of draft laws in the Verkhovna Rada, the following steps are needed:

• Unify the European integration assessment process across all stages of a draft law’s consideration in Parliament, preferably by introducing a dedicated procedure for the adoption of European integration draft laws.
• Define the concept of, and the requirements for, a ‘European integration draft law’. This would help to resolve the uncertainty surrounding which draft laws are subject to European integration assessment.
• Expand the powers of the Committee on European Integration to conduct assessment at all stages of the legislative process. Assessing every draft law prepared for the second and subsequent readings would be impractical given the Committee’s heavy workload. Instead, the Committee could be granted the right to conduct European integration assessment of draft laws (that have not been designated as European integration draft laws) on its own initiative or at the request of the main committee. Other committees should develop a mechanism for responding to the opinions of the Committee on European Integration — for example, by considering such opinions at committee meetings.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Following the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada were extended, defining the principles for implementing the state’s course towards acquiring full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO. At the same time, no amendments have been made to the sectoral lawsThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of the People’s Deputy of Ukraine’, and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Temporary Investigative Commissions and Temporary Special Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’. that would clarify the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the sphere of European integration.

The role and powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the European integration process are regulated only in a fragmentary manner, which prevents the formation of a coherent system of institutional arrangements for EU accession.

As the sole body of legislative power, Parliament adopts laws, including European integration laws. However, the pace at which such laws are adopted is slow: over the course of 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted only eightAs of 17.06.2026. European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate, expedited procedure for adopting European integration laws.

Within its oversight function, the Verkhovna Rada applies certain mechanisms to scrutinise the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the sphere of European integration: holding a ‘Government Question Time’For example, on 01.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the current state of the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, the opening of negotiation clusters, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of European integration, and the implementation of the list of priority draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 01.05.2026. On 29.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the implementation of state policy in the sphere of Ukraine’s foreign-policy activity under martial law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 29.05.2026. or hearing representatives of the GovernmentOn 29 April 2026, a meeting of the Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy was held. Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. At the meeting on 06.05.2026, the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy heard information at its meeting on the principal commitments within the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the EU relating to finance, taxation and customs policy. Materials of the Committee meeting of 6 May 2026. Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. in committees.

At the same time, there is no coherent legislative mechanism governing how interaction should take place between the Government that currently acts as the principal driving force in the sphere of European integration and Parliament. Certain institutional mechanisms for coordination and procedures for adapting legislation are set out in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004. The Law defined the role of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, of the authorised body in the sphere of adaptation, and of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the State Programme. For example, under this Law, the Coordination Council is to prepare an action plan for implementing the State Programme, the relevant parliamentary committee is to approve it, and the Cabinet of Ministers is to endorse it. However, this Law has not undergone any amendments — neither after the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution, nor after the Association Agreement entered into force, nor after the start of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX on parliamentary support for the negotiation process. By this Resolution, the Verkhovna Rada took note of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘On Approval of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)’ of 01.04.2026 No. 438. It should be noted that measure 2 of strategic outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Public Administration Reform Roadmap provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to adopt a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme., approved by the Government. The Government has an obligation to agree any changes to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law with the Chair of the Verkhovna RadaOr, in the Chair’s absence, with the First Deputy Chair or a Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada..

The Resolution relates rather to the oversight powers of the Verkhovna Rada and provides that the Government must report on progress in the sphere of European integration: (1) inform the Verkhovna Rada, the main committee and the Committee on European integration of the results of consultations with the European Union concerning the content of draft laws being prepared by the Government and of draft laws already registered in Parliament; (2) submit a quarterly report on the state of implementation of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis); (3) submit a quarterly report on the current state of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU; and (4) promptly inform the Verkhovna Rada of decisions taken in respect of Ukraine by EU bodies and of the individual positions of member states, and so on. At the same time, this approach to providing information can hardly be described as inclusive or transparent: Resolution No. 4912-IX does not provide for the consideration of the reports submitted by the Government (whether by the relevant committee or at a plenary sitting of Parliament).

Resolution No. 4912-IX also placesThe National Adaptation Programme also comprises the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, and the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine. the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada under an obligation to ensure coordination of the Verkhovna Rada and its Secretariat with regard to (1) implementing the measures of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (in respect of Section III, ‘The Functioning of Parliaments in a Democratic System’); and (2) the procedure for working with the National Adaptation Programme.

Within the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union is in operation. It is this Committee that carries out the parliamentary assessment of draft laws for compliance with Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the sphere of European integration and with the EU acquis. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that this Committee prepares an opinion on every draft law registered in Parliament.

In addition, pursuant to Resolution No. 2483-IX, the Committee on European Integration also assesses European integration draft laws ahead of the second and subsequent readings, which increases the workload on the Committee. The Chair of the Committee has repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the Committee’s staffing capacity. The Committee’s powers also include granting a draft law ‘European integration’ status, at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative.

Within its oversight powers, the Committee holds monitoring meetings. For example, in April 2026, the Committee held a meeting, where the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law was presented.

At the same time, the Committee has not been designatedThis is due to the distribution of areas of competence among the committees of the Verkhovna Rada. For example, a draft law concerning the protection of natural resources is considered by the Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management; one concerning the activities of political parties, by the Committee on Legal Policy; one concerning customs policy, by the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy, and so on — even though such draft laws may be European integration ones. as the main committee for the preparation of any European integration draft law, which means that the weight of its assessment in the legislative process depends largely on the position of the main committee and its willingness to respond to the comments of the relevant committee. The draft laws that the Committee on European Integration considers as the main committee mostly concern the ratification of Ukraine’s international treaties with the EU and its member states.

In July 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX, which provided for the establishment of European integration subcommittees in all parliamentary committeesNamely, subcommittees on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of EU law (EU acquis) and on the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international legal commitments in the sphere of European integration. (other than the Committee on European Integration).

Committees took two approaches: most established new subcommittees, while a smaller number assigned the new areas of competence to existing subcommittees. As of 2026, such subcommittees have been created within all committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; however, Members of Parliament rate their effectiveness as low.

Members of such a subcommittee take part in the meetings of the relevant Committee on European Integration and also hold meetings with the Government on European integration progress. At the same time, these subcommittees have not been given any new instruments for their work or for their participation in the European integration process. At the subcommittee level, there are no agreed approaches to assessing draft laws for compliance with the EU acquis, nor appropriate mechanisms for coordination between subcommittees or between a subcommittee and the Government, which results in varying levels of involvement. A subcommittee’s participation in preparing European integration laws often depends on the individual chairing it and on his/hers expertise and activity.

The institutional mechanism associated with the formation and implementation of state policy in the sphere of European integration has not undergone substantial change, despite progress in the negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This creates a gap in the inter-institutional coordination of Parliament and the Government and a mismatch between the political commitments undertaken and the actual capacity to fulfil them. A modern framework law on the principles of state policy in the sphere of European integration could help bridge this gap and ensure the implementation of the declared course towards EU membership.

The mechanism for informing the Verkhovna Rada introduced by Resolution No. 4912-IX should be supplemented with procedures for the mandatory consideration of the Government’s reports on the state of implementation of the National Adaptation Programme and of information on the European integration process. Such reports and information could be considered at meetings of the Committee on European integration, with the involvement of representatives of other committees, or at plenary sittings. These measures should ensure proper feedback and the broader involvement of Members of Parliament, as well as transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making in the sphere of European integration.

The Committee on European Integration should be more closely involved in the process of adopting European integration laws in the Verkhovna Rada. Other parliamentary committees should develop a mechanism to interact with the Committee on European Integration so that its assessment is taken into account when preparing draft laws for consideration at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Verkhovna Rada should also define standards for the operation of the European integration subcommittees and establish their systematic cooperation with the Committee on European Integration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 1 April 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union LawIt is worth noting that Measure 2 of Strategic Outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme. (EU acquis) (hereinafter – the National Adaptation Programme). The document comprises 1,875 tasks, providing for the implementation of more than 1,600 EU legal acts. Ukraine has set the ambitious goal of fully completing legislative adaptation by 2027, taking into account possible transitional periods. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Adaptation Programme.

At the same time, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate procedure for processing and adopting draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law (the EU acquis). Moreover, neither the concept of a European integration draft law nor exhaustive criteria for defining one have been established in legislation.

In the absence of a dedicated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws, their priority consideration is not guaranteed, which may delay the adoption of laws needed to fulfil Ukraine’s European integration commitments. The lack of a legally defined status for European integration draft laws, and of requirements applying to them, complicates the systematic review of draft laws for compliance with EU law.

Developing, adopting and implementing legislation on a dedicated procedure for preparing, initiating, considering and adopting European integration draft laws is one of the Verkhovna Rada’s commitments under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The deadline for this measure was set for the fourth quarter of 2025, yet a separate procedure for adopting European integration laws has still not been established.

MPs have registered several legislative initiatives to address this problem, but none has been considered at a plenary sitting of Parliament. The regulation of procedures for considering European integration draft laws currently remains fragmentary.

For a long time, the key piece of specialised legislation was the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’. This law sets out no separate requirements for adopting European integration laws, but it does provide for the examination of draft laws submitted to Parliament for compliance with the EU acquis at every stage of consideration. However, the law has not been amended in connection with Ukraine’s EU accession process: although it remains formally in force, it is effectively inoperative.

After Ukraine obtained candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which introduced some additional tools for adopting European integration laws.

The Resolution designates the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as the principal initiator of European integration draft laws, although in practice most draft laws aimed at European integration — and marked as such on the draft law’s registration card — have been registered by MPsAs of 01.06.2026, 268 draft laws defined as European integration draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. Of these, 153 were registered by MPs, 104 by the Government and 11 by the President.. Draft laws initiated by MPs account for more than half of all European integration laws adopted.

The adopted National Adaptation Programme designates ministries and central executive authorities as responsible for drafting laws. They submit draft laws to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no later than six months before the date set by the National Adaptation Programme for their adoption by Parliament. In other words, the Government allows a minimum of six months for completing all internal procedures within the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (inter-ministerial approval of the draft law, the conduct of examinations, and so on) and for the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the draft law — which, given the slowdown in Parliament’s work, may be insufficient.

The National Adaptation Programme also provides that, when drafting laws, ministries and central executive authorities must ensure cooperation with parliamentary committees and MPs, in particular by presenting and discussing the concepts of such draft laws at meetings of the relevant committees.

A separate instrument intended to give weight to European integration draft laws is the Legislative Work Plan of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is meant to ensure coordination between Parliament and the Government. For example, the Legislative Work Plan for 2026 contains a separate section listing the European integration draft laws that need to be adoptedIt contains 160 draft laws (41% of the total number of draft laws in the Legislative Work Plan for 2026).. Under this Plan, parliamentary committees were expected to ensure the priority consideration of European integration draft laws. However, the Legislative Work Plan is not a particularly effective planning instrument (for example, Parliament fully implemented only 12% of the 2024 Plan): neither the Government nor Parliament takes it into account in its work.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do not establish separate procedures for adopting European integration draft laws, MPs consider them under the ordinary procedure. The Rules of Procedure allow the use of accelerated proceduresFor example, shortening the deadline for submitting alternative draft laws, or shortening the deadline for submitting amendments and proposals for the second reading. that speed up the consideration of laws. During the 15th sessionThe 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 9th convocation began on 03.02.2026., such procedures were not applied to European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure also allow laws to be adopted as a whole at first reading. During the 15th session, the Verkhovna Rada adopted eight European integration laws, seven of which went throughOne law concerned Ukraine’s accession to the Convention on International Access to Justice. The Verkhovna Rada adopts decisions on the ratification or denunciation of international treaties at first reading, both as a basis and as a whole. the full two-reading procedure.

While the European integration procedure is still not enshrined in the legislation, the Verkhovna Rada is attempting to introduce fragmented innovations through its resolutions.

Resolution No. 2483-IX (adopted in 2022) introduces innovations such as an additional examination of a European integration draft law before the second and subsequent readings, and provides that committees must take into account tables of the draft law’s compliance with EU law as well as the official translation of EU legislation.

Resolution No. 2483-IX also gives preference to considering European integration draft laws under the two-reading procedure. A European integration draft law may be adopted only where there is a positive opinion from the examination conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Given the provisions on additional discussionResolution No. 2483-IX provides for the floor to be given to a representative of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and, at the chair’s discretion, to a representative of the main committee responsible for adapting Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of European Union law (the EU acquis) and for fulfilling Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration., Resolution No. 2483-IX is aimed more at the thorough preparation and consideration of a draft law than at an accelerated procedure for its adoption.

In June 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted another resolution, No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union’^[20]. This Resolution additionally requires the Cabinet of Ministers to inform Verkhovna Rada committees of the outcomes of consultations with the European Union on the content of draft laws being prepared for registration in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as of legislative initiatives already registered.

Resolution No. 4912-IX also provides that draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Adaptation Programme are granted ‘European integration’ status. In addition, other draft laws (including alternative onesThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that draft laws are considered alternative where they contain provisions regulating the same range of issues and, in essence, replicate provisions governing the same social relations.) relating to Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments may be granted such status by decision of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union.

Several draft laws proposing to regulate the process of adopting European integration laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

In November 2022, the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada registered Draft Law No. 8242, which provides for a special procedure for considering European integration draft laws. Under this draft law, European integration draft laws are placed on the agenda without an additional vote and are subject to higher requirements for their supporting documents (such as the inclusion of a translation of the relevant EU legislation and a clause-by-clause compliance table). Draft Law No. 8242 gives priority to applying the two-reading procedure when considering European integration draft laws, and allows the text of draft laws to be revised between readings to reflect the comments set out in the opinions of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union, the Government, and the expert and legal units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat. The main committeeThe main committee responsible for the preparation and preliminary consideration of Draft Law No. 8242 is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. issued an opinion recommending that the Verkhovna Rada adopt this draft law as a basis, but it was not considered at a plenary sitting.

In August and September 2025, MPs registered Draft Law No. 13653 and an alternative to it, Draft Law No. 13653-1. Both draft laws propose amending not only the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but also the Laws of Ukraine ‘On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’ and ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.

There are conceptual differences between the two draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 envisages a leading role for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which approves the National Adaptation Programme and acts as the principal initiator of adaptation draft laws, as well as an accelerated procedure for adopting draft laws. The alternative, Draft Law No. 13653-1, by contrast, strengthens the role of the parliamentary Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union in determining the status of such initiatives and allows for broader participation by MPs.

At the same time, both draft laws shorten the deadlines for submitting alternative draft laws as well as the deadlines for committees to provide their opinions. Both also propose introducing two routes for considering draft laws aimed at European integration: (1) an accelerated route (at first reading), where there are no comments from the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; and (2) the two-reading procedure. Where a draft law is considered under the two-reading procedure, MPs may table amendments and proposals for the second reading only with a justification of how they relate to European integration commitments. The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine prepare an expert opinion on a draft law that has been prepared for the second or repeat second reading.

Both draft laws also include a provision repealing the 2004 Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’.

At the same time, these draft laws do not strike a balance between the speed and the quality of considering European integration draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 provides that, at one stage of consideration, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union must deliver its expert opinion within three days. This period may prove insufficient for providing an expert opinion, particularly for large draft laws and given the committee’s overall workload. Another shortcoming of the draft is the requirement to ‘add’ supporting documents to a draft law if it is recognised as a European integration draft law after registration. In that case, the speed of considering and adopting the draft law will depend on the legislative initiator’s capacity to carry out a swift assessment of compliance with EU law and to prepare a clause-by-clause compliance table.

These draft laws have still not been considered by the main committeeThe committee designated for the preparation and preliminary consideration is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. and therefore cannot be brought to a plenary sitting.

1. The Verkhovna Rada should develop a new draft law, or refine the existing ones, on introducing a separate accelerated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws. It should establish exhaustive criteria for defining draft laws as European integration draft laws, as well as requirements for the supporting documents accompanying such draft laws.
2. For a separate European integration procedure, the abuse of accelerated procedures for considering draft laws must not be permitted. Minimum periods should be set to allow sufficient time for MPs to review draft laws and for the committees and the structural units to provide examination opinions. These periods should take into account the real capacity of the committees and the structural units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat to process the text of a draft law.
3. At the same time, the mere existence of such a procedure does not guarantee the swift processing and consideration of European integration draft laws. A significant proportion of European integration initiatives are still pending under review of the main committees, despite the current provision on their priority processing.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Concept of Reforming Local Self-Government and Territorial Organisation of Power in Ukraine set out, as early as 2014, the objective of achieving an optimal distribution of powers between local self-government bodies (LSGBs) and state authorities. Despite this, the proper delineation of powers between the various levels of public administration remains an open question and has yet to be conclusively resolved. The absence of such delineation sustains the excessive (post-communist) centralisation of public administration, entrenches an ineffective model of power-sharing between central state authorities and LSGBs, undermines the achievements of Ukraine’s decentralisation reform, and does not conform to the European principles governing the distribution of powers across levels of public governance. In practical terms, the lack of delineation gives rise to conflicts of competence, the inefficient use of resources, and the dependence of local self-government on ‘manual’ control from the centre.

The specific problem has been set out in the following documents:

• the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027,which sets the task of bringing into force, by 31 March 2026, legislation delineating powers between LSGBs and state authorities, and between the various levels of public administration, in line with the principles of decentralisation and subsidiarity;
• the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, which establishes commitments: (1) to define the principles for delineating the spheres of competence of the state and of local self-government and (2) to distribute LSGB powers into own and delegated powers by June 2025, and (3) to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine a draft law on delineating the powers of LSGBs of different levels and of LSGBs and executive authorities in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity by August 2025;
• the Public Administration Reform Roadmap (2025), which provides for completing the reform of local self-government and the territorial organisation of power in Ukraine by 31 December 2027 and adopting the corresponding legislation by 31 March 2026.

Entrenching the current model of power-sharing between LSGBs and state authorities, together with the imbalances between the various levels of public administration, creates a set of systemic risks. Specifically, it:

1. makes effective vertical coordination impossible owing to chronic conflicts of competence between levels of authority: the quality of public service delivery becomes secondary, while authorities focus on disputes over the limits of their responsibilities;
2. undermines the very idea of decentralisation: the administrative, financial and resource dependence of LSGBs — driven by the persistence of extensive ‘manual’ control over them by state administrations — devalues the accountability of LSGBs to voters;
3. contributes to a negative assessment of Ukraine’s progress in the EU negotiation process, owing to the late fulfilment of commitments under the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027, the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, the European Commission’s recommendations set out in its report on Ukraine (November 2025), and the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, [АБ1] with regard to regulating the area of multi-level governance.

The problems described above are to be resolved by the government’s draft law ‘On the Principles of Delineation and Distribution of Powers Between Levels of Public Governance’ (No. 14412 of 30 January 2026).

The draft law sets out the framework, principles, conditions and criteria for the delineation and distribution of powers between executive bodies and local self-government bodies. If it is adopted, amendments will be required for a further 158 laws and other legal acts, ultimately establishing the powers of public governance bodies.

Draft Law No. 14412 defines:

• the legal basis and principles for delineating and distributing powers of public governance bodies;
• the levels and bodies of public governance;
• the classification of the powers of public governance bodies;
• the criteria for distinguishing the own and delegated powers of local self-government, as well as the criteria for delineating powers between levels of local self-government;
• the conditions under which the state may delegate powers to LSGBs;
• the specific arrangements for the exercise of powers by executive authorities and LSGBs under martial law or a state of emergency;
• the resourcing of the exercise of powers by public governance bodies;
• the limits of LSGB autonomy in decision-making;
• the accountability of LSGBs for the exercise of their powers.

Draft Law No. 14412 was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted at first reading on 7 April 2026. While it regulates the same matters of local self-government reform and the territorial organisation of power as the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1748 of 12 December 2025, the two documents propose different approaches to classifying the powers of public governance bodies. The government Resolution No. 1748 differentiates between (1) powers of state authorities that cannot be transferred to LSGBs; (2) powers of executive authorities that may be transferred under certain conditions; (3) delegated powers of LSGBs; and (4) own powers of LSGBs. The classification proposed by Draft Law No. 14412 includes (1) functional powers (own, delegated, optional, and those falling within the exclusive competence of the state) and (2) institutional and organisational powers (powers aimed at establishing and providing organisational support for the activities of public governance bodies).

Inconsistency in the legal basis for the activities of the various levels of public governance. Draft Law No. 14412 contains provisions that conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine and with European law, namely: (1) defining by law the manner in which LSGBs perform their own functions; (2) specifying the list of LSGB functions through a legal act of the government or the President rather than through a law; (3) restricting the right of LSGBs to challenge in court the decisions concerning their own powers; and (4) establishing contractual grounds for the joint exercise or delegation of powers. Together with the discrepancies between Draft Law No. 14412 and Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1748 regarding the classification of the powers of public governance bodies, these features create the following risks:

1. a high likelihood that the law will be found unconstitutional, in whole or in part;
2. the emergence of an internally contradictory model of public governance;
3. a slowing of European integration.

Institutional bias in favour of the executive vertical. Draft Law No. 14412 effectively allows the functions of LSGBs to be defined at the level of subordinate legislation (acts of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers), which creates a threat:

• to the balance between the branches of government, in particular by limiting the competence of Parliament and of local councils;
• to the long-term planning of LSGB activities, since subordinate legislation is less stable and predictable than primary law.

Adopting Draft Law No. 14412 without addressing its conceptual inconsistencies would create risks of legal uncertainty and institutional conflict, lay the groundwork for greater centralisation of administration by the executive and the erosion of the positive results of the decentralisation reform, and slow Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Synchronise government decisions with legislative changes in the area of the optimal distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration; align the terminology and the classification of powers used in Draft Law No. 14412 and in government Resolution No. 1748.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on defining the functions of LSGBs through subordinate legislation, and provide that LSGB functions be defined exclusively by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the norms allowing executive authorities to determine the means and procedures by which LSGBs exercise their own powers, leaving communities free to choose their own working methods within the powers conferred on them by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the concept of ‘optional powers’, as it has no equivalent in European law and creates legal uncertainty.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on the contractual redistribution of powers between public authorities, and provide that powers be defined exclusively by law rather than transferred locally through informal arrangements.
• Provide for the resolution of any disputes regarding the exercise of all powers (not only those delegated) through the courts.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• Conduct a functional audit of the system of public powers.
• Develop and enshrine in law a single model for classifying powers.
• Regulate the resourcing for LSGBs’ exercise of delegated powers.
• Institutionalise a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Suspending competitive selection was a necessary step for the civil service system at the start of the full-scale invasion. But what comes next amid martial law, active European integration and a growing staffing crisis? The Agency for Legislative Initiatives presented its vision in the study ‘Staffing of the Civil Service during Martial Law: Needs, Challenges and Prospects’ during a roundtable organised by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on the Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning. Together with MPs of Ukraine, representatives of state institutions and civil society, participants discussed:

• improving the procedure for entry into and service in the civil service;
• restoring competitions for civil service positions and service in local self-government bodies;
• proposals to the relevant Draft Law No. 13478-1, which is currently being prepared for the second reading.

International institutions emphasise that Ukraine shall return to competitive selection based on merit. Lawmakers are focused on meeting these requirements, while civil servants themselves do not always agree with these proposals. This is why the problem of staffing the civil service also needs to be viewed from within.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director for Analytical Work at ALI, said that the study covers such aspects as civil servants’ internal assessment of the current system of selection for civil service positions, their needs and expectations, and possible approaches to addressing the problem of staff selection. In addition, the study contains recommendations on the legal regulation of selection for civil service positions.

The results show that civil servants have adapted to the current staffing model and have limited awareness of the potential benefits of competitive selection:

1. the majority of respondents (57.2%) are satisfied with the absence of competitive procedures, while more than 55% believe that the absence of competitions fully ensures equality of access to positions;
2. some respondents (26.3%) clearly understand the need for competitions and are waiting for them to be restored.

What explains these results? Factors include trust in the results of competitive selection and the uncertain status of civil servants appointed to positions without competitions. Currently, 42.8% of the civil servants surveyed believe that such persons may continue civil service without competition based on the results of performance appraisal.

A separate focus of the study is the prospect of adopting Draft Law No. 13478-1 in the near future. Civil servants’ expectations are rather cautious, but MPs note that restoring competitions is long overdue. Adoption of Draft Law No. 13478-1 on restoring competitive procedures would help fulfil one of the requirements of the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027. Restoring competitions is not only a matter of political expediency but also of evidence-based policy: what problems emerged during the period of simplified procedures, what risks are visible now and which models can work under martial law.

However, the staffing model is not the only factor shaping the professionalism, prestige and staffing stability of the civil service. Working conditions are no less important.

What model for restoring competitions would be fair, realistic and, at the same time, safe for the stability and functionality of the public administration system? It is now important to talk about the phased restoration of competitions, specific features for local self-government bodies and compliance with both Ukrainian realities and international standards.

Read more about ALI’s recommendations, stakeholders’ positions on the relevant draft law and the analysis of the current state and practice of selection for civil service positions under martial law in the new study.

The suspension of competitive selection in early 2022 was a necessary emergency measure for the civil service system in the first months of the full-scale invasion. At the same time, several questions remain open regarding:

1. whether the use of this practice throughout the entire period of the legal regime of martial law is justified;
2. the mechanisms to be introduced to remedy the situation;
3. whether the proposed approaches meet the interests of the target audience — civil servants themselves.

This report seeks to answer these questions.

Throughout martial law, the restoration of competitive procedures for civil service positions has repeatedly prompted active debate. International institutions have emphasised the need for Ukraine to return to merit-based, competitive selection. Lawmakers have focused on meeting these requirements, while the target audience — civil servants themselves — do not always share this view.

This study focuses on civil servants’ internal perspective of the current state of play and prospects for staffing the civil service during the legal regime of martial law, as well as their attitudes, needs and expectations.

The internal assessments and attitudes of the civil service were identified through an anonymous questionnaire survey.

Overall, the survey results indicate that civil servants have adapted to the current staffing model and appear to have limited awareness of the potential advantages of competitive selection. A majority of respondents (57.2%) are comfortable with the absence of competitive procedures and, in some cases, openly opposed their restoration, not only during martial law but more broadly.

At the same time, some respondents clearly recognise the need to restore competitive procedures for civil service positions and expect this step to be taken. They associate such procedures with fair selection, reduced subjective discretion and lower corruption risks in staffing decisions. However, this group accounts for only 26.3% of respondents.

Although the prospect of restoring competitive procedures did not receive broad support, a majority of respondents (51.7%) expressed trust in their results. At the same time, almost one in five respondents does not trust the results of competitive selection. As civil servants themselves explain, this mistrust is based on their own negative experience of taking part in competitive procedures.

This experience has created demand among respondents for improving the quality and transparency of competitions. In this context, civil servants identified areas that could strengthen the effectiveness of the Commission on Senior Civil Service and competition commissions, including:

1. granting commissions the power to select one winner of the competition and the next-ranked candidate, who may take up the position if the winner declines or if the position becomes vacant within one year after the competition — 29.5%;
2. reducing political influence on commission members — 29%;
3. specifying liability for interference in the work of commissions — 22.9%;
4. training commission members in tools for assessing candidates’ professional competence — 22.5%.

Civil servants appointed without competition during martial law are concerned about their future status once competitive selection is restored. Most respondents (42.8%) believe that such persons should be able to continue in civil service without a competition based on the results of performance appraisal, 26.7% — based on the actual length of service and 22.5% — based on a competition under the general procedure. In addition, respondents suggested combining appraisal results with the time actually worked, as well as simplifying competitive procedures for persons who already have some length of service in civil service positions.

38.6% of survey participants stated that continuation of civil service based on a decision of the appointing authority would improve the quality of public administration, as it creates opportunities to retain valuable and experienced staff.

On the one hand, these results may reflect concerns about competitive selection or an unwillingness to spend personal resources, in particular time and effort, on additional preparation for it. On the other hand, the inclination towards this practice may indicate that the civil servants do not perceive the appointing authority’s discretion as a significant risk and, in some cases, even regard it as a potential advantage and an acceptable alternative to competitive selection.

At the same time, the staffing model is not the main factor shaping the professionalism, prestige and stability of the civil service workforce. Working conditions play an equally important role and are currently neither conducive to attracting highly qualified specialists to the civil service nor to retaining current civil servants.

Only 8% of respondents consider civil service employment to be prestigious. Respondents most often mention: (1) excessive workload, which leads to burnout and resignations; (2) low remuneration; (3) frequent changes in the organisational structure of state bodies (changes in structure, staffing tables and staff reductions); (4) instability of the system of central executive bodies (redistribution of powers, reorganisations and changes in subordination or functions of bodies); (5) ineffective decisions and weak management by the political leadership. These factors encourage civil servants to change jobs.

The adoption of Draft Law No. 13478-1 on restoring competitive procedures will contribute to meeting one of the requirements of the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027 and to resolving a number of problems related to forming the workforce, serving in and terminating civil service.

At the same time, civil servants are cautious about the draft law’s ability to improve the situation. Only 4.2% of respondents believe that it will do so, while the largest share (29.2%) assumes that the draft law will help resolve the problems only partially. Every sixth respondent (17.8%) is not familiar with the provisions of Draft Law No. 13478-1 at all. This points to insufficient awareness among civil servants of their prospects for continuing in the civil service and the need to strengthen communication activities to prepare them to work under the renewed conditions.

Despite the sceptical attitude of most respondents towards the restoration of competitive procedures, competitive selection remains a tool with clear advantages over the current procedure for forming the civil service workforce.

A meritocratic approach to staffing increases the value of selection both for the civil servant, who invests personal effort in entering the civil service, and for the state body, which has an interest in retaining a professional selected through competition.

Selecting candidates for civil service positions on a competitive basis can potentially contribute to a more balanced distribution of workload among staff, reducing the risk of situations where some specialists have to compensate for the lack of experience or professional training of newly appointed employees. Therefore, restoring competitions is likely to help reduce staff turnover.

The restoration of competitive selection and clarification of certain conditions for entry into, service in and termination of civil service should not be expected, in themselves, to automatically ensure the recruitment of highly qualified specialists or significantly increase the prestige of the civil service. This requires comprehensive solutions aimed at creating working conditions that would be both attractive and acceptable for potential and current civil servants. This concerns ensuring fair remuneration (respondents mention disgracefully low pay), stability in the system of public authorities and improving the quality of managerial competences and decisions of the political leadership, whose effectiveness is assessed critically by some civil servants.

Restoring competitive procedures is a necessary step, but parallel efforts must continue to develop and implement measures that increase the prestige of the civil service and strengthen the state’s image as a reliable and competitive employer.

Democratic governance and the rule of law are essential components of European integration and of our long-term security and defence capabilities. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives consistently upholds these values and works to implement them within Ukrainian state institutions. Therefore, as part of a delegation of Ukrainian non-governmental organisations, the ALI participated in the First Supplementary Meeting on the Human Dimension organised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Ukraine was represented by Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director for Analytics at the ALI, Ihor Kohut, Director at the Ukrainian Parliamentary Institute, Anastasiia Datsiv, European Integration Advocacy Manager at the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, and Halyna Petrenko, Director of Detector Media.

EU accession requires the implementation of institutional reforms and transparent legislative changes, with the participation of civil society. Responsibility for this lies with the Ukrainian Parliament, whose work is undoubtedly influenced by a number of wartime circumstances. During the panel discussion ‘Parliament’s Lawmaking: Ukraine between the War and European Integration’, ALI and other participants discussed how parliamentary procedures are being adapted during wartime while preserving transparency and accountability. They also exchanged views on the role of civil society in supporting legislative quality, EU acquis alignment, and independent monitoring.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi emphasised that the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation has been working under the conditions of a full-scale war for longer than in peacetime and has gone through several stages of transformation. The first months were characterised by extraordinary speed of decision-making and an exceptionally high level of legislative activity and political unity.

A special focus should be on strengthening Parliament’s ability to operate amid new and existing security challenges and to progress toward the EU, noted Ihor Kohut. Important areas include developing the parliamentary administration and implementing the Roadmap for democratic institutions along with the European Commission’s recommendations on enlargement.

In other words, despite procedural obstacles, the Verkhovna Rada has largely adapted to the conditions of a protracted war and continues to function despite obvious difficulties. What, then, can help the Parliament achieve stability in the current Ukrainian context:

1. Full implementation of a methodology for assessing the legislative impact of draft laws, in conjunction with post-legislative oversight tools, as well as a methodology for gender-sensitive legal expertise of legislative initiatives.
2. Adoption of a law strengthening ethical standards for Members of Parliament.
3. Updating priorities regarding next steps, in particular, the adoption of a new Resolution on parliamentary reform.
4. Inclusion in the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of special procedures and mechanisms in case of the need to operate under extreme (including wartime) conditions.

These recommendations from the ALI will contribute to the consistent improvement of legislative work and to effective legislative support for European integration. In this process, it is important for Parliament to be open to cooperation and dialogue with civil society.

Despite the security risks associated with martial law, the Verkhovna Rada is gradually becoming more open, though it has not yet returned to pre-war levels.

Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings provide a platform for exchange of views between OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions, international organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders to discuss implementation of specific OSCE commitments in the human dimension. In 2026, the OSCE will hold three supplementary human dimension meetings. The first focused on threats to democratic lawmaking and the role of preventive safeguards, the contribution of civil society and independent oversight, and the importance of judicial review and accountability throughout the legislative process.

The series of meetings was organised by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The discussion titled ‘Parliament’s Lawmaking: Ukraine between the War and European Integration’ was held with the support of the Netherlands Helsinki Committee.